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Hungarian Minorities in East Central Europe: 
An Introduction. 
Nandor Dreisziger with Andrew Ludanyi 
In a series of guest lectures at the University of Toronto in 1985, William 
H. McNeill, one of North America's most distinguished historians, sur-
veyed the evolution of the relationship of polyethnicity and national unity 
in the history of mankind.1 His conclusion was that, throughout history, the 
norm of societal existence was the co-habitation of different ethnic groups 
within the individual states that made up the community of nations. In 
ancient times, McNeill observed, "civilized societies" were multi-ethnic as 
foreign conquests, trade and epidemics worked to make them such.2 In the 
period between 1750 and 1920 an ideal emerged that went counter to this 
norm. This was the idea of nations made up of members of the same eth-
nic group. Ironically, this concept gained greatest acceptance in Western 
Europe just at the time when Europeans started expanding overseas, ini-
tiating a mingling of races and cultures on an unprecedented scale.3 This 
experiment in building homogeneous nation states began to ebb after World 
War I, even though some outbreaks of militant nationalism took place later. 
Since 1920, there has been a gradual return to the ideal of polyethnic so-
ciety. Surveying the world today, McNeill sees the increasing mingling 
of peoples, the greater ease of international travel and migration, and the 
growing acceptance again of the concept of multi-ethnic societies.4 
While McNeill's analysis was not designed to deal with the specific 
question of ethnic minorities within states, it implicitly has a great deal to 
say about them and their situation. Hence it is not inappropriate to test 
McNeill's observations about the global situation in light of the realities of 
ethnic groups in a small part of the world—East Central Europe—and in 
particular in the position of one ethnic group there: the Hungarian. Such 
a test will confirm a few of McNeill's observations, but it will also reveal 
that in East Central Europe, especially as far as the situation of Hungar-
ian minorities is concerned, for some time the general trends have been 
going against those that Professor McNeill has observed elsewhere in the 
world. 
East Central Europe is one of the highly "polyethnic" regions of the world. 
Despite the attempt by the peacemakers after the First World War to create 
national states there, most of the states of East Central Europe remain 
multi-ethnic entities. That this is so is largely due to the fact that many 
of these states have sizable Hungarian minorities. In fact, Hungarians 
compose the largest minority populations in a number of states within 
all of contemporary Europe. There are over two million Hungarians in 
Rumania, approximately 660,000 in Czechoslovakia, almost half a million 
in Yugoslavia, about 200,000 in the Carpatho-Ruthenian part of the Soviet 
Ukraine, and about 50,000 in Austria. It might be added that there are also 
some two million Hungarians dispersed throughout the world with many of 
them settled in the United States and Canada, in several Western European 
countries, as well as South America and Australia. This volume will not 
deal with the communities of Magyars in the Hungarian diaspora, not even 
with the Hungarian community of Austria as it is made up in part of people 
who had migrated there from Hungary over the past four decades. It will 
deal with Hungarians who have been born in ancestral Hungarian lands 
which are now part of one or the other of Hungary's socialist neighbours. 
There are three traits of these Hungarian minorities that are worth stress-
ing. One is the fact that minority status was imposed upon them from the 
outside, through border changes affected without plebiscites. This differ-
entiates the members of these Magyar minorities from those of Hungarian 
settlements in the New World for example whose members had assumed 
minority status through more-or-less voluntary migration (and here we do 
not mean to deny that some of these migrants fled East Central Europe to 
save their lives). The second characteristic of Hungarian minorities in East 
Central Europe is the fact that their birth is a fairly recent development, hav-
ing occurred in the aftermath of World War I, in living memory of the older 
generation. A third, and perhaps even more important trait of these minori-
ties, is the fact that a large percentage of them are "border" minorities: their 
members live in territories abutting the borders of Hungary. This last factor 
makes Hungarian minorities potential irredentas, a fact which can engender 
a great deal of political insecurity in the countries where they exist. 
The states that received these large Hungarian minorities from the hands 
of the peacemakers in 1920 were the so-called successor states: newly 
created Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and enlarged Rumania. In the 
interwar period these countries failed (to a greater or lesser extent) to abide 
by the treaties they had signed after the war promising to respect the rights 
of their minorities.5 This resulted in conditions which weakened the political 
stability of the whole region. The stability of East Central Europe was also 
lessened by the dissatisfaction of the ethnic groups that had felt wronged 
in the peace settlement (the Hungarian, Ukrainian, and the Bulgarian). 
Majority-minority relations in the region became more and more tense 
which made the nations of East Central Europe easy prey for Nazi-German 
expansion. 
The Second World War brought important changes in the situation of the 
Hungarian minorities in East Central Europe, even though it brought few 
significant changes in the territorial arrangements that had been imposed in 
the Carpathian Basin in the wake of the First World War. First of all, the 
establishment of Soviet control over East Central Europe in the wake of 
World War II put the "nationality question" there into a new political and 
ideological context. Marxism-Leninism, as practiced in the Soviet Union, 
became the "guiding light" for the solution of all ethnic and national fric-
tion within the expanded empire of the U.S.S.R. Moreover, the war, and 
the post-war peace treaties and population transfers, profoundly affected 
the ethnic make-up and, in particular, the minority profile of East Central 
Europe, or Eastern Europe as some prefer to call the socialist countries be-
tween Central Europe and the U.S.S.R. (Poland Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
Rumania, Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria). Leszek Kosinski has pointed 
out that in 1930 Eastern Europe had 94 million inhabitants of whom 24 
million lived in minority status (24 percent of the total population, i.e. every 
fourth person). In 1960, these same states had a population of 99 million, 
out of which only 7.1 million were members of minorities (7.2 percent of 
the total population, that is every 14th person).6 
This changed demographic balance between minority and majority pop-
ulations in East Central Europe had significant adverse implications for 
the survival prospects of Hungarian minorities there. Hungarians remain 
(besides Albanians) the only numerically significant minority people in the 
region (if we assume that Slovaks, Croats, etc., are power-sharing eth-
nic groups within their respective countries rather than simple minorities). 
Moreover, they have become minorities without allies or friends. In the 
interwar years Germany demanded minority protection for the Germans of 
East Central Europe, the Soviet Union for the White Russians and Ukraini-
ans, and the Zionists of the West, for the Jews. This situation had enabled 
Hungarians to form alignments with one or the other of these ethnic groups 
and even with their protectors. But, after World War II, this kind of a united 
front against minority persecution was no longer a viable option. Form-
ing alliances for the protection of minorities has become difficult if not 
impossible in Soviet-controlled East Central Europe for another reason. 
There, the fate of minorities became governed by the principles of pro-
letarian internationalism, bringing central control, one party rule, and the 
subjugation of the individual to the state. In this new political context, 
alignments within bourgeois parliaments, and other means through which 
pluralistic societies provide protection for ethnic, religious or occupational 
groups or minorities, were no longer possible. But Soviet rule after 1945 
brought dangers that were specific for the Hungarian minorities. The Rus-
sian leaders looked upon Magyars as non-Slavs, and as an enemy people 
who had fought against Russia in both world wars, and especially, in the 
Great Patriotic War. Soviet rule, moreover, brought the isolation of Hun-
garian minorities from Hungary, as well as from the West, and even from 
each other, making them much more vulnerable to pressure from the cen-
tral (majority) authorities. Soviet domination also meant the weakening 
or even the destruction of social and religious institutions that in the past 
had acted as spokesmen for minorities, or had given them hope and so-
lace. The destruction of a free press, the reduction of the influence of the 
churches, the elimination of voluntary organizations of the villagers, have 
all contributed to the increased vulnerability of Hungarian minorities in 
most East Central European states. The economic malaise that Soviet rule 
and Marxist economic practices have brought to this part of the world have 
also had their negative effect: it led to the pauperization of all segments 
of society, and especially the middle class to which many Hungarians be-
longed in some regions, such as urban Transylvania. And poverty makes 
all citizens—members of minorities and majorities alike—more dependent 
on the state. 
After these comments on the situation of Hungarian minorities in East 
Central Europe in general, it is necessary to pay a little attention at least to 
the particular conditions that govern their situation in the individual East 
Central European or East European countries. This is necessary as basic 
conditions facing these minorities vary a great deal from one East European 
state to another.7 
In Czechoslovakia there exists a Hungarian minority that should be cul-
turally dynamic, given its size and its geographic concentration along the 
southern border of Slovakia (as well as within many tightly knit village 
communities), yet there are factors that sap this minority's cultural dy-
namism, restrict the group's development, and cast dark clouds over its 
prospects. The most important of these factors is a basic one: the Hungar-
ians of Czechoslovakia live in the territory of one of the principal ethnic 
groups making up the country: the Slovaks. The Magyars of this Czech-
Slovak state are an ethnic group within the living body of another ethnic 
group, jealous of its present status and concerned about its prospects. It 
should be explained that Slovaks, after having lived for centuries under 
Hungarian rule, and decades under that of the Czechs, developed a resilient, 
even a militant form of nationalism. They had feared for their cultural sur-
vival for generations, and they continue to feel threatened by what they see 
as potential Hungarian irredentism or, possibly, an alliance of their coun-
try's non-Slovak ethnic groups (i.e., mainly the Czechs and Hungarians) 
against themselves aimed at keeping Slovaks "in their place." In Slovakia 
Hungarians (both the autochthonous types and visitors from Hungary) are 
openly resented. They are looked upon as the former "cruel" masters of 
the Slovaks, and as members of the nation whose armed forces had assisted 
the U.S.S.R. in crushing the "Prague spring" experiment in 1968 (tending 
to forget that Hungarians had little choice in this matter). Furthermore, 
Slovakia, like all of Czechoslovakia since that fateful year, has been a 
"hard-line" communist police state. In such a state the authorities—and, 
in the matter of cultural policy this means the Slovak party hierarchy—can 
utilize the unlimited powers of the state security forces to impose their will 
on any minority living under their jurisdiction. 
The Hungarian minority of the U.S.S.R. exists in a somewhat differ-
ent situation, even though its prospects for cultural survival are similarly 
dim. In the context of the politics of the Soviet Union, a huge multina-
tional empire, the Magyar minority is insignificant. Within the political 
affairs of the Western Ukraine, and in the context of Ukrainian versus So-
viet or Russian nationalism, and Ukrainian versus Ruthenian particularism, 
the Hungarians of Ruthenia assume much greater significance. Unlike the 
Magyars of Slovakia, those of Ruthenia can hardly be regarded as irre-
dentists capable of jeopardizing the territorial integrity of the U.S.S.R., or 
even the Ukrainian S.S.R. But the question of which other ethnic group in 
the region (the all-Ukrainian nationalists or some Ruthenian particularists) 
would have the Magyar's sympathy and support can hardly be ignored by 
the political and cultural elite of the Western Ukraine. For this particular 
Hungarian minority, the advent of the age of Mikhail Gorbachev seems 
to have brought immediate changes. The increased opportunities for cul-
tural self-expression that glasnost has given to many minorities has had a 
positive impact on the Hungarians of Ruthenia—as Professor S.B. Vardy 
points out in the conclusion of his paper. The new political atmosphere in 
the U.S.S.R. has also served to enhance Ukrainian as well as other partic-
ularisms, and has fueled minority aspirations everywhere. With prospects 
for Ukrainian self-determination growing, and the possibility of the prin-
ciple of the "separate roads to communism" being applied to some extent 
even within the U.S.S.R., the Magyars of Ruthenia might conceivably be 
facing the same situation as they do in Slovakia. That is, they might be 
abandoned by the central authorities to an even greater extent than they 
have been in the past and be placed at the mercy of an ethnic group more 
jealous of its influence and more concerned with its own cultural survival 
than the Russians. 
There can be no doubt that the saddest situation of all of East Central 
Europe's Hungarian minorities is that of the one in Rumania. In view 
of its size and its geographical disposition in mainly Hungarian-populated 
regions, this Hungarian minority should be the most viable, the most dy-
namic and should have the best prospects for cultural survival. However, 
given the political situation in Rumania, the traditions of the Rumanian 
nation, and the attitudes of Rumania's present regime, even this very large 
Hungarian minority is threatened with cultural extinction. One of the most 
important factors is the following: the Magyars of Rumania, unlike those of 
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and, especially, the U.S.S.R, live in a state in 
which they constitute the only truly large ethnic minority (tens of thousands 
of ethnic Germans, and thousands of Jews having emigrated from Rumania 
in recent decades to West Germany and Israel respectively). As a result 
of this, they have no possible political allies in their struggle for minority 
rights. At the same time, they are considered by many Rumanians—and 
obviously by the country's regime—as constituting the main internal threat 
to the country's security. 
Indeed, Rumania seems to be the classic example of a state with a most 
insecure elite, as such insecurity is defined by ethnic and military affairs 
specialist Dr. Cynthia H. Enloe. She describes this situation in her book 
Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in Divided Societies: 
When state elites feel most insecure and when that sense of insecurity 
(i.e. the feeling that state institutions are ineffective, . . . ) stems in 
significant measure from perception of ethnically based dissidence or 
withdrawal, then the penetration of the state into all ethnic communi-
ties is the greatest.8 
The distrust of Hungarians by Rumanians is coupled with a legacy of 
hatred that Rumanians have felt toward Hungarians—their former masters 
and social betters in Transylvania—for several centuries. It was this hatred 
that evidently made it easier for Rumania's leaders to invade Hungary 
four times in living memory (in 1916, 1918, 1919, and 1944), and it is 
this deep-rooted resentment by Rumanians of anything Hungarian that no 
doubt enables Rumania's present regime to maintain a singularly repressive 
minority policy in the country. As at least two of the studies in this volume 
point out, this resentment against Hungarians by Rumanians is deliberately 
and systematically fostered by the country's current regime. 
In recent years, of all the Hungarian minorities in East Central Europe, 
the one in Yugoslavia enjoyed the best situation and had the best (rela-
tively speaking) prospects for cultural survival. This fact is due mainly to 
Yugoslavia's particular ethnic and constitutional make-up. The country is 
a federal state made up of several ethnic groups. In recent decades, its 
politics have been based more on a political stalemate among the various 
republics representing the principal ethnic groups than the domination of 
one group (historically the Serbian) over the others. The vast majority 
of the Magyars in Yugoslavia are within the Serbian republic. But even 
within this constituent part of Yugoslavia there are other minorities, the 
most notable of these being the Albanians. 
This complex situation has tended to benefit the Hungarians, at least 
in the recent past. It provides for the formation of alignments among 
ethnic groups. It threatens any ethnic group aspiring to hegemony with 
the prospect of a hostile alliance of other ethnic groups. This is certainly 
true in the all-Yugoslav context, but might also apply, to some extent at 
least, in the context of the politics of Serbia. Furthermore, in Yugoslavia— 
unlike in Czechoslovakia and, especially, Rumania—no ethnic group or 
political elite needs to fear Hungarian irredentism, or consider Hungarians 
a threat to the extent of their political influence. Yugoslavia has enough 
irredentist problems in places other than the Hungarian border to have to 
worry about a possible threat that the Magyars could pose. Thus, no major 
ethnic group or political faction in the country needs to feel the necessity 
for the accelerated assimilation of the Hungarians. Further, some ethnic 
groups might decidedly oppose the idea of assimilating the Magyars into 
the already large and influential Serb nation. These factors tend to outweigh 
those that might threaten the position of the Magyar minority (such as a 
tradition of hostility between Magyar and Serb). 
As part of the conclusion to this introductory essay, it might be worth 
returning to Professor William McNeill 's observations about polyethnicity 
in world history and test it against the realities of the East Central European 
situation. From time immemorial, East Central Europe has been a meeting 
place of peoples. In recent centuries, Slavs, Germans, Rumanians, and 
Hungarians had co-existed there—along with some smaller groups—though 
not always in harmony. They had formed a bewildering array of settlements 
or "ethnic islands." This situation continued in East Central Europe, in 
particular in the Hungarian half of the Habsburg Empire, even during the 
nineteenth century, at a time when the concept of the homogeneous nation 
state had gained greater and greater acceptance in Western Europe. This 
"barbarous ideal"—to use the words of McNeill—did gain adherents in 
nineteenth century East Central Europe (including Hungary), but it was not 
really inflicted upon East Central Europe with particular vehemence until 
the end of World War I, precisely at the time when, according to McNeill, 
the tide began to turn and the world began its return to the "polyethnic 
norm." In particular, the idea of unitary nation states was applied to East 
Central Europe by the peacemakers. They saw polyethnic Hungary as an 
anachronism and divided much of her among her neighbours. They meant 
(or pretended) to create mainly homogeneous nation states, and ended up 
establishing multi-ethnic ones. In this process they managed to create 
present-day Europe's largest minorities. 
As a result of the work of the peacemakers, but contrary to their pro-
fessed intentions, polyethnicity increased in East Central Europe. As al-
ready emphasized, this was the result of external intervention and not the 
consequence of natural processes that McNeill sees at work in the world 
since 1920. Furthermore, the events of 1918-20 failed to set a trend in East 
Central Europe as far as the growth of polyethnicity is concerned. In the 
seventy years since then, however, the region has become less rather than 
more polyethnic. Much of this reduction in polyethnicity has resulted from 
the expulsion or near-extermination of some minorities during and after 
World War II, but in recent decades it has been enhanced by the forced 
assimilation policies of some East European regimes. 
The natural processes that McNeill sees increasing polyethnicity in the 
world, such as the unrestricted intermingling of peoples brought on in 
part by the policies of free emigration practiced by democratic countries, 
are largely absent in East Central Europe. There, ruling elites jealous of 
their position and power, tend to resist the free intermingling of peoples 
and forbid trans-boundary migration. Moreover, some of these same elites 
adhere to that "barbarous ideal" of the homogeneous nation state with 
greater zeal than their misguided nineteenth century predecessors. In fact, 
in countries such as Rumania, this idea is elevated to the highest of state 
priorities and is pursued with ruthlessness possible only in a totalitarian 
society. 
Trends in East Central Europe then, go counter to what exist elsewhere in 
the world. While advanced industrialized nations seek economic advantage, 
the backward regimes of Eastern Europe pursue discredited, "barbarous" 
ideals. Moreover, while the citizens of the former nations bask in prosper-
ity, the subjects of the latter—and especially their minority peoples—suffer 
poverty and persecution. 
In analyzing the world situation, McNeill has paid little attention to East 
Central Europe. After all, as the decades pass and as other regions of the 
world come into influence and prominence, that part of Europe has become 
less and less significant. Its economic troubles, cultural stagnation, and its 
backward political system—based on an outdated and inflexible ideology— 
relegate East Central Europe to the backwaters of world civilization, a 
region fit to be ignored. Alas, the by-product of this trend to ignore this 
part of the world is the tendency to forget the sufferings of its peoples, 
especially, the plight of its minorities. It is hoped that the publication of 
this collection of studies will help to counteract this tendency, that it will 
remind scholars and lay readers alike of the need to provide more detailed 
and more accurate information on the situation of East Central Europe's 
minorities to the public and leaders of the industrialized world. 
Most of the studies featured in this volume are based on, or are the expanded 
and revised versions of papers that were given at a memorial conference 
held at Oberlin College in Oberlin, Ohio, on November 7-9, 1985. The 
gathering was held in honour of the 110th anniversary of the birth of Oscar 
Jaszi (1875-1957), the noted turn-of-the-century Hungarian thinker and 
politician who ended his career as a professor at Oberlin College. 
Jaszi (in Hungarian Jaszi) was a highly appropriate choice for being 
honoured by a conference dealing mainly with Hungarian minorities. He 
was a Hungarian who had devoted many of his works to the examination 
of the question of ethnic relations—"polyethnicity" one might say, though 
the term does not crop up in his writings—both in his native Kingdom of 
Hungary and, after that country's dismemberment after World War I, in the 
successor states. Indeed, a few of Jaszi's works deal, much like Professor 
McNeill's Polyethnicity but in far greater detail, with the relationship of 
ethnic minorities and states in world history.9 Jaszi was not only an expert 
on ethnic and minority questions, but he was also a philosophical interna-
tionalist, a true believer in East Central European federalism—as a possible 
beginning for a world federation of nations.10 
The papers that were given at the Oscar Jaszi Memorial Conference in 
Oberlin were divided into two groups. Those that dealt with Jaszi as a 
thinker and politician will be published elsewhere, while those dealing— 
directly or indirectly—with Hungarian minorities in socialist East Central 
Europe are published in our volume. Of these papers Walker Connor's is 
the broadest in scope. It treats the approach of communist thinkers and 
statesmen to the nationality problem. This paper outlines the tenets of 
Marxist-Leninist ideology regarding ethnic relations, and examines to what 
extent these ideological considerations have determined communist practice 
in dealing with minorities, and also, to what extent communist states have 
been successful in dealing with issues of minority-majority relations. This 
paper places the rest of the studies in this volume, those dealing with 
Hungarian minorities directly, into a broader, theoretical context. 
Connor's study is followed by papers with specific themes covering or at 
least touching on the past and recent situation of the individual Hungarian 
minorities in East Central Europe. The situation of the Hungarian minority 
in Czechoslovakia is introduced by Magda Adam, a member of the Hun-
garian Academy of Sciences. Her chapter in this volume is excerpted from 
a larger study that dealt with the ethnic-awareness of the Hungarian mi-
norities in the socialist countries of East Central Europe as revealed in their 
media. According to our information, this study had been commissioned 
for Hungary's communist party, and for some time was restricted in its 
circulation. The excerpts that are printed here serve to give an overview of 
the fate of Hungarians in Slovakia and offer a taste of the problems faced 
by them and their cultural institutions.11 To round out the subject of the 
Hungarian minority of Czechoslovakia, the third paper in this volume deals 
with the problems of Magyar ethnic schools in that country in recent years. 
This paper is by Professor Karoly Nagy, and it tells the story of attempts by 
Slovakia's leaders during the 1980s to restrict access to minority schooling 
for Hungarians in Slovakia. The paper also outlines the case of Miklos 
Duray, a dissident who took upon himself to lead a movement of protest 
against these measures. 
The volume's next chapter is devoted to the fate of the Hungarian mi-
nority in the Carpatho-Ruthenian region of the U.S.S.R. This is done in a 
detailed historical study written by Professor S.B. Vardy. His work is a 
case study of the Soviet Union's efforts to be the Soviet bloc's "guiding 
light" in the realm of Marxist nationality policies. The following chapter, 
by Andrew Ludanyi, is an examination of the Yugoslav variation in the 
communist treatment of minorities. It traces the history of the Hungarian 
community of Yugoslavia and Yugoslav policies toward this group from 
the interwar period through World War II and the Tito era. This work is 
an amplification of communist nationality policy as implemented by the 
regime that pioneered the practice of taking the "separate road" to social-
ism. Ludanyi's paper is followed by studies dealing with the Hungarians of 
Rumania or with books that touch on this minority group. Louis J. Elteto, 
in particular, examines the consequences of a total breakdown in tolerance 
toward minorities. Through the examination of popular Rumanian liter-
ature and the way it pictures Hungarians, Elteto outlines the Ceausescu 
regime's practice of using minorities as scapegoats for Rumania's troubles. 
The volume ends with Thomas Szendrey's in-depth review of the recently 
published multi-volume history of Transylvania. This review outlines the 
international controversy that followed the publication of this work. 
Dramatic changes have taken place in East Central and Eastern Europe 
while this volume was being prepared. Some of the chapters were revised 
to take these events into consideration, only to be rendered outdated by still 
newer developments. With the situation in that part of the world changing 
day-by-day during the second half of 1989, it became evident that this 
volume could not be an overview of the "current" state of affairs, but only 
a guide to understanding its background. 
The changes that East Central Europe has experienced while this volume 
was in its gestation period have their roots in the decision of the Soviet 
leadership, particularly Mikhail Gorbachev, to embark on a new course of 
reforms. This new era of Soviet policy had momentous implications for the 
situation of Hungarian minorities of East Central Europe. Some of these 
were direct and some were indirect in nature. Gorbachev's new approach 
to Soviet politics has resulted in a veritable revolution in the ethnic politics 
of the U.S.S.R. The changes introduced have resulted in a dramatic trans-
formation of the situation of the Hungarian minority of Carpatho-Ruthenia. 
From being one of the most stunted and neglected Hungarian minorities 
in the Carpathian Basin for decades, this ethnic group's affairs were trans-
formed within the course of not much more than a year. Currently, this 
Hungarian minority is experiencing a cultural renaissance. How long this 
revival will last, how long-lasting its effects will be, will be determined in 
the end by the general trend of Soviet nationality policies during the 1990s. 
While the changes in the Soviet Union's approach to ethnic affairs have 
been dramatic, they fall short of a fundamental revolution. While the 
country's minorities have received the right to voice their concerns and 
aspirations freely, and the government has repeatedly urged restraint in the 
use of military force for the solution of ethnic problems, some aspects of the 
old minority policies remain. One of these is the idea that the Soviet Armed 
Forces (SAF) will continue to be recruited on the cadre and not a nationality 
principle. This means that there will not be nationality-based formations 
in the SAF, and the forces will continue to be an instrument of ethnic 
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integration and assimilation within the U.S.S.R. Furthermore, Gorbachev 
has repeatedly stressed that there is a limit to the political restructuring of 
the U.S.S.R. He has emphatically stated that the idea of the "federalization" 
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has to be rejected,13 which 
means that the dissolution of the country is not part of his leadership's 
agenda. 
Another observation that should be made about the new Soviet nation-
ality policy is that while the new approach is more positive and more 
humane than the old one, it has not, and will not in the foreseeable future, 
solve the U.S.S.R.'s ethnic problems. In fact, the new approach, with its 
more relaxed attitude to the question of ethnic agitation, in the short run 
will probably be more conducive to heightened ethnic strife than the old 
approach of regimentation and repression. 
While glasnost and perestroika have their limitations in the U.S.S.R., 
no restrictions have been prescribed by the Soviet leadership on reform in 
East Central Europe. Presumably, changes there can be restricted by the 
local communist elites, and it is an open question to what extent and how 
long these can resist popular demand for reform. The first half of 1989 
has already brought change to Poland and Hungary. If and when change 
will come to the rest of East Central Europe, the position of Hungarian 
minorities will be inevitably affected. The advent of Soviet-style glasnost 
should alleviate their situation and might even allow a cultural revival in 
their midst similar to that which is taking place in Sub-Carpathia. More 
dramatic change in the political structure of the countries of East Central 
Europe might have similar effects; however, if that change should come 
about through bloodshed, and should lead to civil war and anarchy, the 
impact on Hungarian minorities—in fact, all minorities—could be nega-
tive. Under these circumstances, the immediate prospects of Hungarian 
minorities in the Carpathian Basin can only be deemed uncertain. 
Prospects for the 1990s and beyond are no different. It is impossible 
to predict what political atmosphere will prevail in this part of the world 
if and when the last of the hard-line communist regimes cease resisting 
the pressure for change. Presumably, the prospects for Hungarian ethnic 
survival in countries such as Czechoslovakia and Rumania will be a func-
tion of the extent to which democratic pluralism can be introduced there. 
Unfortunately, such pluralism is not easy to achieve, even if the present 
hard-line elites should be replaced by a new group of leaders. In the case 
of Rumania, one also wonders to what extent anti-Hungarian suspicions, 
generated by years of hate-mongering, will persist even in a post-Ceausescu 
era. 
An assessment of the Hungarian minorities' prospects for the future, 
however, need not end on a negative note. The extent of change already 
implemented in the Soviet Union bodes ill for the forces of Stalinist totali-
tarianism in East Central Europe. The proximity of a prosperous and demo-
cratic Central and Western Europe, and the obvious interest this Europe has 
in the lands adjoining it to the East, also give hope and encouragement to 
the oppressed peoples of the Carpathian Basin. While Eastern Europe will 
undoubtedly see changes in the not too distant future, it is highly unlikely 
that these changes will bring a revamping of political boundaries there. 
Thus, the re-uniting of Hungarian-populated districts of the successor states 
with Hungary does not seem to be a probability. Nevertheless, the future 
might still hold encouraging prospects for the Hungarian minorities of these 
countries. In a reformed, democratic, and pluralistic East Central Europe, 
the cultural survival, and even flowering, of nationality groups should be 
possible. In such a political environment ethnic institutions—the churches, 
schools, and the media—should be able to function freely, and meaningful 
contacts should evolve between the Hungarian minority groups of Hun-
gary 's neighbours. Furthermore, each of these minorities should be able 
to cultivate extensive cultural and social contacts with Hungarians in Hun-
gary, and their institutions, whether they be schools, churches, publishing 
houses, or the media. 
An even more hopeful prospect would be the integration of the states 
of East Central Europe into the European Community. In a democratic 
and pluralistic "common European home," should one ultimately emerge 
from the fateful events of 1989, freedoms such as described above would be 
commonplace. Moreover, in a united Europe, all the nations of East Central 
Europe will be minorities, which in fact should make minority status—as 
we think of that status in the 1980s—meaningless and irrelevant. While the 
creation of such a Europe is the optimum that the members of East Central 
Europe's Hungarian minorities can hope for, their true prospects probably 
lie somewhere between ethnic renaissance in a free and united Europe and 
continued cultural stagnation under hard-line, xenophobic communist rule. 
The holding of the Jaszi memorial conference and the publication of this 
volume would not have been possible without the help of numerous in-
stitutions and individuals. Funds and other support for the holding of 
the Conference were received from the Soros Foundation, Ohio Northern 
University, Oberlin College, Indiana University, the American Hungarian 
Educators' Association, the Hungarian Community of Friends, from Piiski 
Corvin Books of New York, as well as several individuals.14 The publi-
cation of the 1989 volume of our journal in turn was made possible by a 
"special project" grant from the Hungarian Research Institute of the Uni-
versity of Toronto, a "termination grant" from the Social Sciences and 
Humanities Research Council of Canada, and financial help from the Soros 
Foundation for the translation of one of the papers. 
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Leninist Nationality Policy: 
Solution to the "National Question"? 
Walker Connor 
Nationalism in the Writings of Marx 
The most fundamental tenets of classical Marxist ideology would seem-
ingly mandate a clear, transitory, and relatively unimportant role for ethnic 
nationalism. There is an evident conflict between a fundamental division 
of mankind horizontally into economic classes and the division of men 
vertically into nations. In turning Hegel's dialectic "right way up," Marx 
explicitly repudiated nationalism (that is, the "idea" of the nation striv-
ing to manifest itself through its cultural and institutional contributions) as 
the principal vehicle of history in favour of socio-economic classes. The 
nation and nationalism became relegated to the superstructure. The nation 
was explained as an historically evolved phenomenon which comes into ex-
istence only with the demise of feudalism and the rise of capitalism. Prior 
to the capitalist stage there were human groupings, such as tribes, clans, 
and peoples,1 but it was the new economic relations required by changes in 
the mode of production which created nations. Nationalism was merely a 
device of the bourgeoisie for identifying their own class interests as the in-
terests of the entire people. It attempted to dampen the class consciousness 
of the proletariat (1) by obscuring the conflicting class interests within each 
nation and (2) by evoking rivalry among the proletariat of various nations. 
Because of its association with a specific economic stage, nationalism could 
be progressive or reactionary, depending upon the level of society. At a 
feudal or semi-feudal stage, it is progressive, but at a stage of developed 
capitalism it is counter-revolutionary. 
To this point the Marxist position in unambiguous, consistent, and given 
unequivocal support by contemporary Marxists of rather diverse stamps.3 
More obscure, however, is the question of what happens to nations in the 
post-capitalist period. Marx and Engels made clear in the Manifesto that 
the nation would survive the revolution at least for a time: 
The struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie is at first a national 
struggle. The proletariat of each country must, of course, first of all 
settle matters with its own bourgeoisie. . . . Since the proletariat must 
first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to the leading class of 
the nation, must constitute itself the nation, it is, so far, itself national, 
though not in the bourgeois sense of the word. 
But since the nation is part of the superstructure and the product of specific 
productive forces and relations, will it not, as the state, wither away in the 
post-capitalist period? If so, does its termination merely mean the end of 
national antagonisms or does it mean the end of all national distinctions, 
including such cultural singularities as language? Phrased differently, does 
the socialist revolution presage total assimilation? 
On this issue Marx proved a poor guide. His statements are obtuse, 
and subject to diverse interpretation. The key passage appeared in the 
Manifesto: 
National differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more 
and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to 
freedom of commerce, to the world market, to uniformity in the mode 
of production and in condition of life corresponding thereto. 
The supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster. 
The most common interpretation of this passage is that Marx and Engels 
meant that all national differences faced extermination. But the absence 
of the word all has also permitted another interpretation which holds that 
the authors of the Manifesto foresaw only "the abolition of sharp economic 
and social differences, economic isolation, invidious distinctions, political 
rivalries, wars and exploitation of one nation by another but . . . not the 
complete disappearance of all distinctions whatever."4 The fact that most 
states, communist and noncommunist alike, are multinational units causes 
the matter to be of great importance, but Marx and Engels' ambiguity on 
this point is reflected even today in the general vagueness which surrounds 
the national policies of contemporary communist governments. 
Marx's failure to spell out the future of nations in greater detail is symp-
tomatic of the fact that his interest in nations was at best peripheral. This 
is also illustrated by his careless use of terms. Nowhere does he under-
take a systematic definition of a nation. The term is employed at various 
times as synonymous with (1) country or state, (2) the ruling class of a 
country, and (3) society. His lack of avid curiosity concerning the nation 
is accountable in part to his reaction to Hegelian thought, to his own cos-
mopolitan background and proclivities, and to the fact that he lived during 
an early phase of the era of nationalism, when the breadth and depth of its 
appeal were not yet fully manifest. But his lack of interest was also due 
to a basic misreading of the nature of nationalism. His emphasis on eco-
nomic forces caused him to slight the importance of cultural and historical 
elements, thereby badly underestimating the magnetic pull exerted by the 
ethnic group. Since the nation was to Marx essentially an economic unit, 
the question of national consciousness was reduced by him to economic 
ties. This led him to believe that small minorities should be considered, 
and did in fact consider themselves to be, members of the large nation to 
whom they were economically wedded. Regardless of dissimilarities in 
language, mores, and traditions, membership in the nation was determined 
simply by ties to the economic unit.5 
Marx's emphasis upon economic considerations also heavily influenced 
his attitude toward questions involving national liberation movements. He 
was not a proponent of national independence in the abstract. His bias to-
ward economic considerations caused him to support or renounce national 
aspirations, depending upon whether or not they were consonant with eco-
nomic progress. He defended overseas colonialism on the ground that it 
offered areas such as India the most efficacious means for advancing to a 
higher economic stage. Moreover, not a believer in the innate worth of 
the nation, Marx would not attempt to breathe the national idea into indus-
trially backward people (whom he termed "people without history"), but 
would prefer to see them attached to more progressive societies. He was 
most apt to support independence for large nations such as the Poles, while 
denying it to nations such as the Czechs which were adjudged too small to 
permit the growth of a modern economy. But beyond the question of size 
and regardless of the potentiality for developing a modern economy, Marx 
ultimately judged each national movement in terms of its impact upon the 
global, revolutionary movement. He was prepared to deny support to large 
movements and to grant it to small, if such seeming inconsistencies served 
grand strategy. Thus, Pan-Slavism was repudiated by Marx because he 
feared it would prove advantageous to czarism, which Marx considered 
the archetype of reaction. Conversely, despite its small size and despite 
his own earlier objections, Marx became an ardent proponent of indepen-
dence for the Irish nation because he believed that the issue was diverting 
class antagonisms from their proper target. The English proletariat and 
the Irish workers within England were at loggerheads over the indepen-
dence question. Proletarian solidarity therefore required support for Irish 
independence, although it is interesting that Marx believed that once inde-
pendence had been achieved and emotions cooled, economic self-interest 
would lead the Irish to seek a form of reunion (probably along federal 
lines) with Britain. At least in this instance, Marx had been forced to 
recognize national consciousness as a more powerful motivation than class 
consciousness. In this situation, strategy took precedence over ideology. 
In summary, Marx's approach to nationalism was characterized by a ten-
dency to underestimate its force and, indeed, to misunderstand its nature. 
His legacy on the national issue included the theory of the nation's rela-
tion to economic stages and the assertion that national distinctions were 
necessarily vanishing, a process which would be accelerated following the 
socialist victory. That legacy also included a number of precedents for 
supporting national movements deemed progressive, but only if the move-
ments were also consonant with the larger interests of the global movement. 
National movements were not to be treated in isolation, but viewed against 
this larger backdrop. Alliances with otherwise unprogressive nationalist 
movements were condoned if strategically wise.6 But while condoning such 
alliances with nationalism and while acknowledging, as earlier mentioned, 
that the proletariat for a time must "constitute itself the nation" thereby 
becoming "national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word," Marx 
maintained that the leadership of the communist movement is differentiated 
precisely by its non-nationalistic outlook: 
The Communists are distinguished from the other working class parties 
by this only: 1. In the national struggles of the proletarians of the 
different countries, they point out and bring to the front the common 
interests of the entire proletariat, independently of all nationality. 2. In 
the various stages of development which the struggle of the working 
class against the bourgeoisie has to pass through, they always and 
everywhere represent the interests of the movement as a whole.7 
A final important element of Marx's legacy to his successors was the 
slogan which later played a vital role in the rise to power of the communist 
parties of Russia, China, Yugoslavia, and Vietnam, and which continues 
to be an important element in the strategy of all four states. In 1865, a 
half-century before Wilson became associated with it, "the right of self-
determination" was proclaimed in a public document drafted by Marx.8 
A right of self-determination of nations must by definition constitute 
a prerogative shared equally by all nations, and subsequent endorsements 
of the principle by both the First and Second Internationals made this 
interpretation explicit.9 Yet, as noted, both Marx and Engels in practice were 
highly selective in extending their support for independence movements, 
and it is evident, therefore, that self-determination was conceived by them 
not as a principle, but as a slogan which could be used to weaken enemies 
and attract allies. Toward the end of his career, Marx, while continuing 
to underestimate nationalism, had come to sense that identifying with it 
might prove useful. The underlying lack of interest in the concept of 
self-determination, however, is manifest in the failure of the communist 
leadership to detail precisely what it meant by self-determination of nations 
despite the slogan's periodic endorsement over several decades. 
Nationalism in Lenin's Pre-Revolutionary Strategy 
This oversight led to a number of acrimonious disputes within the move-
ment in the period immediately prior to World War I. The issue was of 
particular import to those most concerned with the multinational states of 
Central and Eastern Europe, and included such notables as Rosa Luxem-
burg, Otto Bauer, and Karl Renner. However, it was Lenin and, to a lesser 
degree and under his direction, Stalin, who gave definition to the meaning 
and the role of Marxist self-determination. The program of the Russian 
Social Democratic Workers Party, which had been drafted by Lenin and 
endorsed at the 2nd Congress in 1903, contained, in addition to guaran-
tees of equal rights to all nationalities (including certain linguistic rights), 
"the right of self-determination for all nations comprising the State."10 But 
another decade elapsed before Lenin's important writings on the subject 
began to appear. 
One point that Lenin consistently made clear in his writings and state-
ments was that self-determination included the right of political secession. 
Indeed, most of his references to self-determination virtually equate the 
two.11 However, he appears to have agreed with the more comprehensive 
definition, set forth by Stalin in 1913, which includes but is not limited to 
secession. 
The right of self-determination means that a nation can arrange its 
life according to its own will. It has the right to arrange its life on 
the basis of autonomy. It has the right to enter into federal relations 
with other nations. It has the right to complete secession. Nations are 
sovereign and all nations are equal. 
But is not the doctrine of political independence for all nations inconso-
nant with Marx's insistence upon the need for large states? Not to Lenin, 
because he was certain that few small nations would act against their eco-
nomic self-interest. And, in the event that they did, they would soon 
perceive the wisdom of requesting reunion. In Lenin's words: "To defend 
this right [to secession] does in no way mean encouraging the formation of 
small states, but, to the contrary, it leads to a freer, . . . wider formation of 
larger states—a phenomenon more advantageous for the masses and more 
in accord with economic development."13 It may appear paradoxical to es-
pouse a principle in order to frustrate it, but the basis for Lenin's conviction 
on this point is essential to an understanding of Marxist national policy. 
Throughout his life, Lenin was convinced that the only way to defeat 
nationalism was by use of the carrot, never the stick. He conceived of 
nationalism in purely negative terms, that is, it was the response of a people 
to oppression and prejudice (whether real or imagined). Thus the dialectic: 
by conceding all, or rather, by seeming to concede all to nationalism, 
one in fact was promoting cosmopolitanism. With specific regard to self-
determination, this meant that the best way to avoid or to dissipate a grass-
roots demand for independence was to proffer that independence. Phrased 
differently, support for the slogan of self-determination, rather than acting 
as a stimulant to nationalism, would prove to be an antidote.14 
But what if Lenin proved wrong, and a number of nations should elect to 
withdraw from Russia at the time of the Revolution? Was Lenin prepared 
to permit secession? Lenin's position remained unclear. On the one hand, 
he often employed Finland as an example of a nation which might secede, 
and he did not appear to consider such a limited loss objectionable. As 
noted, however, just as Marx in the case of Ireland, Lenin thought that the 
proletariat of a small unit such as Finland would soon perceive that it was 
to their economic advantage to achieve reunion. Moreover, there are a few 
hints that Lenin would view any post-revolutionary attempt at secession 
as counterrevolutionary. When asked directly how he would respond to 
a situation in which a non-proletarian leadership was in charge of a bor-
der nation, Lenin's evasiveness hinted at something less than resignation: 
"What shall happen when the reactionaries are in the majority? . . . This is 
one of those questions of which it is said that seven fools ask more than ten 
wise men can answer."15 On another occasion, his comments on Marx's 
position on the Irish question appeared to preclude any post-revolutionary 
nationalist movements: "If capitalism had been overthrown in England as 
quickly as Marx at first expected, there would have been no room for a 
bourgeois-democratic national movement."16 
In any event, Lenin left his options open by making explicit that the com-
munists need not support each liberation movement.17 Lenin thus made a 
distinction between the abstract right of self-determination, which is en-
joyed by all nations, and the right to exercise that right, which evidently 
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is not. Though supporting the right of self-determination, "we are not 
obliged to support 'every' struggle for independence or 'every' republic or 
anti-clerical movement."19 The question of support in a specific instance 
was left to the communist party and,20 just as strongly as Marx, Lenin in-
sisted that members of the communist party not be tainted by nationalism. 
He demanded, for example, that members whose nationality coincided with 
that of the dominant group in a multinational state must support the right 
of secession, while those of the minority nations must insist on the right to ? 1 
union. By thus insisting on proletarian cosmopolitanism within the party, 
Lenin insured that the communist position on self-determination (in prac-
tice rather than in principle) would be guided by Marxist strategy rather 
than by ethnicity. 
What of those nations who remained within the multinational state? The 
victorious communists would introduce the policy of "national equality," 
guaranteeing to the members of each nation the right to use their own 
language and to an education in that language. These guarantees were con-
tained in the 1903 Programme, and they were reasserted in 1913 by Stalin 
in "Marxism and the National Question." Stalin also set forth as essential a 
system of regional autonomy "for such crystallized units as Poland, Lithua-
nia, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, and so forth," while explicitly denying it 
to smaller nations such as the Latvians. In some instances autonomous 
borders would reflect ethnic distribution; in others (for example, the Cau-
casus and smaller or less nationally conscious groups) they would not. The 
following year (1914), in a private letter Lenin made clear that he had 
already devised the basic content of what subsequently became official So-
viet national policy, although he also demonstrated something substantially 
less than ardour for the policy's merit. 
In order to struggle against the stupidity of the cultural-national au-
tonomists, the fraction must introduce into the Duma a draft law on 
the equality of nations and the definition of the rights of national mi-
norities. I propose that we draw up such a project: 
The general situation of equal rights—the division of the coun-
try into autonomous and self-governing territorial units according— 
among other things—to nationality (the local population determines 
the boundaries, the general parliament confirms them)—the limits of 
the administration of the autonomous districts and regions, as well 
as the self-governing units;—the illegalization of any departure from 
equality of nations in the decisions of autonomous districts, zemstvos, 
etc.; general school councils democratically elected etc., freedom and 
equality of languages—the choice of languages by the municipal in-
stitutions, etc. The protection of minorities: the right to a proportional 
share of the expenditures for school buildings (gratis) for students of 
"alien" (non-Russian) nationalities, for "alien" teachers, for "alien" 
departments in museums and libraries, theaters and the like; the right 
of each citizen to seek redress (before a court) for any departure from 
the corresponding equality of rights, for any "trampling upon" the 
rights of national minorities; a census of population every five years 
in the multi-national districts, a ten-year census in the country as a 
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whole, etc.. . . 
Lenin's lack of ardour for his own program of promoting national equal-
ity and cultural autonomy was a reflection of his conviction that such a pol-
icy was merely the prerequisite for a higher stage. Interspersed throughout 
his writings are references to "the inevitable merging of nations," their 
ultimate "fusion," "amalgamation," or "assimilation."24 Consonant with 
Marx's position on the vanishing of national differences, Lenin viewed 
the movement toward assimilation as both progressive and inevitable. 
But if one desires ultimate assimilation, is he not working at cross-
purposes when he encourages the use of local languages and creates na-
tional schools? Doesn't such an approach strengthen the nationalism of 
the various ethnic groups? Again, as in the case of self-determination, 
Lenin thought not, and essentially for the same reason. Since the bitter-
ness and mistrust which the minorities felt toward the Russians was due to 
a superior-to-inferior relationship long practiced by the latter, these nega-
tive attitudes, which constitute the major barrier to assimilation, must be 
exorcised by a period of national equality, characterized by a pandering 
to some of the more apparent manifestations of national diversity such as 
language. Since he considered nationalism to be the mental product of past 
oppression, Lenin believed that attempts to eradicate it by force could only 
have the unintended effect of strengthening it. His emphasis is ever on the « » * 
voluntary nature of assimilation. Although once in power he was to con-
done the use of force to nullify political secession, he remained convinced 
to the end that a frontal attack upon nationalism was improper strategy.26 
Even if his assumptions proved incorrect, Lenin's temporary concessions 
to national diversity were probably not viewed by him as dangerous because 
of the presence of the Communist Party. It is significant that the tract in 
which he defined the central role and organizational principle of the Party 
preceded by a year his inclusion of cultural concessions in the Programme 
of 1903. His insistence upon party members strictly observing international 
proletariat discipline has been mentioned. Even more important was his 
explicit rejection of any form of federalism or autonomy within the Party, 
and his insistence upon democratic centralism. One reason specified for his 
rejection of any form of decentralization (and this was also a major reason 
for the support he received on the issue of party organization) was to pre-
vent the formation of ethnic poles of power within the party apparatus.27 
In Lenin's words: "We Social-Democrats are opposed to all nationalism 
and advocate democratic centralism." Since the power to make all ma-
jor decisions rested with the Party, such a highly centralized organization 
was the best insurance that regional autonomy could never pose a serious 
threat.29 
It would be in the higher echelons of the Party that the general content 
of educational curricula and of the communications media would be de-
signed. To Lenin the key element was not the language but the message. 
To grant the use of local languages while maintaining control of content 
was to surrender little. Moreover, broadcasting, writing, or lecturing in 
the native language tended to overcome ethnic resentment and suspicion, 
thereby rendering the audience more susceptible to Party direction, includ-
ing direction toward national amalgamation. Stalin's famous shorthand for 
this policy was "national in form, socialist in content." 
As a guide to actual policy, then, there are three prescriptions in Lenin's 
national policy. (1) Prior to the assumption of power, promise the right 
of self-determination (secession), while offering a policy of national equal-
ity and regional cultural autonomy to those nations who wish to remain. (2) 
Following the assumption of power, terminate the right of self-determination 
within the state and begin the dialectical process of assimilation via regional 
cultural autonomy. (3) Keep the Party free of any taint of nationalism. 
Post-Revolutionary Practice 
Lenin's injunction to uphold the right of all national groups to self-deter-
mination, expressly including the right of separation, need not long detain 
us. However, it might be noted in passing that such promises played 
a major role in the rise to power of the Soviet, Yugoslav, Chinese, and 
Vietnamese communist parties.30 The Leninist strategy of pledging respect 
for self-determination, including secession, has therefore paid handsome 
dividends to Marxist-Leninist parties in their quest for power. Far less 
effective, however, has been Lenin's scheme for ridding the state of national 
antagonisms following a successful revolution. It will be recalled that he 
envisaged a dialectical approach. Homogenization was to be achieved 
by passing through a period of cultural pluralism, during which the more 
overt manifestations of each nation's uniqueness were to be nurtured by the 
state. This seemingly incongruous synthesis was possible because during 
the period of cultural pluralism (which, with time, would come to be known 
as the period of "the flourishing of the nations") all of the state's vast, 
multifaceted apparati for shaping the consciousness of its citizens were to 
din the messages of scientific Marxism. 
The keystone of Leninist national policy for a post-revolutionary situation 
was therefore a plenary distinction between form and substance. While the 
former assumes a national coloration during the period of the flourishing of 
the nations, the latter must remain unerringly socialist at all times. Faithful 
compliance with both aspects of this policy ("national in form, socialist in 
content") is expected to cause a "coming together" of the nations until a 
final "fusion" or "merging" of the nations into a uniform whole occurs. 
The guiding slogan for the period of national flourishing is that "all 
nations are equal" and the inclusion of it, or a near equivalent, in the con-
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stitutions of Marxist-Leninist states has become de rigueur. In turn, the 
policy of national equality contains three subcategories: (1) cultural equal-
ity (particularly the right to employ one's own language), (2) economic 
equality, and (3) political equality (predicated upon a system of territorial 
autonomy for all compact national groups). But although Marxist-Leninist 
governments pay public obeisance to Leninist national policy in all of its 
aspects, the record of carry-over from avowal to practice has been an ex-
tremely spotty one. For example, within only four Marxist-Leninist states 
(the Soviet Union, China, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia) do internal 
borders and institutions reflect any concession to Lenin's prescription con-
cerning the granting of territorial autonomy. In 1968 Rumania dropped the 
single autonomous region that it had accorded a segment of its Hungarian 
minority. And Vietnam also demonstrated something less than unquestion-
ing faith in the wisdom of Lenin's legacy on the national question when its 
summarily dissolved its autonomous regions in 1975, the same year as the 
surrender of South Vietnam. The propagandistic value of the autonomous 
regions having evaporated with victory, autonomy (though always devoid of 
real content) was immediately perceived as having outlived its usefulness. 
Even in the case of those few states that confer special territorial status 
upon their national groups, the diverse manner in which they have done so 
invalidates the assertion that all nations are equal under Marxist-Leninism. 
There are great variations among states. For example, the Soviet Union, 
Yugoslavia, and, since 1968, Czechoslovakia are self-proclaimed federa-
tions composed of "republics"; within China, which remains adamantly 
unitary in form as well as substance, groups cannot aspire to republic sta-
tus. Moreover, while the Constitution of the Soviet Union concedes to its 
union republics the theoretical right of secession, such a right is denied 
by the constitutions of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. And thus, Slo-
vaks, Croats, Slovenes, etc. are not accorded the same right of separation 
ostensibly granted to Latvians, Ukrainians, Georgians, et al. 
Variations also exist in the treatment accorded individual nations within 
a single state. Within the Soviet Union, for example, while certain groups 
are accorded a union republic (the only level of organization with the theo-
retical right to secede), others are assigned the progressively lower status of 
autonomous republic, autonomous region, or autonomous area. And some 
important groups are permitted no autonomous status whatsoever. Simi-
larly, within Czechoslovakia, only the Czechs and Slovaks are accorded 
a republic or, for that matter, any other form of autonomous status; the 
large, territorially compact Hungarian minority is denied an autonomous 
organ, and the large gypsy element is not even extended recognition as a 
distinct people in the census. Within Yugoslavia, the Albanians are granted 
only an autonomous province (a subsidiary part of the Serbian Republic), 
while the substantially less numerous Montenegrins are awarded their own 
republic. Within China, there is no autonomous region (China's most pres-
tigious level of autonomous unit) named after the Yi, Miao, or Manchu, 
although all three peoples are more numerous than the Mongols, who can 
nevertheless point to a Mongolian Autonomous Region. 
The discrepancies in treatment accorded various groups with regard to 
political equality extend to the spheres of cultural and economic equal-
ity as well. Within the Soviet Union, for example, the number of years 
of education in which instruction is available in one's own language ex-
hibits sharp differentials. As one descends from the level of the union 
republics through the autonomous republics and autonomous regions to the 
autonomous areas, the opportunity for instruction in the language of the 
titular nation correspondingly diminishes. Thus, whereas people with a 
union republic are able to complete both primary and secondary education 
(a total of ten years) in their own language, most groups with only an au-
tonomous republic enjoy the possibility of but seven years of instruction 
in their own language, a few are limited to only four years, and one group 
(the Karelians) has no native language schools whatsoever. Within China 
also, certain minorities, such as the Manchu, are without instruction in their 
mother tongue. As to Vietnam, even during the period when autonomous 
regions were permitted to exist, only four of thirty-seven officially recog-
nized minorities were given any schooling in their own language, and for 
these four exceptions all instruction above the fourth year was conducted 
in the Vietnamese language. Somewhat similarly, within the Soviet Union 
and China, the language of the dominant group (Russian and Mandarin Chi-
nese respectively) monopolizes nearly all instruction beyond the secondary 
level. 
So too with regard to economic equality. Income levels vary substan-
tially among groups. In the case of the oldest Marxist-Leninist state, for 
example, the per capita product of the wealthiest union republic within the 
Soviet Union is more than two-and-one-third times that of the poorest.32 
We conclude, therefore, that George Orwell's all too often paraphrased epi-
gram concerning the nature of equality under Marxist-Leninism most aptly 
applies to nations: all are equal but some are more equal than others. 
Marxist-Leninist governments have therefore either ignored Lenin's pre-
scriptions on the national question or have applied them most unevenly. 
Moreover, even those governments that have imperfectly implemented 
Lenin's formula for solving the national question have demonstrated broadly 
held skepticism concerning its wisdom, by simultaneously introducing risk-
reducing policies. The major hedging devices that have been employed can 
be grouped under (1) language policy, (2) the recruitment and purging of 
elites, and (3) the redistribution and gerrymandering of national groups. 
Here limitations on space mandate that we limit ourselves to the briefest 
outline.33 
Language 
In the area of linguistic policy, Marxist-Leninist states have exhibited an 
evolutionary, three-stage pattern. (1) Pluralism: The first stage is charac-
terized by official preoccupation with encouraging (some of) the individual 
languages. Any official pressure to learn the state's dominant language is 
muted or indirect. (2) Bilingualism: This stage is characterized by growing 
overt pressure to learn the state's dominant language, culminating in mak-
ing this step mandatory. In the case of the Soviet Union, for example, study 
of the Russian language became compulsory in 1938. (3) Monolingualism: 
This final stage, though nowhere yet achieved, is heralded by pressures for 
making the dominant tongue the sole language of instruction and the sole 
official language.34 
These stages overlap and reinforce one another and are often pursued 
concomitantly. Moreover, their evolutionary nature need not be reflected 
in chronological evolution. In this realm of linguistic policy, governments 
have been known to push forward or retreat precipitously in response to 
community forces. During the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revo-
lution, for example, pressures were exerted immediately to enthrone Man-
darin as the sole language of China. But following the demise of each 
of these programs, policy reverted abruptly to the stage of "the flowering 
of the nations." But despite such irregular patterns, it is evident that the 
ostensible encouragement of national languages has come to be tempered 
in practice by the encouragement of bilingualism, and, further, by psycho-
logical and other inducements to adopt the state's principal language as 
one 's own. 
The techniques employed to ensure this progression toward unilingualism 
are numerous and diverse. The following are but a few of the more impor-
tant: (1) Schools with instruction conducted in the state's dominant tongue 
are created everywhere, whereas those conducting instruction in any other 
language are limited solely to the appropriate autonomous unit. Thus, the 
many people living outside of their titular unit (or those without such a unit) 
have no opportunity to attend their "own" schools. (2) Even if living within 
their autonomous unit, parents are encouraged to send their children to the 
school conducting instruction in the state's dominant language, because 
fluency in that language is one key to social mobility. (3) Whenever possi-
ble, minority-language schools are merged with dominant-language schools, 
and the number of courses offered in the minority language is subsequently 
progressively curtailed. (4) Those desirous of an education conducted in 
their own language increasingly find this realizable, if at all, only at the 
lower levels. Higher education is customarily restricted to instruction in the 
dominant language. For those who wish to continue their education, this 
is a persuasive reason to attend the dominant-language schools from the 
outset, so as to be better prepared for later training. (5) Monopoly over the 
publishing industry permits the government to determine the number and 
the nature of publications to be allocated each language. In many cases, the 
entire literature of a discipline is monopolized by the dominant language, 
thus demanding great fluency in that language on the part of anyone desir-
ing to pursue research in the field. (6) Examinations, interviews, and other 
such prerequisites for entering a profession are also apt to be conducted 
solely in the dominant language. (7) Minority languages are themselves 
brought to resemble more closely the dominant language by impregnating 
the former with vocabulary and grammatical forms drawn from the latter, 
as well as by requiring that all minority languages be written in the script 
of the dominant language. 
The desire of any government, Marxist-Leninist or otherwise, to promote 
unilingualism is quite understandable. Polylingualism offers numerous im-
pediments to economic efficiency and state integration. The point, however, 
is that Marxist-Leninist governments have been promoting linguistic assim-
ilation, while maintaining the guise of orthodoxy with regard to Leninist 
national policy and the promotion of the flourishing of national forms.36 
Nor is this the extent of the apostasy. Departing from Lenin's notion of 
language as pure form, his successors have viewed it as a major deter-
minant of primary group-identity. A move toward linguistic assimilation 
is perceived as a move toward psychological assimilation. As succinctly 
stated in a Vietnamese publication: "The fate of the language of a people 
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is always linked to the destiny of that people."' Or, as phrased in a Soviet 
publication: "Groups of people who have changed their language in the 
course of time usually also change their ethnic (national) identity."38 A 
Soviet scholar echoes: "If linguistic and ethnic affiliation do not coincide, 
the result is inevitably a change in one's national awareness."39 Official 
avowals of their Leninist orthodoxy to the contrary, the actions of Marxist-
Leninist governments and the writings of their theorists betray a conviction 
that language is much more than just form. 
The Recruitment and Purging of Elites 
None of the Marxist-Leninist states have honored the notion of national 
in form with regard to cadres. As made explicit in the 1961 program of 
the Soviet Union's Communist Party, the "continuous exchange of trained 
personnel among nations" is a fixture of official policy. This departure 
from the Leninist scheme is a surprising one. As a blueprint for nurtur-
ing Marxism within a single, integrated, multinational structure, Leninist 
national policy would seemingly mandate that the visible central organs of 
authority reflect the ethnonational complexity of the entire population, while 
the more localized visible power-structures reflect the unique national col-
oration of the immediately surrounding populace. In particular, one would 
expect that the visible elite within an ethnically delineated autonomous 
unit would risk undermining the very raison d'etre of such administrative 
units, namely, to convince each national group that it has its own, truly 
autonomous political organization, if the elite were drawn from outside the 
indigenous group. Yet, the governments have felt that the need to resort to 
such a hedging device outweighs such a risk. The resulting dilemma faced 
the Chinese Communist Party shortly after its assumption of power. Even 
while in the midst of a propaganda campaign whose slogan was that terri-
torial autonomy would make each national group "the master of his home," 
governmental spokesmen concomitantly insisted that Han Chinese cadres 
were to be permanent members of that household. "If it is considered that 
by assuming control of one's own homeland . . . there is no need for the 
support of the Han people and cadres—then it will be an obvious mistake 
which must be prevented . . ."40 
The cutting edge of such a cadre policy is somewhat blunted by the prac-
tice of assigning members of the local national group to positions of great 
visibility and little power. Meanwhile, members of the state's dominant 
ethnic element tend to hold the key positions of power, particularly those 
responsible for internal security. Thus, in all Marxist-Leninist states the 
dominant group is customarily disproportionately represented in the upper 
echelons of the military; combined with the practice of assigning minority 
personnel serving in the military outside of their homelands, this procedure 
minimizes any danger of the homeland serving as a focus for a secessionist 
movement. Both aspects of this military personnel policy came to the fore 
in Yugoslavia in the early 1970s, when angry Croatian spokesmen pointed 
out (1) that only 15 percent of all Croatian recruits were performing their 
military service within Croatia (despite an earlier wrung concession promis-
ing that 25 percent would so serve), and (2) that Serbs and Montenegrins, 
though together accounting for only 43 percent of the population, repre-
sented 85 percent of all army officers. A somewhat similar if less dramatic 
situation prevailed in Czechoslovakia, wherein the Slovaks (30 percent of 
the population) accounted for only 20 percent of all military officers and 
for an even smaller percentage of people at the higher echelons of the Min-
istry of Defence.41 And in the case of the Soviet Union, one study indicated 
that all of the commanders-in-chief of the country's military districts were 
Russian.4,1 Similar considerations help determine the national composition 
of the police of both the overt and secret variety.43 
Staffing key slots with non-indigenous personnel is only one aspect of a 
cadre policy aimed at nullifying any potential nationalist threat. Another is 
the periodic purging of leaders, who have been drawn from the local group, 
for alleged nationalist deviations. Still another practice is the placing of 
primary responsibility for the monitoring of cadre policy on the local scene 
in the person of a non-indigene, whose primary loyalty to the center is 
further ensured by limiting the duration of his assignment in the locale.44 
In toto, such practices add up to an impressive system of hedges, but 
they also represent a sharp departure from the Leninist notion of territorial 
autonomy. 
Gerrymandering and Population Redistribution 
Governments have traditionally attempted to blur ethnic divisions within 
their territory. Certainly, they have seldom exalted them. By contrast, 
Lenin's plan for dividing the territory into autonomous units would high-
light and institutionalize ethnonational divisions. His rationale was that 
the giving to territorially compact people their own administrative division 
would blunt, if not sate, the titular people's desire for political indepen-
dence. The guiding rule for such a scheme was one people, one autonomous 
unit. But as a result of gerrymandering and population redistribution, the 
ethnic homogeneity of the ostensibly ethnically delineated constituent units 
within Marxist-Leninist states has been severely compromised. 
From the beginning the Soviets demonstrated a flair for gerrymander-
ing. In some cases, borders were drawn in a manner that divided a people, 
while, in other cases, borders were drawn so as to incorporate alien groups. 
In the Central Asia area, for example, the authorities feared that excessively 
large and unmanageable groups might evolve in the shape of a Bukharan, 
Turkic, or Muslim national group. Therefore, after a short interlude during 
which the Soviets consolidated their power, the region's political borders 
were drawn so as to divide the inhabitants into a number of units and thus 
encourage a sense of separate national identity on the part of the Kazakhs, 
Kirgiz, Tajiks, Turkmen, and Uzbeks, all peoples whose sense of national 
consciousness at that time was in a very inchoate state. By contrast, in 
the Caucuses, the authorities were confronted with the Armenians and the 
Georgians, each of whom had a developed sense of national consciousness 
that had already manifested itself in separatist movements. This situation 
was therefore met with the opposite stratagem of grouping theses two peo-
ples, along with the Azerbaidzhani, in a single Transcaucasian Federated 
Republic, a solution that prevailed until 1936. Moreover, when this unit 
dissolved into three union republics, there was little attempt to draw their 
borders in the closest possible conformity to ethnic distributions. In partic-
ular, territories in which Armenians predominated were made part of the 
Azerbaidzhani and Georgian Republics.45 
Some appreciation of the extent of the gerrymandering engaged in at 
the time of creating the autonomous units within the Soviet Union can 
be gleaned from the following data. In nine of the twenty-seven union 
and autonomous republics whose name in each case implied the predom-
inance of a single national group, the titular group did not in fact even 
account for a majority of the population. In no case did its proportion 
reach 90 percent, and the median proportion it represented was less than 
two-thirds.46 In addition, there were three autonomous republics whose 
ethnic heterogeneity was at least suggested by their official designations, 
each of which contained the names of two ethnic groups.47 The title of 
yet another autonomous republic made no mention of any ethnonational 
group; its highly heterogeneous population was grouped under the name 
of the region, Dagestan. Thus, the theory of Leninist national policy to 
the contrary, most people, including those purportedly assigned their own 
unit, found themselves sharing an autonomous unit with large numbers of 
aliens. 
Almost equally injurious to the principle of one nation, one autonomous 
unit were the large numbers of people left outside of the unit bearing their 
designation. In three of the twenty-seven previously mentioned cases, a 
majority of the group's members remained outside. In half of the cases, less 
than 80 percent of the membership resided within the confines of the unit 
bearing their national name.48 Recalling that residence within one's own 
autonomous unit would become a prerequisite for schooling conducted in 
one 's native language, the impact of this gerrymandering upon the rate of 
acculturation must have been marked. 
Subsequent redistribution of population within the Soviet Union has fur-
ther vitiated the principle of ethnonational autonomy. Particularly pro-
nounced has been the impact of migrations by the state's dominant group. 
Since 1917, there has been a dramatic influx of Russians into all non-
traditionally Russian homelands. As of 1979, Russian accounted for more 
than 7 percent of the population of each of the Union Republics other than 
Armenia. The range was from 2.3 percent in the case of Armenia to 40.8 
percent in the case of Kazakhstan, with a mean of 16.7 percent and a me-
dian of 12.3 percent. The penetration was more dramatic yet with regard 
to the autonomous republics within the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist 
Republic. The percentage of Russians within these sixteen republics ranged 
from 14.7 percent to 73.5 percent with a mean of 45 percent and a median 
of 44.1 percent. In five of the sixteen autonomous republics, the Russians 
constituted an absolute majority, and, in four others, they were the largest 
single ethnonational group. 
The overall results of gerrymandering and population redistribution upon 
the ethnic homogeneity of the republics has been enormous. With regard 
to the fourteen non-Russian union republics, the titular group typically 
accounts for less than two-thirds of the republic's population (a mean of 
64.6 percent and a median of 68.6). In no case does it account for 90 
percent of the entire population, and in two cases it fails to account for 
a majority.49 Again, even more striking is the case of the autonomous 
republics within the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. In only 
two of the sixteen cases does a single, non-Russian people account for a 
majority of the population. 
The ethnic homogeneity of China's autonomous units has been similarly 
diluted. The centrally ordered migration of millions of Han Chinese into 
the hinterlands has been combined with extensive gerrymandering to render 
the titular national groups a certain minority in four of the country's five 
autonomous regions (China's most prestigious level of autonomy) and a 
most probable minority in the other. Furthermore, these same policies were 
carried over to the next lower level of administrative unit, the autonomous 
district. In only eight of the twenty-nine districts existing in 1965, did 
the titular group represent a majority of the population. In two others, 
the titular group was reported to account for precisely fifty percent. This 
left nineteen of the twenty-nine districts in which the titular element was 
a minority. Moreover, five of the eight cases where the titular group was 
in a majority were districts principally populated by Tibetans. All five 
districts were part of a contiguous Tibetan homeland and should logically 
have been made part of an enlarged Tibetan autonomous region. They 
too were therefore a reflection of a hedging against the principle of ethnic 
autonomy, rather than an honoring of it. Moreover, in one of the three 
remaining possible examples of honoring the principle, the dominant group 
(56.3 percent of the population) had to share the ethnic designation of the 
district with another people, though the latter accounted for only 2 percent 
of the population. Thus, out of thirty-four autonomous regions and districts 
within China, we are reduced to two that could possibly be said to reflect 
Lenin's plan to grant territorial autonomy to concentrated peoples. In one 
of these, the titular group represented a bare majority (56.4 percent) and 
in the other 81.4 percent. Neither would therefore qualify as ethnically 
homogeneous. 
Yugoslavia too bears the imprint of intense gerrymandering. Here, how-
ever, the intent was somewhat different. Elsewhere, gerrymandering had 
been employed as a means of neutralizing or undermining nationalistic 
inclinations on the part of minorities. This was a goal of Yugoslavian au-
thorities as well. But, in addition, the authorities were anxious to diminish 
the relative strength of the state's largest ethnic element. Inter-ethnic an-
imosities, particularly those between Serb and Croat, had been the cancer 
of prewar Yugoslavia. In large part because of their numerical advantage, 
Serbs had tended to dominate the state, and the allegation of Serbian hege-
mony had been a rallying cry for Croatian nationalists. Parcelling the Serbs 
out among several autonomous units would reduce the advantage of num-
bers and thereby assuage the fears and jealousies of numerically smaller 
groups, most particularly the Croats. At the same time, those Serbs who 
found themselves outside the Serbian republic would serve the same pro-
tective function relative to minority nationalism as do the Russians and Han 
Chinese who live in minority areas within their respective states. Particu-
larly important in this regard was the decision to permit the return to their 
prewar homes of large numbers of Serbs who had fled Croatia to avoid 
genocide at the hands of the Croats during World War 
In addition to weakening the concentration of Serbs by apportioning them 
among a number of republics, the Serbian community was further fractured 
through the creation of two autonomous provinces within the Serbian re-
public (the only republic to be so subdivided). The two provinces were 
purportedly created to extend recognition to the Albanian and Hungarian 
minority respectively, and the borders of these two provinces should there-
fore have closely followed the delineation between Serb and non-Serb. In 
each case, however, the territory was expanded beyond that populated by 
the minority in a manner that needlessly incorporated large numbers of 
Serbs. In the case of one of the provinces, so many Serbs were incorpo-
rated that they became a powerful majority, thus questioning the ostensible 
rationale for the province. 
The overall impact of the original delineation of republican borders upon 
the ethnic composition of Yugoslavia's six major constituent units proved 
to be a profound one. In one case, the result was the absence of a majority 
ethnic group. Only in two republics did the titular group account for 90 
percent of the population, and subsequent migration has reduced the titular 
group's percentage in one of these republics from 90.7 percent to 67.2 
percent. Today, with a single exception, minority peoples account for at 
least 20 percent of each republic's population. 
Similar practices have been employed within Czechoslovakia (against the 
Hungarians), Rumania, and Vietnam. Authorities in the last named state 
appear particularly intent to bring about immediate dilution of minorities. 
Despite earlier promises to the contrary, the country's current five-year 
plan calls for the resettlement of hundreds of thousands of hill tribesmen 
in lowland communities and the moving of millions of Vietnamese into the 
traditional homelands of the minorities. Here as elsewhere, dilution, rather 
than autonomy for compact groups, has proven to be the rule. 
To recapitulate briefly: The communist parties of all Marxist-Leninist 
states are committed in principle to Leninist national policy. In practice, 
however, only a few have introduced the policy's sine qua non of a system 
of territorial autonomy. Those few have manifested a fundamental skepti-
cism concerning the wisdom of Lenin's policy, by encumbering it with a 
series of hedging devices. Thus hedged, the practices of states with regard 
to their national question differ dramatically from the practices prescribed 
by Lenin. Lenin's prescription for manipulating the national aspirations 
of minorities within a revolutionary or pre-revolutionary situation remains 
in the Marxist-Leninist arsenal of proven weaponry. Despite much lip-
service to the contrary, Lenin's prescriptions for taming nationalism in a 
post-revolutionary situation fail to achieve their intended results. 
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The Hungarian Minority 
of Czechoslovakia and its Press 
Magda Adam 
In Czechoslovakia the number of ethnic Hungarians changed frequently 
over the past fifty years. Of the 896,271 Hungarians registered for the 
present area of the country by the last Hungarian census, that of 1910, only 
650,597 remained by 1920. By 1930 their numbers had decreased further 
still, to 596,861. In the wake of the Vienna Award of 1938, the Hungarian 
census again registered 800,000 ethnic Hungarians in the area annexed to 
Hungary, besides whom there were another 53,128 left in Slovakia. After 
1945 the plan was to resettle Czechoslovakia's Hungarians in Hungary. 
As a result of this population transfer, some 117,000 Hungarians were 
relocated in Hungary. An additional 41,640 Hungarians were deported to 
the Sudetenland in westernmost Czechoslovakia, while those Hungarians 
who remained in Slovakia were compelled to request "re-Slovakization." 
Although their disadvantaged status ceased after 1948, their number fell 
to 368,000 in the 1950 census. Following further improvement in their 
situation, those declaring themselves Hungarian rose to 534,000 in 1961 
and to 573,000 by 1970. However, we know their real number to be around 
650,000. 
During these decades the ethnic composition of Slovakia's formerly al-
most homogeneous Hungarian communities has changed, as migrations and 
resettlement gave rise to mixed populations in them. This trend affected 
mainly cities with Hungarian majorities in 1910. In these communities their 
proportion dropped from 93.8 to 17.5 percent. The loss is particularly con-
spicuous in Kassa [Kosice] (down from 75.4 to 3.9 percent), in Leva [Lev-
ice] and Losonc [Lucenec]. With the exception of Komarom [Komarno] 
the Hungarians became a minority in other cities as well: Ersekujvar [Nove 
Zamky], Rimaszombat [Rimavska Sobota], Rozsnyo [Roznava]. In Poz-
sony [Bratislava] a mere 9,932 Hungarians lived in 1970 despite that city's 
vast demographic growth of the past decades. This compares with 31,705 
Hungarians registered there in 1910. Hungarian populations have disap-
peared almost completely from the towns located in Slovakia's traditionally 
Slovak-speaking areas. . . . 
In the rapidly developing local administrative centres the decrease of 
the Hungarian population was greater than average: their ratio dropped 
from 93.8 to 52.5 percent. In five of the fourteen communities of this 
kind (Pozsonypiispoki [Podunajske Biskupice], Galanta [Galanta], Szenc 
[Senec], Vagsellye [Sal'a], Szepsi [Moldava nad Bodvou]) they lost their 
absolute majority, but elsewhere too, their ratio declined significantly. 
Most successful in preserving their original character were the villages 
where the proportion of the Hungarian population was still 75 percent 
even in 1970, as compared to 98.2 percent in 1910. In 182 of the 491 
settlements in this category Hungarians accounted for over 90 percent of 
the population even in 1970. Their former majority was still preserved in 
422 communities, but in 69 they became a minority. The latter figure does 
not include the 60 settlements that had a Hungarian majorities in 1910, 
where the latest Czechoslovak censuses registered Hungarian populations 
of more than 10 percent or less than one hundred people. 
The demographic conditions of the Hungarian-populated communities 
scattered in a belt of several hundred kilometers north of Hungary have 
changed a great deal since 1910. The number of Hungarians rose the 
most in the Csallokoz and the Bodrogkoz, that is at the westernmost and 
easternmost edges of the Hungarian settlement area. On the other hand, 
there was a conspicuous decline in their numbers in the vicinity of Leva 
and Kassa. This is partly due to the magnitude of the deportations there 
and is in part connected with low birthrates. . . . 
A county-by-county analysis of the settlements with one-time Hungarian 
majorities revealed that even in 1970 Hungarians continued to constitute a 
sizable majority of the population in settlements formerly belonging to Gyor 
County (95.8 percent), in the Dunaszerdahely district of Pozsony County 
(92.0 percent), in the Csallokoz district of Komarom County (87.3 percent) 
and in the Bodrogkoz district of Zemplen County (86.6 percent). Also, 
their ratio remained over 70 percent in the Somorja, Galanta and Udvardi 
districts, in the formerly Hungarian villages of Esztergom, Hont, Gomor, 
Torna and Ung counties. This means that from Gutor to Szob settlements 
with Hungarian majorities still flanked the Danube. The Csallokoz core 
of the Hungarian settlement area in western Slovakia also remained almost 
completely intact. Contiguity with the Hungarian settlements situated along 
the River Ipoly is ensured by the populous communities of Komarom and 
Esztergom counties. 
In this area the Hungarian population declined primarily along the Hun-
garian-Slovak linguistic boundary. In Pozsony County the number of Hun-
garians decreased mainly in local administrative centres, but in the Szenc 
district the smaller villages were no exception either. The absorption of 
the Hungarian population of the communities situated in a Slovak linguistic 
environment in the vicinity of the town of Nyitra increased, and the Slovak 
penetration of Nagysurany [Surany] broadened. 
Even greater changes can be observed in Bars County, where the 50 
settlements near Leva lost their one-time Hungarian majority or their entire 
Hungarian population. For the time being it cannot be determined whether 
the decrease in the Hungarian population was mainly due to the prevalence 
of the one child only family model, the resettlements, re-Slovakization and 
migration, or whether the censuses are actually distorting the situation. 
The narrow band of Hungarian settlement stretching towards the north-
east in Nograd County is in the process of gradual break-up between Zsely 
[Zel'ovce] and Losonc. In the vicinity of Fiilek [Fil'akovo], however, it 
once again broadens and some 200 Hungarian villages, mostly sparsely 
populated, line up, primarily on the territory of Gomor County, up to the 
Torna Plateau. In this general region, the Hungarian majority has eroded 
in the towns and the more rapidly developing villages, as well as in some 
settlements along the linguistic boundary. 
The situation is far more serious in Abauj County, where the Hungarian 
population of Czechoslovakia suffered its greatest losses. Between Kassa 
and the Hungarian border the latest Czechoslovak censuses did not register 
any Hungarian population at all in communities with one-time Hungarian 
majorities. In another thirteen settlements their proportion dropped to below 
50 percent. In this region the number of Hungarians had decreased by 
some 50,000 between 1910 and 1970. As a result of this, the line of 
Hungarian settlements formerly stretching up to Eperjes [Presov] along 
the Hernad River was further reduced. Gradually, even the remaining 
Hungarian diaspora faded into oblivion. . . . 
Similarly, a substantial decrease can be observed in the Satoraljaujhely 
district of Zemplen County, where eighteen communities with one-time 
Hungarian majorities are missing from the Czechoslovak census of 1970. 
In another five settlements their ratio dropped to below 50 percent and 
almost everywhere the number of Hungarians decreased significantly. On 
the other hand, the Hungarian villages in the Bodrogkoz district and those 
with Hungarian majorities that at one time belonged to Ung County, solidly 
retained their considerable Hungarian majorities; however, they are totally 
isolated from the rest of the Hungarian-populated areas of Czechoslovakia. 
Numbering some 50,000 and concentrated in 50 settlements, this group has 
even shown slight population increase over the past few decades. 
The historical self-awareness of Czechoslovakia's minorities leaves a great 
deal to be desired. Amongst the factors contributing to this state of affairs 
special mention must go to the total absence of historical scholarship on 
the history of the Hungarian minority. The products of interwar bourgeois 
historiography are unknown. Indeed, in practical terms, they are accessible 
to those interested, mostly amateur researchers, only in Budapest. The most 
serious reason, is, however, the dogmatic approach to tradition, under which 
only the revolutionary traditions are considered worthy of exploration and 
publication. . . . 
Concerning the origins of Czechoslovakia's Hungarian minority, it was 
only in the course of the debates of 1968 that Hungarians pointed out that it 
was not of their own free will that they ended up living in Czechoslovakia. 
(Today Czechoslovak historical scholarship also acknowledges the violation 
of the principle of national self-determination with respect to minorities 
living in Czechoslovakia.) Generally, however, it is customary to stress 
that the post-war peace settlement brought about the liberation of the small 
nations of central Europe. Seen from this perspective, the birth of the 
bourgeois democratic Czechoslovak state is seen as significant progress in 
every respect. 
Two things deserve special mention from the first twenty years of the 
Hungarian minority's history. The first is the idealized image presented in 
the periodical Sarlo [Sickle]: a straight and smooth path from the recogni-
tion of national and social problems to the acceptance of communist ideals, 
the formulation of a new democratic definition of being Hungarian for all 
Hungarians, the uncritical acceptance of minority messianism. The second 
is the stereotype investigation of the activities in southern Slovakia of the 
Czechoslovak Communist Party—making a contribution only to scholar-
ship on local history. Of the latter, attention is regularly being focused 
on the Whitsun strike by agricultural workers in the community of Kosut 
in 1931, in which several people died. (Special attention is paid here to 
the role of Istvan Major, a leading functionary of the Czechoslovak Com-
munist Party.) The same holds true for the anti-fascist rallies of 1938. 
Special attention is paid to the writings and reminiscences of the labour 
movement veteran Dezso Rojak. His works and the tone of the contempo-
rary Czechoslovak communist press, incidentally, indicate that amongst the 
Hungarian minority of the interwar period the Czechoslovak Communist 
Party, which advocated a radical programme of national self-determination, 
enjoyed broad-based support. (It is quite another matter and characteristic 
of Czechoslovakia's present nationalities policy that all of these events, 
persons and movements are presented in Slovak scholarship in a way that 
the minority connections of the southern Slovak communist movement are 
impossible to discern.). . . . 
The subject of the "years of homelessness" between 1945 and 1948 sur-
faced in the press of Slovakia's Hungarian minority only during the Prague 
Spring. Although in the rehabilitation documents of the condemned Slovak 
communist leaders, the Czechoslovak Communist Party's Central Commit-
tee denounced the negative policy pursued against the Hungarian minority 
after the war, the act of rehabilitation itself remained rather ambiguous. 
According to the rehabilitation documents, the anti-Hungarian measures 
expressed the opinion of the entire leadership of the party at the time. . . . 
Traces of the Hungarian minority's Magyar historical consciousness in 
Slovakia's Hungarian press are for the most part confined to the post-1948-
49 period. In connection with the various anniversaries of the launching 
of Uj Szd (New Word) [in late 1948] and of the founding of CSEMADOK 
(Csehszlovakiai Magyar Dolgozok Kulturalis Egyesiilete; literally: the Cul-
tural Association of Hungarian Workers in Czechoslovakia) [1949], this 
organization's weekly, the Het (Week), carried a grandiose article series 
of recollections from the "torch-bearers"—official appraisals from the na-
tional and district leaders of the organization and from the Slovak leaders 
in charge of the nationalities question in the district councils. There is 
not very much in these recollections beyond an enumeration of cultural 
and organizing activities. There is no mention in them of the cultiva-
tion of the language, only a discussion of amateur theatricals and folk 
song competitions. Admittedly, the latter, too, have always possessed a 
community-forging power. However—and this is characteristic of amateur 
movements—organizational instability and general apathy are growing in 
the ranks of the minority. This is seemingly contradicted by the constant 
growth of CSEMADOK membership: in the seventies it rose from 5 5 -
60,000 to 80,000. (It must, however, be noted here that only a very tiny 
proportion of the membership is in fact active, and that recruitment is rather 
routine—for example involving pupils in schools, and so on.) 
Whereas in the fifties CSEMADOK—much like the minority cultural 
federations in Hungary at the time—was considered "a lackey dressed in 
folk dress," by the end of the sixties had tried to turn into a kind of ethnic 
lobby. After being officially reprimanded in the seventies, its leadership 
adopted a bureaucratic style and, under the slogan of "quality in cultural 
work," it shifted the emphasis to ideological work. . . . 
It is important to add that the dearth of publications in the field of his-
torical scholarship has prompted literature and literary history to undertake 
the task of creating a healthier historical self-awareness for the minorities. 
However, this is a rather difficult undertaking on account of a very narrow 
readership and beacuse it demanded daring and inventiveness on the part of 
writers. The results of these efforts are not comparable to those prevalent 
in Hungary. . . . 
Each year, two Hungarian historical anniversaries are marked by Slovakia's 
Hungarian minority press: 1848 and 1919. The former usually consists of 
a report on the traditional ceremony staged annually at the Petofi statue 
in Pozsony. Invariably, there are articles on the role of the Hungarian 
War of Independence in European progress and on the "procrastinating" 
and "misguided" minorities policy of the Hungarian Revolution. As it has 
already been indicated,. . . . not even in 1968-69 did Pozsony's Hungarian 
journalists indulge in the euphoric spirit of 1848. Their commemorations 
always remained within the conceptual sphere of central European national 
interdependence and brotherhood. . . . 
In connection with the subject of Hungarian historical consciousness at-
tention should be paid to the questions raised in the literature of Slovakia's 
Hungarian minority that probe the relationship of collective Hungarian his-
tory and the traditions of the Hungarian minorities in neighbouring coun-
tries. In one study examining the theoretical problems of Hungarian histor-
ical scholarship in Czechoslovakia, Sandor Varga, the CSEMADOK secre-
tary in 1968-69, attempted to clarify this theme in 1977: "The notion of a 
Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia was non-existent prior to 1918. . . ." 
Precisely for this reason the history of this ethnic group up to 1918 is an 
organic part of the history of the Hungarian state and nation. In 1918, this 
segment of the Hungarian people became, almost overnight, an adjunct of 
an entirely different, new, political and economic entity. The two to three 
years that constituted the transition were unable to change significantly the 
Hungarian people's centuries of tradition and customs. A situation arose 
whereby groups of the Hungarian people differing from each other in many 
regards (here the author is thinking of the ethnic sub-groups of the Hun-
garian regions of Slovakia: the Matyusfold, Garammente, Csallokoz and 
the Palocsag) suddenly came to possess numerous common traits. They 
became the "Hungarians of Czechoslovakia. . . ." 
Before we turn to the examination of the treatment of the Hungarian mi-
nority's historical anniversaries, mention must be made of the fact that the 
more extensive and more unequivocal commemorations than those found 
in either the Transylvanian or Vojvodina press, indicate that the Hungarian 
minority in Slovakia adheres to universal Hungarian traditions, perhaps, to 
a greater extent than the Magyar minorities of Rumania and Yugoslavia. . . . 
The great Hungarian men of letters are regularly present in the Hungarian 
press of Slovakia on the pretext of their connections with Upper Hun-
gary 
The Hungarian press of Slovakia is not, however, concerned only with 
the classical Hungarian literary heritage. The achievements of post-1945 
Hungarian culture may also be found in the three papers investigated in 
this study, albeit to a far lesser extent. As a matter of fact in this regard 
the second half of the seventies witnessed a conspicuous setback. (This 
was especially noticeable in book distribution, restricted opportunities for 
subscribing to journals published in Hungary, and in the misunderstand-
ings which surfaced in connection with the publishing of works by certain 
Hungarian writers.) 
In the seventies, during the aftermath of the "crisis period," writing about 
the historical traditions of minorities became rather restricted. Contempo-
rary reporting was confined to such themes as the actions of the Czechoslo-
vak Communist Party in southern Slovakia with respect to the Hungarian 
minority, and its leaders of Hungarian nationality. At the same time, writ-
ing in the Sarlo became confined to Edgar Balogh, Laszlo Dobossy, Ferenc 
Horvath, and a few others who turned communist and also won admission 
to the Czechoslovak Communist Party. Subjects such as Czech-Hungarian 
and Slovak-Hungarian attempts at rapprochement and cooperation, also 
came into focus. . . . 
Naturally, the Hungarian minority's historical consciousness is already 
dominated by the events of Czechoslovak history. Whilst the anniversary 
of the establishment of the Czechoslovak state—following the practice of 
the Czech and Slovak press—passes almost unnoticed, the anniversaries 
related to party history (the forming of the Czechoslovak Communist Party 
[1921]; the electing of the Gottwald leadership [1929] . . . and so on) are 
given prominence. Also, each year the lessons of the year 1938 furnish 
an opportunity in the minority press, too, for praising the positive role 
played in the struggle against fascism by Czechoslovakia's emerging united 
front—under communist leadership. 
In the discussions of the wartime resistance movements the subject that 
dominates is the Slovak National Uprising. In fifteen years of commemora-
tive literature only one negative comment can be found. In his August 1969 
recollections, the scholar and teacher Kalman Hamar of Nyitra lamented 
that the internationalism of the uprising's leaders suddenly disappeared into 
thin air after 1945. Only the anniversary of the liberation of Czechoslovakia 
and of the events of 1948 in Czechoslovakia are marked for comparable 
attention in the Hungarian minority press. 
Celebrated under the name February Victory, the anniversaries of the 
"people's democratic" takeover of 25 February 1948 serve as an opportunity 
for discussing the consequences of "Ice-Breaking February" on nationalities 
policy—to use the expression of Andor Sas, a former incumbent of the 
Chair of Hungarian Studies at the University of Bratislava. The usual cue 
for this is the stereotype cliche according to which the "taking over of 
power by the working class also of necessity raised the prospects of a 
positive solution of the nationality question." 
It has already been mentioned that the anniversaries of the launching of 
Uj Szd, CSEMADOK and the other Hungarian cultural institutes provide 
ample opportunity for the evaluation of the post-1948 period. . . . It usually 
becomes the task of literary historians to debate the truth or otherwise of 
the tenet "starting from scratch." Its real basis is the void in the wake of 
the expulsion to Hungary of the majority of the Hungarian intelligentsia, 
its "voluntary" departure and the three- or four-year gap in the functioning 
of the Hungarian schools and press. The enthusiastic will to act of the 
emerging new Hungarian minority intelligentsia in the years of the person-
ality cult . . . was not followed by steps to institutionalize minority public 
life. . . . 
It may be stated that no relations exist on a regular basis between the Hun-
garians of Czechoslovakia and those living in Rumania and Yugoslavia. 
Some rare contacts in fact do take place—a case in point is, for instance, 
cooperation between the pedagogical research institutions of Bratislava and 
Novi Sad [Ujvidek], over the methodology of teaching the majority lan-
guage to minority children. But apart from this, mention in Slovakia's 
Hungarian media of the Hungarian minorities living in other countries is 
few and far between. Zoltan Fonod's 1970 report on his trip to Transyl-
vania is a unique exception in the history of Uj Szd. It is another matter 
that in spite of all this, these contacts are clearly discernible in the realm 
of literature. Thanks to the relationship between Gyula Duba and Erno 
Gall, reviews of the works of Hungarian writers living in Rumania and 
Czechoslovakia are published several times a year in both Irodalmi Szemle 
[Literary Review] and in Korunk [Our Time]. On the other hand, more 
recently, there is less and less in the one- or two-page literary columns 
of Het or Uj Szd from the works of the outstanding representatives of 
Transylvanian literature. 
The new Hungarian literary generation in Slovakia appeared on the scene 
around 1968. Under the banner of avant-garde rebelliousness it turned its 
back on the former united Hungarian literary and cultural front in Slovakia. 
Strangely enough, it regarded the youth rallying around Uj Symposion [New 
Symposium] of Vojvodina as its paragon. . . . 
Hungarian writers in Slovakia have pressed for more regular contact with 
their counterparts in Rumania and Yugoslavia—mainly in the realm of book 
publishing and book distribution. They did so in vain. Laszlo Dobos had, 
at the time, planned to launch an East-Central European paper, similar 
to Korunk [Our Time] of the interwar period, covering all the Hungarian 
minorities. Subsequently he was attacked for this idea too. 
As regards the irregularity and superficiality of these contacts, let it 
suffice to mention that we have failed to encounter a single article analyzing 
Yugoslav practice in nationalities policy. . . . It is in the introductions to 
book reviews that one might come across facts pertaining to and analyses of 
the situation of the Hungarian minority in Rumania and Yugoslavia. From 
these it turns out that even in Pozsony the network of Hungarian minority 
institutions in Vojvodina are seen as an example, a goal to be attained. . . . 
On the basis of a comparison of the condition of the Hungarian minori-
ties we believe that the Hungarian minority living in Yugoslavia is better 
off than its counterparts in Rumania and in Czechoslovakia—in every way. 
Despite its occasional drawbacks, "self-management" in Yugoslavia has 
provided the opportunity for the establishment of a network of institutions 
which rendered minority rights (also theoretically existent in Czechoslo-
vakia) attainable in practice. In contrast, the basic principle of Rumanian 
practice is a "self-sufficiency" of sorts, which, it is true, regards the Hun-
garian minority as an active factor. On the other hand, however, it makes 
every effort to impede or make impossible contact with Hungary—contact 
indispensable even in the case of the Hungarians of Transylvania. The aim 
is clearly to speed up the process of assimilation. 
In Czechoslovak practice neither the principle of "self-management," nor 
that of "self-sufficiency" are asserted. The minority is the passive subject 
of the state's policy under the full control of the majority nation, just like 
the "self-sufficient" Hungarian minority of Transylvania. Because it is not 
"self-sufficient," but rather, the beneficiary of support from Hungary, it 
cannot put in a claim for the development of its own cultural institutions, 
or secondary and higher education networks. (It is another matter that 
at one time the promise was made that the lack of higher education in 
Hungarian would be compensated by scholarships to Hungary. However, 
today there are fewer and fewer opportunities for this. A case in point is 
the discontinuation of training for actors in Hungary.) There is no need, the 
authorities claim, for another daily newspaper . . . or a Hungarian scientific 
journal . . . since in any case Hungarians are "reading" (would like to read) 
the papers published in Hungary and watch Hungarian television. 
This ambiguous minorities policy practice in Czechoslovakia already 
boasts significant results: the weakening of ethnic consciousness amongst 
the ranks of the Hungarians living in Slovakia has reached a stage when, 
even in the short run, it may corroborate the Slovak and Czech claims that 
the nationality question no longer exists in Czechoslovakia. . . . 
Editors' note: This paper is an excerpt from a larger study by Magda 
Adam on the subject of ethnic awareness, patriotism, and internationalism 
as revealed in the media of the Hungarian minorities of Czechoslovakia, 
the USSR, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. Parts of this larger work have been 
translated from the Hungarian with the help of Zsuzsa Beres of Budapest. 
Funds for financing this and other translation work have been received from 
the Soros Foundation. Presumably because this original study was prepared 
for a strictly Hungarian audience, geographic designations were given in 
it only in Hungarian. Whenever such names came up for the first time, 
we included their appropriate or closest present-day Slovak equivalents in 
parentheses. It might be added here that if a place has a distinct Magyar 
name, Hungarians will use that name, even if the particular location is 
beyond the borders of Hungary. For example, they always call Vienna by 
its Magyar name "Bees," and never the German "Wien." 
Author's note: Research on the subject has been based primarily on the 
following press publications of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia: 
Uj Szd [New Word], Irodalmi Szemle [Literary Review], Het [Week]. 
Hungarian Minority Education in Czechoslovakia: 
A Struggle for Ethnic Survival 
Karoly Nagy 
Most of Czechoslovakia's 579,600 Hungarians live in Slovakia.1 1,084,000 
Hungarians were annexed there without their consent after the 1920 Treaty 
of Trianon. According to 1980 census data, in 451 Slovak towns Hungar-
ians still constitute the majority of the population. 
Slovakia's Hungarians are subjected to a political, economic, social, and 
cultural existence of double jeopardy. On the one hand they are deprived 
of a democratic life with guaranteed human rights and freedoms. They are, 
like all citizens of the country, ruled by a communist one-party dictatorship. 
On the other hand Hungarians are also subjected to additional pressures, 
discrimination, and deprivations, resulting from governmental policies of 
denationalization, of forced assimilation.3 
Nowhere is this policy more flagrant and damaging than in the educa-
tional sector, which, next to the family, is the most important institution of 
language and culture preservation. School closings, discontinuation of Hun-
garian language use and instruction, political-social pressures on parents to 
enroll their children in Slovak-language schools, all add up to a dangerously 
diminishing opportunity for ethno-cultural continuity. School enrollment 
statistics show that, besides studying the Slovak language which is compul-
sory in all schools, the chances for Hungarian and other national minority 
students to receive instruction in their own language is steadily diminish-
ing. An example: in the 1977-78 school year 76 percent of all Hungarian 
students attended Hungarian elementary, high and vocational high schools 
and Slovak schools which offer at least some Hungarian instruction. Five 
years later, in the 1982-83 school year, this ratio decreased to 72 percent, 
or 62.5 percent, if we add the ratio of industrial schools.4 It should be added 
that in the past thirty-eight years the government has eliminated 340 Hun-
garian elementary schools in Slovakia.5 It has also completely discontinued 
the higher education programmes in Hungarian teacher training. 
Throughout his life, Oszkar Jaszi (known to North American audiences as 
Oscar Jaszi), the turn-of-the-century Hungarian scholar and publicist, con-
sistently argued and struggled for the rights of the national minorities.6 He 
leveled his strongest criticism against the forced assimilation practices of 
his own Hungarian government and society at the beginning of the century, 
upholding ethnic autonomy as the only humane, democratic and practically, 
even politically viable principle. He wrote in 1911: "There exists a uni-
versal, minimal national minorities programme, common to all national 
minority questions of the world, without the solution of which nowhere 
in the world was it ever possible to achieve peace, order and cooperation. 
This programme can be succinctly summarized thus: . . . good schools, 
good government administration and good jurisdiction which can be good 
only if offered in the people's own language." Jaszi was a socialist, but 
he also recognized that international solidarity is not possible without rec-
ognizing the importance of national or ethnic identity first. He wrote: 
"Mankind is made such that there is only one road leading to internation-
alism: the one through national existence. There is no other cultural recipe 
possible."8 In his 1926-28 monumental work about the dissolution of the 
Habsburg Monarchy he also bemoaned the fact that the new rulers of the 
dismembered Monarchy's successor states continued the inhuman forced 
assimilation policies which had been the chief obstacles to Central Euro-
pean cooperation in the past.9 He wrote: "We can witness that the same 
policies which gave a pretext for dismembering Hungary are now practiced 
by the former victims of that policy.10 "The new ruling nations, in some 
places, are practicing the same political and cultural methods, which were 
used before the war by the Germans, the Hungarians and the Poles to main-
tain their hegemony over the people they ruled." "Some of the victorious 
people did not learn from the tragic fate of the Habsburg Empire and most 
of these old methods live on in education as well as in administrative life. 
Excesses of the most flagrant nationalistic fever are poisoning the air in 
some places."11 
After the Second World War the peace treaties again thrust all the Hun-
garians in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, Rumania and Yugoslavia into 
minority status. With the possible exception of the latter country, the 
communist one-party governments demonstrated more continuity than dis-
continuity during the past forty years with regard to discrimination against 
the Hungarian minorities. What Jaszi observed in 1928, still applies today: 
some of the victorious people did not learn from old mistakes, most of the 
old forced-assimilation methods are still practiced in education as well as in 
administrative life, excesses of the most flagrant nationalism are poisoning 
the air in some places. To be sure, Jaszi did not have any illusions about 
anticipating democratic humanism of the new "socialist" ruling model. Af-
ter visiting Hungary in 1948, on the eve of the Communist Party's total 
take-over there with the support of the Soviet occupying forces, he be-
moaned the fact that "the increasingly permeating atmosphere is that of 
Eastern totalitarianism and the omnipotent state" "copying Russian dicta-
torship in every essential aspect."12 He argued that "Austrian absolutism 
and the Nazis were annihilated in vain if the country submits itself now to 
a new, ruthless imperialism."13 
Subsequent events have proved Jaszi's forebodings all too correct, and 
not only for Hungary: totalitarian dictatorships suffocated the Soviet-do-
minated regions of Europe for about a decade to come. And, although 
after violent upheavals of protest in East Germany and Poland, after the 
Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and the "Prague Spring" of 1968, economic 
reforms and a semblance of democratization have achieved some movement 
from totalitarianism towards authoritarianism in Hungary, Czechoslovakia 
is still suffering from a very predominantly anti-democratic dictatorship in 
all spheres of life and Rumania's population is completely subjugated by a 
totalitarian police state. It is in these latter two countries that minorities— 
Hungarian, German, Ukrainian, Jewish, and others—suffer from the most 
persistent and systematic discrimination, described by some as European 
Apartheid, cultural genocide, or ethnocide. 
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During the night of May 10, 1984, Dr. Miklos Duray was arrested for 
the second time in Bratislava (Pozsony), Slovakia's capital city, where he 
works as a geologist.14 He was charged by the police under sections 112 and 
199 of the criminal code, i.e.: "perpetrating activities damaging to the ex-
ternal interests of the Republic" and "propagating false, inciting rumors"— 
charges usually leveled against political dissidents there—punishable with 
a maximum penalty of three years and six months respectively. Dr. Duray 
was imprisoned in solitary confinement, he was not permitted even to see a 
lawyer, or a visitor. On September 29, the police dropped the two charges 
and submitted a new indictment against him, this time: Section 98 of the 
penal code: i.e.: "subversion," which carries a penalty of one to five years 
imprisonment, but, if committed with the aid of a foreign power, three to 
ten years. Later, he was granted permission to be visited by his wife during 
Christmas and on two other occasions, and they placed him in a cell with 
others. On May 10, 1985, at 12:30 p.m. he was released under the terms 
of a limited amnesty, with all charges withdrawn. 
What did Dr. Duray in fact do to deserve to be imprisoned for 470 days 
from November 10, 1982 to February 22, 1983 and from May 10, 1984 to 
May 10, 1985? 
Miklos Duray was born on July 18, 1945, in Losonc (Lucenec). He 
describes, in his autobiographical work: Kutyaszorito]5 , how he began, 
as a student in the 1960's, to participate in political life, in Hungarian 
student clubs and associations. He became one of the leading organizers 
of the Hungarian democratic youth movement in Slovakia. The movement 
and its leaders suffered from increasing political and police pressures until, 
finally, they could no longer continue their functions. He became keenly 
aware, during his years as a student activist, that Hungarians and other 
national minorities suffer discrimination in all walks of life. The official 
anti-minority policies and practices are fanned and made worse by Slovak 
anti-Hungarian nationalism which, like racism and anti-Semitism of other 
times and places, permeates the entire social fabric. 
During the spring of 1978, alarming news of a comprehensive govern-
mental policy plan reached some Hungarian minority circles in Slovakia 
about "educational reorganization." According to the plans, from the fall of 
1978 the language of instruction was to be changed in all Hungarian schools 
to Slovak, in all classes above the fifth grade, with the exception of four 
subjects: Hungarian grammar and literature, geography and history. This 
would have meant that the Hungarian schools would have become Slovak 
schools with only some subjects taught in Hungarian. 
A sharp protest by a substantial number of concerned Hungarians made 
the government postpone the plans for a few months. It was during this 
year that, as one of the acts of protest, Miklos Duray and others, founded 
the "Committee for the Defense of the Rights of the Hungarian Minority in 
Czechoslovakia" (Csehszlovakiai Magyar Kisebbseg Jogvedo Bizottsaga). 
The Committee began to conduct a clandestine information and protest 
campaign. In November of 1978 the government's Department of Ed-
ucation, jointly with the Slovak Communist Party's Central Committee, 
officially revealed their "educational reorganization" plan, a version of the 
previously tabled programme. This time the popular protest was even more 
vigorous and widespread than before. Even the governmental "National-
ity Secretariat" and the officially approved—and controlled—Hungarian 
cultural organization, the CSEMADOK (Csehszlovakiai Magyar Dolgozok 
Kulturegyesiilete, i.e. Czechoslovak Hungarian Workers' Cultural Associ-
ation) officially registered their disapproval. 
The Committee for the Defence of the Rights of the Hungarian Mi-
nority in Czechoslovakia (CDRHMC) managed to intensify its activities. 
Their letters reached many thousands of citizens, and they succeeded in 
smuggling their memoranda, situation reports and documents to Hungary 
as well as to Austria, France, West Germany and the United States, where 
they received increasing publicity. They sent petitions to the Czechoslovak 
government, letters to the leaders of Charter 77—the dissident group of 
Czechoslovak intellectuals (of which Duray is a member)—and presented 
a detailed memorandum to the 1980-81 Madrid Review Conference of the 
Helsinki Agreement (the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe), and in 1981, a comprehensive documentary study 
to the London Minority Rights Group. All of these were published in a 
number of languages in Western countries. The police reacted by increased 
harassment of the group with repeated house searches, interrogations, and 
surveillance, and by the arrest of Miklos Duray on November 10, 1982, 
An international campaign of protest ensued. Government officials, writ-
ers (including Irving Howe, Susan Sontag and Kurt Vonnegut) newspapers, 
organizations (Amnesty International, Helsinki Watch, the Hungarian Hu-
man Rights Foundation and many others—in Europe and in the United 
States), demanded Duray's release. There were also rumours of meetings, 
even negotiations between some of Hungary's and Czechoslovakia's party 
and government officials, but there were no Hungarian governmental public 
statements made then, either about Duray's arrest, or about any other acts 
of discrimination against the Hungarian national minorities in East Central 
Europe. At the time there was no discernible official Hungarian policy 
in existence on this issue. Apparently, the Hungarian government of the 
time was not aware of Jaszi's admonition, made after the 1920 dismem-
berment of Hungary, that the country's subsequent policy must "demand 
with uncompromising intransigence that Hungarians not only be citizens 
with equal rights within their new states, but that they can stay Hungarians 
in their language and culture, in full undisturbed spiritual contact with the 
7 - 8 million Hungarians left in the old motherland."16 After a two-day trial, 
on January 31 and February 1 of 1983, Duray was released but the charges 
against him were not withdrawn. 
The government's campaign to liquidate Hungarian schools continued. 
Between February and November of 1983, two versions of governmental 
legislative proposal were revealed. The November 25 version—Resolution 
345, clause 32a—contained two paragraphs which, in effect, aimed at pro-
viding legal foundations for the elimination of Hungarian, German, Polish, 
and Ukrainian minority language schools. It stated: [in paragraph 4] "The 
Ministry of Education can authorize some subjects to be taught in the Slo-
vak or Czech language in the nationality-language schools if the locally 
responsible national committees, based on agreement with the students' 
parents, submit proposals to this effect." And [in paragraph 5] "The Min-
istry of Education can decree some definite subjects in some schools to 
be taught in other than the schools' language of instruction." All citi-
zens, ruled by dictatorial governments, know what phrases, like "based on 
agreement with the students' parents" really mean. In actual practice they 
give license—even an instruction—to local party and government officials 
to "obtain" such "agreements" from the parents by all the means that the 
local powers control. And they do control virtually all the means: jobs, 
income, housing, travel, health, children's school admissions and grand-
parents' retirement pensions, just to mention some of the most obvious 
ones. Pressures on parents to discontinue the maintenance of their minor-
ity language and culture have been systematically applied all along—the 
present legislation would have legalized, expanded, and accelerated the 
denationalization programme with the force of law. 
CDRHMS again organized a protest campaign. Miklos Duray wrote a 
letter to President Gustav Husak, dated February 12, 1984, pointing out that 
the proposed legislation is unconstitutional, because the 1960 Constitution 
and 1968 Constitutional Law Concerning the Nationalities, guaranteed the 
right of the country's national minorities to maintain their schools and to 
develop their cultures in their own languages. During the early spring of 
1984, more than ten thousand citizens from all walks of life wrote letters 
of protest to various governmental and party forums. Again, the protests 
were partly successful. 
The Slovak National Council 's April 2, 1984, session enacted the Gov-
ernmental legislative proposal except for paragraphs 4 and 5. What limited 
the protesters' success was a statement of the Minister of Education, Juraj 
Busa, which declared that the excluded paragraphs would be put in effect 
by Ministry ordinances. 
On May 10 Duray was again arrested. This time an even more widespread 
international protest ensued. This activity must have been at least partly 
responsible for his release, with amnesty, on May 10, 1985. Hungarian 
and non-Hungarian writers, intellectuals, politicians, organizations and in-
dividuals in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, in Western Europe, the 
Americas, even in Australia and Japan, wrote thousands of letters, made 
official statements, publicized their indignation, demanding Duray's im-
mediate release. In a letter after his release, thanking everyone for their 
actions and expressions of solidarity, Duray wrote: "International support 
and help was effective not only to me, personally, but even more to the 
cause of minority rights which must be part of the conscience of interna-
tional politics."17 
The historically consistent cause-and-effect relationship which exists be-
tween political democracy and opportunities for minority culture mainte-
nance is evident in the case of the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia. The 
fate of Hungarian language and culture there depends, to a large extent, on 
whether or not Czechoslovakia will be able to democratize its society. 
The struggle of Hungarians for cultural survival in Slovakia is a demo-
cratic movement. Its practices and expressions emphasize constitutionally 
guaranteed legal rights, freedom of choice, of information, of expression, 
of conscience. In fact, the movement attempts to translate the formally 
pronounced legal rights to actual practices, thus it strives for the democra-
tization of society at large. 
No actions or pronouncements bear any signs of chauvinism on the part 
of the Hungarians struggling for national survival in Slovakia. They do not 
seem to answer anti-Hungarian nationalism with counter-nationalism. In 
fact, they always emphasize equal regard and equal rights for both majority 
and minority groups. This stance might have been one of the reasons that 
prompted a number of leading Czechoslovak intellectuals to write open 
letters to their government demanding Duray's release. The Hungarian 
minority leaders base their struggle on the principles of self-determination. 
And as Hungarian thinker Istvan Bibo asserted in 1972: "The principle of 
self-determination. . . , when taken seriously and applied in practice, is the 
only realistic antidote to states and complexes of superiority, of subjugation 
and of fear, which give birth to nationalism." 
The role of the Hungarian government regarding the case of Duray was 
that of a woefully unfulfilled historical responsibility. When citizens in 
dozens of countries raised their voices demanding the fulfillment of basic 
human rights for oppressed Hungarian minorities, Hungary's government 
remained silent. An example of this malign neglect: no Hungarian embassy 
or consulate in any country has any information in any language about 
the Hungarian minorities, in spite of the fact that about one third of the 
approximately 16 million Hungarians of the world live outside of Hungary's 
present borders. 
Sustained international awareness and readiness for active support does 
seem to help human life and human rights efforts of groups and individ-
uals in a world community of increased communication capabilities, in-
creasing interdependence and growing nuclear danger. Hunger in Ethiopia, 
Apartheid in South Africa, the oppression of the Hungarian minorities in 
East Central Europe, terrorism in the Middle East and Latin America, sup-
pression of the Solidarity movement in Poland, affects us all, therefore is 
the responsibility of us all. We need to increase our will, ways, and means 
of fulfilling our responsibility. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1. 
Number of Hungarian elementary schools in Slovakia, 1950-1988 
Year Number of Hungarian Elementary Schools 
1950 609 
1970 490 
1982 295 
1985 277 
1988 269 
Table 2. 
Hungarian Students Receiving all 
or Some Hungarian and only Slovak Instruction 
Percent of Hungarian Percent of Hungarian 
Students Receiving all Students in Schools 
or some Hungarian Offering only Slovak 
School Type Instruction Instruction 
1977-78 1982-83 1977-78 1982-83 
Elementary 79 76 21 24 
High 83 75 17 25 
Vocational High 67 64 33 36 
Industrial n.a. 35 n.a. 65 
Total: 76 62.5 24 37.5 

Soviet Nationality Policy 
in Carpatho-Ukraine since World War II: 
The Hungarians of Sub-Carpathia 
S.B. Vardy 
The land that since World War I has been known variously as "Carpatho-
Ruthenia," "Sub-Carpathia," "Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia," and since World 
War II also as "Carpatho-Ukraine" and "Trans-Carpathia" did not even have 
a name of its own, let alone a specific identity before the collapse of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire—and therein historic Hungary—in 1918. For a 
whole millennium it was simply part of the Kingdom of Hungary, or to be 
more exact, of the northeastern Hungarian highlands. It had become part 
of the country in the late 9th century, when the majority of the conquering 
Hungarians crossed the Carpathian Mountains at the Verecke Pass—the 
gateway to Carpatho-Ruthenia and to the whole Carpathian Basin. 
Following the Hungarian conquest, this mountainous region of less than 
5,000 square miles remained part of Hungary right up to the end of World 
War I, when in consequence of the Treaty of Trianon (June 4, 1920) it 
was transferred to the newly founded Czechoslovak state. After Hitler's 
dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in 1938 and 1939, Carpatho-Ruthenia 
was reincorporated into Hungary. Then, at the end of World War II, it was 
lost again, this time to the Soviet Union. The Soviets acquired it on the 
basis of a Czechoslovak-Soviet agreement (June 29, 1945), one year after 
effective control had already been taken over by the Soviet Army. 
To the Hungarians, the loss of Carpatho-Ruthenia meant basically the 
loss of an ancient Hungarian land, and—after 1945—the intrusion of the 
dreaded "Eastern Colossus" into the Carpathian heartland. To the Sovi-
ets, on the other hand, this transfer was the "reunion" of an allegedly 
"ancient Slavic homeland" to the "mother country" that came a thousand 
years too late, i.e. after a millennium of dominance by the "Hungarian 
aristocracy and capitalists."1 Ever since 1945 this fiction of "reunion" 
has been the main theme of all Soviet historical and political pronounce-
ments concerning this region notwithstanding the fact that prior to 1918 
Carpatho-Ruthenia has never had any connections with any of the earlier 
Slavonic states. Moreover, the great majority of the local Ruthenians or 
Rusyns have migrated to the area only between the 14th and 17th cen-
turies. This influx, combined with their natural growth in the hidden and 
protected valleys of the northeastern Carpathians, gradually made them into 
the majority nationality in that area. Thus, by 1910 the region's popula-
tion of 571,488 was composed of 319,361 Rusyns (55.8 percent), 169,434 
Hungarians (29.7 percent), 62,182 Germans (10.9 percent), 15,382 Ruma-
nians (2.7 percent), 4,067 Slovaks (0.7 percent), and 1,062 others (0.2 
percent). 
Given the nature of these nationality statistics and the lack of any histor-
ical claims by the Czechs and the Slovaks, Carpatho-Ruthenia's attachment 
to Czechoslovakia in 1918-1920 was motivated purely by political consid-
erations, and more specifically by French interests in the area. It certainly 
violated the Wilsonian principle of national self-determination—both of 
the largely anational Rusyns whose only perceptible loyalty was to Hun-
gary (their forced identification with the Ukrainians came later), and of 
the Hungarians who now were forcibly detached from the mother coun-
try. Political and administrative power in Carpatho-Ruthenia fell into the 
hands of Czech "carpetbaggers" who, while bringing elements of modern-
ization to the province, treated its population rather offhandedly. They also 
introduced land reform at the expense of the Hungarian landowners, but 
left the landless Hungarian peasantry out of the benefits of this long over-
due socio-economic transformation. Thus, of the 260,115 holds (372,000 
acres) expropriated and distributed, Hungarians received only 19,000 holds 
(27,000 acres).3 
In addition to offhand treatment by Czech administrators, the Hungarians 
also had to suffer mistreatment at the hands of the increasingly intolerant 
and aggressive Slovak and Ukrainian nationalists. Czechs and Rusyns were 
forcibly settled in pure Hungarian villages, where they were given free 
lands and funds for building homes and churches. The same villages were 
also compelled to open Czech, Slovak and Ukrainian schools at the same 
time when the nearly 200,000 strong Hungarian population of Carpatho-
Ruthenia during the 1930s had only a single Hungarian secondary school 
at Beregszasz (Berehovo, Beregovo). 
In 1939, after Czechoslovakia's dismemberment, the Hungarian army 
reconquered Carpatho-Ruthenia, and did so with Polish approval. At that 
time Stalin still regarded the views of the Ukrainian nationalists concerning 
the future of that province as not even worthy of consideration. In the 
course of World War II, however, Stalin's views changed, and by 1944 
he openly demanded that "Carpatho-Ukraine" (a newly fabricated term) be 
united with Soviet Ukraine.4 It was this demand that found fulfillment on 
June 29, 1945, with the already mentioned Czechoslovak-Soviet agreement 
of that date. 
The Soviet Takeover 
We know very little about the months and years that followed the Soviet 
acquisition of Carpatho-Ruthenia, except that the new authorities did ev-
erything in their power to clean out all pockets of resistance. The two 
nationalities who suffered the most were the Hungarians and the Rusyns 
who refused to be categorized as "Ukrainians." The new Soviet author-
ities were unusually harsh with the members of the Greek or Byzantine 
Catholic clergy, virtually all of whom supported the idea of a distinct 
Rusyn nationhood. But of all the people of Carpatho-Ruthenia, it was the 
Hungarians who suffered the most. According to spotty reports that ap-
peared in the contemporary Western press, all manifestations of Hungarian 
national consciousness were suppressed, including even the speaking of 
Hungarian. Moreover, a sizable portion of the Hungarian male population 
was deported to the interior of the Ukraine. Much of this was being done 
in secret, although reports of the consequences of this deportation did seep 
across the new Soviet-Hungarian border. There were also reports about the 
massacre of some of the resisting peasants, e.g. in Nagydobrony (Velikaya 
Dobron) where allegedly the population was decimated in the summer of 
1945 (July 8).5 
Most of the repercussions following the Soviet takeover constitute a 
tightly kept secret. Yet, some of these were alluded to in an article by two 
Hungarian literati from Carpatho-Ruthenia in 1970 in the Hungarian peri-
odical Tiszataj.6 Moreover, sections of it were also republished recently in a 
major compendium of Hungarian literature abroad. Writing very carefully 
the two authors alleged: 
The pseudo-state that came into being on the area of Sub-Carpathia— 
i.e. Zakarpatska Ukraina—existed from November 1944 until January 
1946. The policy of our power structure . . . was dominated only by 
two considerations: those of Ukrainian nationalism and the personality 
cult, both of them amplified by the conditions of the war. The unlaw-
ful and discrediting measures [of this policy] brought irreparable harm 
and dealt a powerful blow to the Hungarians of Sub-Carpathia. . . . 
At the end of 1944 the whole Hungarian adult male population was 
temporarily deported into the inner regions of the Ukraine, from where 
they were able to return only after several years . . . Hungarian sec-
ondary schools were abolished . . . This policy of discrediting [the 
Hungarians] continued to a certain degree even after January 1946 
when Sub-Carpathia received a new status. Only very slowly and only 
in certain areas did it gradually begin to approach the norms of Lenin-
ist nationality policy . . . Not until 1954-1955 did the initial signs of 
relaxation appear, when Hungarian secondary schools were gradually 
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reopened, at first in the cities and then also in the villages . . . 
The history of those bitter transitional years is still largely unwritten 
and the living witnesses are fast passing away. The latter include also the 
noted Sub-Carpathian Hungarian poet Vilmos Kovacs (1927-1977), one of 
the authors of the above article, with whom the author of this study was 
still able to speak one year before his death, at the time when Kovacs was 
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desperately trying to emigrate to Hungary. 
Carpatho-Ruthenia 's Hungarian Population 
According to the Soviet census of 1979, there were 171,000 Hungarians 
in the Soviet Union, of whom 164,000 lived in Carpatho-Ruthenia.9 Their 
actual number, however, is probably closer to 200,000, as a sizable portion 
of them declared themselves "Ukrainians" or "Russians" so as to enhance 
their career opportunities. This is indicated, among others, by the fact that 
there are many more who claim Hungarian as a mother tongue, than those 
who claim to be of the Hungarian nationality. (According to one estimate 
for the year 1979, the figures are: 200,000 to 220,000 [mother tongue] 
versus 180,000 [nationality])10 If we take 200,000 as a working figure— 
which is also used by most of the Hungarian newspapers—this still speaks 
of a sizable population loss since World War II. In 1941 the same province 
had a Hungarian population of 223,649, which in the meanwhile should 
have grown to nearly 300,000. While much of this loss is permanent— 
i.e. the direct result of World War II and its consequences—some of it 
is only apparent. Given the right circumstances, the number of the Sub-
Carpathian Hungarians would undoubtedly go up significantly through the 
simple process of self-reclassification. Even so, however, they would still 
constitute only 20 percent of the province's population of 1,183,000 (1984) 
as opposed to the 30 percent prior to 1918. 
The majority of the Hungarians live on the southern and western fringes 
of Carpatho-Ruthenia, directly adjacent to today's Hungary and to their fel-
low Hungarians in Czechoslovakia. The district of Beregszasz, for example 
is 95 percent Hungarian, and there are also significant and compact Hungar-
ian ethnic islands in the districts of Munkacs (Munkachevo), Nagyszollos 
(Vinogradovo, Sevliush) and Ungvar (Uzhorod, Uzhgorod). With a few 
exceptions, these Hungarians keep close to one another and refuse to mix 
with the Rusyn/Ukrainian and Russian majority. This fact is acknowledged, 
among others, by a Soviet ethnographic report published in a 1970 issue 
of the Sovietskaya etnografiya, which reads as follows: 
The largest national minority with the longest history of settlement 
here are the Hungarians (c. 160,000) who live in well-defined settle-
ments on the southern and western lowlands [of Carpatho-Ruthenia]. 
During the two months of our expedition we have visited twenty-seven 
Hungarian villages of between 500 and 7,000 inhabitants. The pop-
ulation of the great majority of these villages is almost exclusively 
Hungarian. From among the many nationalities they live in proxim-
ity only with the Ukrainians [i.e. Rusyns] and the Russians, who are 
employed largely in the local educational and health institutions. In 
these villages the Hungarians are strongly attached to their national 
traditions. Even today only a few of them speak Russian or Ukrainian, 
notwithstanding the fact that these languages are taught in the Hun-
garian schools. Hungarian-Ukrainian marriages are rare . . . There are 
also villages of mixed nationality in the region, but in those villages 
the nationalities are locally segregated . . . n 
The content of this quotation is most revealing. It tells us both of the So-
viet tactics to denationalize the Hungarians by filling their local educational, 
cultural and health institutions with Ukrainized Rusyns and Russians (who 
are usually zealous advocates of their respective nationalities), as well as 
of the Hungarians' strong resistance to this denationalization effort. They 
simply refuse to learn Russian and Ukrainian, and also decline to marry 
outside their own nationality. This form of resistance, however, also has its 
drawbacks. The most significant is that it condemns most of the Hungarians 
to a perpetually lowly position in society, as any form of social advance-
ment immediately implies both the need to know Ukrainian and Russian, 
as well as the showing of at least some outward signs of assimilation. 
It should be noted here that while official publications identify the two 
dominant nationalities as "Ukrainians" and "Russians," the former of these 
are really Rusyns, although a large number of them did become Ukrainized. 
As such, there are in effect three East Slavic nationalities in the province of 
whom the Rusyns—who have remained faithful to their own nationality— 
are the least influential. The most vocal and intolerant toward Hungarians 
are the "Ukrainians" who have either fallen under the influence of the un-
usually emotional and demanding Ukrainian nationalism, or opted to go 
along with the official line simply for opportunistic reasons. The Russians, 
on the other hand, are newcomers to the area who were settled there as 
a result of the conscious effort on the part of the Soviet Government to 
Russify the cities of Carpatho-Ruthenia. The Rusyns who have remained 
faithful to their own nationality generally sympathize and fraternize with 
the Hungarians. They do so not only because of their common traditions, 
but also because of their commonly shared intense dislike of the intolerant 
Ukrainian nationalists as the "vostoknichiks" or "Eastern carpetbaggers." 
As a matter of fact, many of the Rusyns also speak some Hungarian and— 
if our sources are right—they often use Hungarian in the presence of the 
Russians and the Ukrainians so as to prevent the latter from following their 
conversations. In this connection it should also be mentioned that, contrary 
to the overbearing Ukrainian nationalists, the newly settled Russians have 
no anti-Hungarian feelings. They generally look up to the Hungarians as 
representatives of the envied Western culture and way of life, and many of 
their women dream of marrying Hungarian intellectuals. They generally re-
gard a marriage to a Hungarian as a significant step upward; a phenomenon 
which is also evident from the attitude of the bedazzled Russian tourists in 
Hungary. Hungarian men, on the other hand, generally enter such marriage 
primarily for existential reasons, regarding it as the surest way to advance 
their career opportunities. While perhaps questionable ethically, this at-
titude is the direct result of the unwritten law which proclaims that only 
Hungarians with Russian or Ukrainian marriage partners have a chance to 
rise significantly in Carpatho-Ruthenian society.1" Of these two partners, 
however, the Russian wife appears to be preferable. She ties the Hun-
garian to the first among the two dominant nationalities, and—so we are 
told—it also saves him from the constant barrage of emotional pressures 
represented by the insatiated Ukrainian nationalism. 
Education, Ideology and Historical Thinking 
It is one of the unwritten laws of national minority life that the continued 
existence and future of a national minority depends to a large degree on its 
ability to cultivate and perpetuate its language. Once it loses its language— 
i.e. once it becomes linguistically assimilated—it also loses its identity as 
a separate nationality. And it is in this area, or rather in the area of the cul-
tivation of their language where the Hungarians of Carpatho-Ruthenia are 
most endangered, despite their well-known resistance to denationalization. 
We already know from the cited report by Vilmos Kovacs and Andras 
Benedek that in the decade between 1944 and 1954 all Hungarian secondary 
schools were closed, and only in the late 1950s were the Hungarians again 
given the chance to study in their mother tongue. Even then, however, 
they faced the problem of not having Hungarian teachers and thus being 
taught by Rusyns or Ukrainians who could barely speak their language. The 
reasons behind this shortage of Hungarian teachers were: first, at the end 
of World War II most Sub-Carpathian Hungarian intellectuals fled or were 
deported; second, until 1963 there was no institution of higher learning in 
Carpatho-Ruthenia that was equipped to train Hungarian teachers in their 
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own mother tongue. 
As we know from a number of recent reports in Hungarian newspa-
pers and periodicals, in the early 1980s there were about 70-72 Hungarian 
schools in Carpatho-Ruthenia, which are divided into the following three 
categories: 1) Hungarian schools where the language of instruction is Hun-
garian, but often with one day per week being a "Russian Day" when only 
Russian is used; 2) bi-lingual schools that have parallel Hungarian and 
Russian or Hungarian and Ukrainian classes; and 3) amended Hungarian 
schools where special Russian or Ukrainian speaking classes have been set 
up for Hungarian children.14 Of these three types, it is perhaps the third type 
that is the most dangerous, for it usually results in the forced enrollment 
of Hungarian students in Russian or Ukrainian classes in purely Hungarian 
villages. The parents are usually pressured into enrolling their children 
in such classes so that the few artificially settled Russians and Ukrainians 
would have their own school. Such is the case in Nagydobrony, for ex-
ample, whose 6,550 inhabitants contain only 270 newly settled Ukrainians 
and Russians (i.e. 4 percent of the population), yet its Hungarian school 
now has parallel Russian classes. And what is even more meaningful, 99 
percent of the students in these Russian classes are Hungarians.15 
As opposed to this special treatment of a few newly settled Russians and 
Ukrainians in purely Hungarian villages, Hungarians in mixed villages are 
given very few chances to study in their own language—in direct violation 
of the Soviet Constitution. One of the examples is the town of Raho which 
has a Hungarian population of 1,400 (12 percent of the population and 
equivalent to a medium-size village), yet there are no Hungarian schools. 
There are many other towns and villages where half of the population is 
Hungarian, yet they either have no Hungarian schools at all, or at best 
Hungarian children can study in their own mother tongue only in the first 
three grades. Then they usually have to transfer to Ukrainian schools, with 
all the disadvantages this involves. In most instances Hungarian children 
in these towns are not even permitted to study Hungarian language and 
literature on an elective basis, even though there are Hungarian teachers 
who would be willing to teach them.16 
The number of the Hungarian schools is on the decline. Thus, whereas 
in 1968-1969 there were still 93 purely Hungarian schools and only 6 
mixed schools, by the following year the former had declined to 68, while 
the latter increased to 29. During the same timespan there was also a 10 
percent decline in the number of students enrolled in Hungarian schools 
from 22,800 to 20,873.17 Of the 70-72 Hungarian schools of the early 
1980s, about 31 were ten-year schools, i.e. a combination of primary and 
secondary schools typical of the Soviet educational system.18 There are, 
however, no Hungarian kindergartens that supply the early foundations of 
education in the mother tongue. Hungarian children therefore are unable 
to familiarize themselves with the basic concepts of education in their own 
language. This generally confuses them and hinders their education once 
they enter Hungarian schools. To avoid the resulting problems, many par-
ents give in to the relentless pressures from kindergarten teachers and local 
administrators, and enroll their children in Ukrainian or Russian language 
schools. Often these pressures are all the more successful as the parents 
are given to understand that enrolling their children in Hungarian schools 
in effect puts them at a disadvantage as compared to those who study in 
Ukrainian or Russian.19 
The results of this policy of discrimination are clearly evident already 
on the secondary level. As there are no Hungarian technical high schools 
in the whole province, all children who wish to study one of the technical 
fields have to enter a Russian or Ukrainian school. Moreover, they also 
have to take their entrance examinations in one of these languages—with 
the predictable results. 
This also holds true for the entrance examinations at the Uzhorod State 
University, even though this is a clear violation of the students' rights 
as guaranteed by the constitution. As discussed in a special report by 
a Hungarian literary circle known as the "Forras Studio," which after its 
disbandment in 1971 became a kind of "protest group," local and university 
officials always find a way to prevent the graduates of Hungarian schools 
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from competing on an equal basis. The result is that Hungarians enter the 
province's only university in much fewer numbers than do the Ukrainians 
and the Russians. In 1970, for example, only 9.4 percent of the admitted 
students at Uzhorod State University was Hungarian, which is barely half 
their share of the population.21 This, in spite of the fact that Hungarians 
traditionally constituted the most educated segment of Carpatho-Ruthenia's 
population. Given this situation, the future of Hungarian education in that 
province is rather bleak. But what is perhaps even worse, this bleakness 
also extends to the spirit and content of their education. This is particularly 
evident from what they are permitted and obliged to read and to study 
about Hungarian history, literature and culture in general. And it is also 
evident from the professional difficulties faced by Hungarians enrolled at 
the 10,000-11,000 student Uzhorod State University.22 
First to be noted is that of the nearly 1,000 Hungarians studying at this 
university only a small fraction can study a few of the subjects in their 
native tongue, while the rest of them study only in Ukrainian or Russian. 
These few "privileged" students are those enrolled in the Department of 
Hungarian Studies established in 1963 for the purposes of training Hungar-
ian teachers for the re-established Hungarian schools of Carpatho-Ruthenia. 
After an initial annual number of 20 enrollees, today the Department admits 
only 10 students per year. But as even these ten graduates have difficul-
ties in finding appropriate positions, in 1979 the Department had only two 
applicants.23 
The training of these students is also rather deficient for—as pointed 
out recently by a member of the faculty—they are only taught Hungar-
ian language, linguistics and literature, but not the technical language of 
the various disciplines they are obliged to teach in the primary and sec-
ondary schools. Thus, these future educators are compelled to acquire the 
basic linguistic skills of their disciplines on their own, which is all the 
more difficult as the acquisition of the appropriate Hungarian books is next 
to impossible. In the early 1980s the faculty of the Department of Hun-
garian Studies consisted of three linguists (Istvan Kotyuk, Imre Zekany 
and Katalin Horvath) and three literary scholars (Vera Vaszocsik, Erzsebet 
Gertvay and Sandor Fodo). It is chaired, however, by the Rusyn-Ukrainian 
Linguist Petro Lizanec, who is also the Dean of the Faculty of Arts and 
is dubbed as a "lover of our language." It is indicative of the Depart-
ment 's quality and ideological orientation that—outside of a few courses 
on Ukrainian-Hungarian and Russian-Hungarian literary connections—the 
bulk of its literary offerings consists of such courses as "Lenin's Image in 
Hungarian Literature," "Sevchenko and Hungary," "The Problem of Inter-
nationalism and the Critique of Hungarian Bourgeois Nationalism in Hun-
garian Literature," "Anti-Religious Motifs in Hungarian Literature," etc.24 
In addition to performing their teaching duties, the faculty members are 
also engaged in research. But their topics are usually limited to the Hun-
garian folklore, ethnography, and linguistics of Carpatho-Ruthenia, without 
any possibility of studying their own people's history. This is all the more 
significant as it is precisely in the area of history and historical conscious-
ness where the province's Hungarians are subjected to the greatest degree 
of psychological emasculation. 
One of the best examples of this phenomenon is the scandalously primi-
tive "prize winning" work with the title: A boldogsag fele. Karpatontul 
vazlatos tortenete [Towards Happiness. The Outline History of Trans-
Carpathia]. Published in 1975 by the foreign language publishing house of 
Uzhorod/Ungvar, the Karpati Konyvkiado, this work was authored by a col-
lection of allegedly distinguished academicians. Its quality and tendencious 
nature, however, is revealed by its very title, which hardly needs any expla-
nation to a Western scholar. The millennial history of this region—which 
suddenly was renamed Trans-Carpathia, even though it was on "this" side 
of the Carpathians, i.e. "inside" the Carpathian Basin ever since creation— 
is depicted as a thousand year long struggle of the "oppressed Ukrainians" 
to reach eternal happiness inside the "Soviet heaven." To quote: 
For many centuries Trans-Carpathia had been forcibly torn from the 
motherland, and its working people suffered under the relentless social, 
economic, political and national oppression of Hungarian aristocrats, 
Austrian barons, Czech capitalists and their 'own' exploiters. Notwith-
standing all this, however, the toilers have preserved their language 
and culture, as well as their feelings of unity with the Ukrainian peo-
ple and with their common historical traditions. Through many cen-
turies they have sustained themselves with the desire of reunification 
. . . [Thus] the reunification of Trans-Carpathian Ukraine with Soviet 
Ukraine in 1945 was the triumph of historical justice. It was a turn-
ing point in the history of the province and a shining example of the 
implementation of the wise Leninist nationality policy of the Soviet 
Communist Party and the Soviet Government . . . The many centuries 
of heroic struggles of the toilers of Trans-Carpathia . . . thus came to 
a [triumphant] end . . . with the province's liberation and reunification 
with its motherland, Soviet Ukraine.26 
This type of political oratory, combined with half-truths and conscious 
misinterpretation of historical facts, makes up much of the content of this 
volume. And it is being passed off as the first "scientific history" of 
Carpatho-Ruthenia that is to replace all earlier works produced by "bour-
geois falsificators of history." This itself could still be passed off as irre-
sponsible pamphleteering were it not for the fact that the book was authored 
by a dozen Soviet historians based on the "archival sources" of three coun-
tries and the "published results of Soviet scholarship;" and were it not that 
in 1974 it was awarded an "Honorary Diploma" in Moscow as a work of 
great historical significance, and that its content is basically identical with 
the type of "history" that the psychologically emaciated Hungarians of the 
region have been obliged to study and to teach as the "true history" of 
their more immediate homeland ever since Carpatho-Ruthenia's incorpo-
ration into the Soviet Union.27 Given the above, the content of this work 
has to be regarded as the true reflection of the mentality that dominates 
historical thinking and scholarship in Carpatho-Ruthenia. 
Journalism and Book Publishing 
Nominally the Hungarians of Carpatho-Ruthenia have several Hungarian 
newspapers. These include the four-page daily Karpati Igaz Szd [Carpathian 
True Word] which appears in about 38,000 copies, as well as several tri-
weekly papers and other occasional publications. 
Between 1946 and 1965 the Karpati Igaz Szd was simply a verbatim 
translation of the Ukrainian Zakarpatska Pravda, but in the latter year it 
became an independent paper under the editorship of the poet and novelist 
Laszlo Balla (born in 1927) who is one of the thee Hungarian members of 
the Soviet Writers' Union (the other two being Borbala Szalai and Karoly 
D. Balla, Laszlo's son). In actuality, however, the Karpati Igaz Szd and 
its sister papers have no real independence. They are basically Soviet 
Ukrainian papers in the Hungarian language, with only a small percentage 
of their space devoted specifically to Carpatho-Hungarian matters. More-
over, they lack all elements of the Hungarian spirit. Nor can they represent 
the interests of the Hungarian minority against the universal Gleichschal-
tung represented by the Soviet mentality and Ukrainian nationalism that 
dominate all aspects of social and intellectual life in the province. This as-
sertion holds true for all Hungarian language papers of Carpatho-Ruthenia, 
including, in addition to the Karpati Igaz Szd, such tri-weekly papers as 
the Karpatontuli Ifjusag [Trans-Carpathian Youth] which is the Hungar-
ian translation of the province's official Komsomol paper; as well as the 
Voros Zaszlo [Red Flag] of Beregszasz, the Kommunizmus Fenyei [Lights 
of Communism] of Ungvar, and the Kommunizmus Zaszlaja [The Commu-
nist Flag] of Nagyszollos. The very titles of these papers are indicative 
of their content. Thus, outside of a few original literary pieces by local 
authors, they are filled with political propaganda reminiscent of the dark-
est years of Stalinist rule in Hungary (i.e. the age of Rakosi). Most of 
the articles are written by various party functionaries and deal with the 
alleged bliss of the workers in the Soviet paradise and with their efforts to 
outdo themselves for the good of the socialist homeland. The papers are 
also filled with praises for the Communist Party, with the achievements 
of the collective farms and factories, and with the allegedly best ways to 
implement the "Leninist methods of production." It really takes a person 
reared in the atmosphere of that Soviet dominated province to be able to 
endure the content of these papers. No wonder that Hungarians of the 
much more liberal Hungary of today are not given the opportunity to read 
them, and apparently not even the Hungarian National Library (Szechenyi 
Library) has a complete run of them.2 ' ' The only visible bond between Hun-
gary and these "Hungarian papers" of Carpatho-Ruthenia seems to be the 
daily programme of Hungarian Television, which is printed regularly in the 
Karpati Igaz Szd. The Carpatho-Hungarians' ability to receive Hungarian 
radio and T.V. programmes, however, is also a matter of concern to the 
Soviet Ukrainian masters of the province, for these programmes constitute 
a perpetual and readily available bond between these "lost" Hungarians 
and their former mother country. Moreover, they also constitute a basis for 
comparing the two worlds and two cultures—which usually turns out to 
be most unfavourable for the Soviets. But they do help the Hungarians of 
Carpatho-Ruthenia, for they keep the spirit of survival alive among them. 
If the picture of Hungarian journalism in Carpatho-Ruthenia is bleak, so 
is the general picture of book publishing. Hungarian language works are 
published almost exclusively only by the Karpati Konyvkiado of Ungvar, 
which also publishes works in Russian, Ukrainian and Moldavian (i.e. Ru-
manian in Cyrillic alphabet). Founded in 1945 and reorganized in 1964 as 
one of the seven publishing houses of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Re-
public, in the early 1980s the Karpati Konyvkiado published 91-93 titles 
per year. In 1981 36 of these titles were Hungarian language publications, 
including 10-12 indigenous works and about two dozen joint publications 
with various Hungarian publishers. This sounds rather impressive until we 
look at the titles of these works and examine their content. Our skepticism 
is also substantiated by some of the recent pronouncements of the Karpati 
Konyvkiado's director, Boris Gvaradionov. "Our main goal," said he in an 
interview, "is to make available in sufficient number of copies the necessary 
political, ideological and sociological works . . . in [minority] languages: 
such works as those of Vladimir Iliyich Lenin and Leonid Iliyich Brezh-
nev, the constitutions of our republic and of the Soviet Union, their election 
laws, the documents of the Five Year Plans and of the Party Congresses, 
atheist brochures, as well as other works needed for the ideological struggle. 
On top of this all, we also publish works in three broad areas: Specialized 
works on industry and agriculture. . . , touristic works. . . , and works of 
belles lettres."30 Ultimately, therefore, the majority of the so-called "Hun-
garian publications" turn out to be Marxist ideological works, Soviet pro-
paganda pamphlets, and various trade books. Only in the category of belles 
lettres does the Hungarian element finally enter into the picture; although 
even there a goodly number of them are translated Russian and Ukrainian 
literary works. The rest are carefully selected Hungarian classics, pieces 
of modern Hungarian literature, and works by local Carpatho-Hungarian 
authors. 
The first Hungarian work ever published by the Karpati Kiado was a 
volume of poetry by the already mentioned Laszlo Balla, which appeared 
in 1951 under the title Zengj hangosabban [Sound Off Louder]. Balla was 
soon joined by Vilmos Kovacs (1927-1877) with his Vallani kell [I have to 
confess] in 1957, and then by several other local authors. The number of 
the Carpatho-Hungarian literati has reached a point where today there are 
perhaps two dozen of them working and publishing about the life and prob-
lems of that most forgotten Hungarian minority in the Carpathian Basin. 
We are told that nowadays these authors collectively publish about two or 
three small volumes per year. Most of these are works of poetry or short 
stories, but occasionally there are also some anthologies and sociographi-
cal or life reports. If we consider that between 1975 and 1981 fourteen of 
these volumes have appeared in print (including two anthologies), then the 
two volumes per year, as claimed by Gvaradionov, appears to be correct. 
The most frequently published authors include Laszlo Balla, Magda Fuzes, 
Balazs Balogh, Karoly D. Balla, Dezso Csengeri, Borbala Szalai, Karoly 
Lusztig and Csaba Markus. Their works are usually published in 1,000 to 
2,000 copies, but the collective allotted annual space for all of these works 
is only 8 -12 printer's sheets (c. 128-196 regular pages). The remaining 
15-19 printer's sheets (c. 240-304 pages) of the 27 printer's sheets allot-
ted to Hungarian belles lettres and scholarly works per year are usually 
reserved for the Karpati Kalendarium [Carpathian Almanach] published 
annually ever since 1957 in about 15,000 to 19,000 copies.31 Printed in 
large format, the Karpati Kalendarium usually runs into 130 to 150 pages. 
It is filled with the usual political and ideological articles, and yet it is 
still called a "kind of anthology" and an outlet for Carpatho-Hungarian 
authors.32 And in a sense it is a literary outlet, for next to the many ide-
ological exhortations and commemorative articles concerning the various 
milestones of Soviet and Ukrainian achievements, it also published some 
belles lettres (i.e. 20 poems, 2 - 3 short stories, etc.), as well as a few short, 
popular and timid historical articles by local Hungarian historians. 
Another "kind of anthology" is the slender volume that is published 
every five years by the "Jozsef Attila Literary Circle" ("Jozsef Attila Iro-
dalmi Studio"). The most recent one is a slight volume of 64 pages entitled 
Lendiilet [Impetus]. It appeared in 1982 on the occasion of the 60th an-
niversary of the foundation of the Soviet Union, and contains contributions 
33 . • * • . 
by fourteen poets and writers. As emphasized in the introduction to this 
volume, the goal of the Literary Circle and its almanach is to advance the 
cause of a "subjectively partisan socialist-realist literature that is imbued 
with revolutionary romanticism."34 Although this work does contain some 
valuable contributions—most of which are written in the traditional poeti-
cal forms—it also has its share of political sloganism. The two most evi-
dent examples are Eva Finta's introductory ode to Lenin ("Leninhez") and 
her crude lyrical description of the alleged relationship between an Amer-
ican arms manufacturer and his workers ("Egy amerikai fegyvergyaros 
meglatogatja a munkasokat" [An American arms manufacturer visits his 
workers]).3" The almanach closes with a brief description of the history 
and activities of the "Jozsef Attila Literary Circle," which appears to be 
an officially sponsored organization under the guidance of the Karpati Igaz 
Szd and long-time editor, Laszlo Balla.36 
Occasionally the Karpati Konyvkiado also publishes Hungarian works in 
the so-called "scholarly" category. But the only two that Director Gvara-
dionov was able to mention are a collection of historical studies by Janos 
Varadi-Sternberg (Utak es talalkozasok [Paths and Encounters], 1971; 2nd 
ed., 1974) and an unnamed atheist work by Aladar Szikszai.37 The most 
recent work in this category is Varadi-Sternberg's Szazadok oroksege [The 
Heritage of Centuries], which, published jointly with the Gondolat Kiado 
of Budapest in 1981, contains another collection of the author's historical 
studies and essays.38 These studies deal with various aspects of Russian-
Hungarian and Ukrainian-Hungarian historical relations, and their tendency 
is to demonstrate that the influences coming from those "great" Slavic 
neighbours were usually beneficial to Hungary and the Hungarians. 
Historical works—whether in article or book form—all follow the "of-
ficial line" to a point that they have little credibility with the professional 
historian either in Hungary or in the United States. The historical in-
terpretations found in these studies are generally disgusting to a Western 
historian—as is particularly evident from the already mentioned magnum 
opus of Carpatho-Ukrainian historiography, Boldogsag fele [Towards Hap-
piness]. But this is even more true for the textbooks, most of which are ver-
batim translations of Ukrainian originals published by the Radanska Skola 
of Kiev. A few exceptions are those that deal with Hungarian literature, 
which are usually prepared by local Hungarian authors, with due attention 
to the official guidelines concerning literary selections and interpretations.39 
But while literary scholars share a slight leeway, no such opportunities exist 
for historians. As a matter of fact, no Carpatho-Hungarian historian is per-
mitted even the slightest role in authoring works that deal with the history 
of Carpatho-Ruthenia as a whole—be these popular works or textbooks. 
All these historians can do is to "accept" and recite the official version that 
is being passed off and taught as their nation's history in that region. 
Preservation of Traditions 
Although the life of the Hungarians of Carpatho-Ruthenia is far from easy, 
and although they are constantly subjected to a demeaning interpretation of 
their history and national traditions, their attachment to the history and those 
traditions appears to be unbroken. Naturally, they can show this attachment 
only within certain limits, i.e. by emphasizing the role of those historical 
personalities who can qualify as "forerunners of socialism." These include 
some of the most prominent national heroes of Hungary's many revolutions 
against external and internal oppressions, such as Prince Ferenc Rakoczi 
(1676-1736) and Lajos Kossuth (1802-1894) as well as such local heroes 
as Rak6czi's peasant general Tamas Esze (1666-1708). These "accept-
able" national heroes are then placed next to the various heroes of Soviet 
communism, although still remaining in the latter's shadows.40 
However timidly, this national spirit is also evident in the renewed in-
terest in Hungarian folk traditions of Carpatho-Ruthenia, even though up 
to now this interest could only be expressed in publications with "folk-
loristic characteristics."41 It is indicative of the situation, however, that the 
ethnographic research conducted by the Institute of Ethnography of the 
Soviet Academy of Sciences—which also dealt with the folklore and folk 
habits of the Hungarians of Carpatho-Ruthenia—was conducted only by 
Ukrainians. This was probably done consciously, for it is unlikely that the 
whole province does not have a single Hungarian ethnographer qualified 
and willing to do research on the ethnography of his own people. 
Religious Life 
Ever since the Union of Ungvar of 1646, the dominant religion of Carpatho-
Ruthenia was Byzantine Catholicism, better known locally as Greek Catholi-
cism. There is also a small Roman Catholic minority, as well as a similarly 
small Calvinist (Reformed) religious community, both of which are almost 
exclusively Hungarian. Moreover, since the early 19th century there was 
also a growing Jewish community. Most of the immigrant Jews, how-
ever, became Magyarized in the late 19th and early 20th century to a 
point where during the interwar years—when Carpatho-Ruthenia was part 
of Czechoslovakia—these Hungarian Jews constituted a significant portion 
of the most nationally conscious Hungarians in the region.42 
Following the Soviet takeover, the Byzantine Catholic majority (most of 
whom were Rusyns) was immediately forced into union with the Ukrainian-
Russian Orthodox Church. This compelled the Byzantine Catholic Hun-
garians, and even many Rusyns, to make a choice between Orthodoxy and 
Roman Catholicism. Virtually all of the Hungarians chose the latter al-
ternative, but so did a number of the Rusyns. This in effect means that 
those Rusyns who opted for Roman Catholicism joined Hungarian Catholic 
parishes and are attending the mass in Hungarian.43 But as active member-
ship in these religious bodies involves many disadvantages the number of 
these Rusyns is relatively small. 
Nor do we know much about the fate of the Calvinists, although a recent 
report in the official papers of the Hungarian Reformed Church, the Re-
formatusok Lapja (December 14, 1980), speaks of about 80 congregations.44 
In 1979 their bishop, Pal Forgon, was awarded an honorary doctorate by 
the Reformed Theology of Budapest. Significantly enough, however, For-
gon received his degree in company of the Ukrainian Metropolitan of Kiev, 
who was also awarded a similar doctorate by the Hungarian institution. 
Notwithstanding these signs of existence, however, the situation of the 
Catholic and Calvinist Hungarians in Carpatho-Ruthenia is very difficult. 
Religious life is frowned upon and both churches suffer from the shortage 
of clergymen. According to a report dated 1976, a single Catholic priest 
or Reformed minister is often obliged to take care of as many as five 
congregations. But at least they are tolerated, which is not true for those 
of their co-religionists who live on the other side of the Carpathians in 
Soviet Ukraine proper. But practicing one 's religious beliefs does imply 
the acceptance of a lowly position in contemporary Soviet society. And this 
also applies to the priest and the ministers who are prevented from teaching 
their respective religious beliefs, while at the same time being compelled to 
praise the alleged virtues of the atheist state even during regular religious 
services. 
Relationship to Hungary and to the Hungarians of the Mother Country 
As is evident from the above, the situation of the Hungarians of Carpatho-
Ruthenia is rather grim, and to many ethnically conscious Hungarian intel-
lectuals there, it probably appears virtually hopeless. To the latter, resettling 
in Hungary is the ultimate and mostly unattainable dream. Today's Hun-
gary represents to them the envied world of Western Civilization, and all 
that it implies in human dignity, personal freedom and cultural achieve-
ments. They are convinced—as are most Hungarians of Hungary—that 
the real Iron Curtain is not between Hungary and Austria, but rather be-
tween Hungary and the Soviet Union. To cross this formidable barrier 
is painful even for a Hungarian from Hungary who knows that he will 
shortly return. To the Hungarians from Carpatho-Ruthenia, however, it is 
both painful and next to impossible. They view it as an almost impenetrable 
wall that—according to one of the resettled Hungarian intellectuals—"locks 
them into a culturally and psychologically alien world that gradually suf-
focates them."4" This wall is penetrated regularly only by the Hungarian 
radio, television, and some of the Hungarian books and newspapers. But 
hearing, seeing and reading about the "world beyond" only whets their 
appetite, and—in a sense—makes their life even less bearable. Even so, 
virtually every Hungarian in the province is glued to the T.V. set every 
night except Monday (the day off for the Hungarian State Television), for 
they need the inspiration that these T.V. programmes represent. Naturally, 
this "inspiration" is resented by the local authorities who often regard it 
as a source of "alienation" from the Soviet way of life and from their 
cherished Ukrainization programme. Some Hungarian intellectuals, on the 
other hand, occasionally also give vent to their own resentments. Such was 
the case in the early 1970s, when a group of young writers, the members 
of the banned "Forras Studio," drew up a carefully written petition against 
the officially-sponsored Ukrainization of the Hungarian schools that vio-
lated the terms and spirit of the Soviet Constitution.46 But they were soon 
silenced, and they were also forced to terminate their studies. In time, 
however, some of them were able to resettle in Hungary. This improved 
their lives radically, but it also cut them off permanently from their more 
immediate homeland. 
How do Hungarians, and in particular, Hungarian intellectuals in Hun-
gary view the plight of their brethren in Carpatho-Ruthenia? The average 
Hungarian of the early 1980s knew and cared very little about this prob-
lem. Not so the nationally conscious Hungarian intellectuals however, who 
were ever more aware of the plight of their Hungarian brethren in most of 
the neighbouring states. But while in those days they were permitted to 
talk, and occasionally even to write, about the problems of the Hungari-
ans in Transylvania (i.e. Rumania) and Slovakia (i.e. Czechoslovakia), no 
one dared to raise openly the difficulties of the Hungarians of Carpatho-
Ruthenia (i.e. the Soviet Union). The weight of the powerful Soviet state 
was simply too much, and all attempts at demanding intercession were 
quickly silenced. 
The reports that appeared in Hungarian newspapers about life in Car-
patho-Ruthenia were almost always one-sided and rosy.47 But few of the 
caring and knowing Hungarians seemed to believe in the veracity of these 
reports—be they by local Quislings or by ideologically committed and 
thus "unseeing" Hungarian publicists. Some of the Hungarian intellectuals 
presented lengthy reports to the Hungarian Party leadership, protesting these 
unrealistic portrayals. They did so, however, without the hope of success, 
for no one in Hungary dared to challenge the great Soviet neighbour. Nor 
could such a challenge be anything but self-defeating at the time, especially 
in light of Hungary's disagreements with some of her other neighbours 
(particularly Romania, and to a lesser degree, Czechoslovakia). 
Recent Developments: the late 1980s 
From the perspective of the early 1980s—when this study was researched— 
the fate of the Hungarians of Carpatho-Ruthenia appeared rather grim and 
hopeless. Their numbers were small, they were cut off from their mother-
land by the nearly impenetrable wall of the Soviet-Hungarian border, and 
they were subjected to a relentless process of denationalization. 
But those were the years before the age of Mikhail Gorbachev in the 
Soviet Union. With the advent of Gorbachev's perestroika things began to 
change for the better. While conditions are still far from what they used to 
be or ought to be, Hungarians of Carpatho-Ruthenia are now at least able 
to express their attachment to their culture, learning, and history, and—on 
a modest level—they are even permitted to give vent to their feelings of 
Hungarian patriotism. 
The improvement in the situation of the Carpatho-Hungarians is best 
measured by the fact that recently a good number of the Transylvanian-
Hungarians who are fleeing Ceausescu's dictatorial regime in Rumania and 
who are unable to find their way into Hungary, have chosen to try their luck 
in Carpatho-Ruthenia.49 This means that contrary to traditional perceptions 
about relative freedom in the socialist countries, nowadays even Soviet 
rule is viewed as preferable to Ceausescu's unbearably oppressive rule in 
Rumania. And at least some of the changes in this perception are the direct 
results of the visibly improved conditions of the Hungarians in Carpatho-
Ruthenia, which are manifested in a number of significant developments. 
Among these developments is the fact that the number of Hungarian 
schools seems to have increased. A report, dated January, 1988, speaks of 
83 schools, of which 56 are complete ten-year schools (offering high school 
diplomas, according to the Soviet system of education), and 27 are incom-
plete, eight-year schools.50 These numbers by themselves may or may not 
mean too much, for they do not tell us anything about the "Hungarianness" 
of these schools. For example: How many of these institutions are "mixed 
schools" where Hungarian children are compelled to study various subjects 
in Russian or Ukrainian? What is the "Hungarian" content of the subjects 
taught in these schools? Is the Hungarian heritage of these children dis-
cussed in a positive or in a negative manner? All of these are decisively 
important considerations. 
Similarly positive are the developments connected with the University 
of Uzhorod [Ungvar], where the Department of Hungarian Studies ap-
pears to have increased its enrollment. According to a recent statement by 
Vera Vaszocsik, an Associate Professor of Linguistics at that institution, 
the Department now enrolls about one hundred students in its five-year 
programme. If this report is true, it means that the Department of Hun-
garian studies at Uzhorod is back to its original quota of 20 students per 
year, which is certainly far cry from the situation in 1979 when only two 
prospective students applied. Vaszocsik also claims that since the Depart-
ment's foundation in 1962, they have graduated around 320 students.^ 
This works out to about 13 students per year. All this seems to indicate 
that the nadir in Carpatho-Hungarian university studies reached in 1979 is 
now a thing of the past. With the increased number of graduates from the 
Department of Hungarian Studies, Hungarian intellectual and cultural life 
in Carpatho-Ruthenia is once more assured of some dedicated flagbearers. 
This somewhat optimistic view is reinforced by another report, also 
dated January, 1988, according to which students of Hungarian schools 
in Carpatho-Ruthenia will finally be given the chance to study the his-
tory of their nation from the beginnings right up to our own period.5" If 
true, this will be a "first" in the region's history since its annexation by 
the Soviet Union. The question is: Will this "History of Hungary" of-
fered in the schools of Carpatho-Ruthenia be a reasonably true overview 
of the nation's past, or will it simply reflect the primitive interpretation 
found in the above-mentioned history of Carpatho-Ruthenia, A boldogsag 
fele [Towards Happiness]?53 In the latter case, the Hungarian children of 
Carpatho-Ruthenia will have gained very little. Certainly, the most recent 
anthology of Carpatho-Hungarian literature on the period since World War 
II (Sugaras utakon [On Illuminated Paths], 1985) does not seem to be very 
encouraging in this regard.54 While this work is by far the largest and most 
comprehensive compendium of the region's Hungarian literary creativity 
of the period since World War II—published on the occasion of the fortieth 
anniversary of Carpatho-Ruthenia's annexation by the Soviet Union—its 
introductory study still reflects the officially-sponsored historical myth of 
"reunification."55 But as this claim of "reunification" appears under the 
name of the regional party secretary, Mikola Semenyuk, it may no longer 
reflect the views of the current "reform scholarship" encouraged by Gor-
bachev. Thus, one can still hope that—given the new openness advocated 
by the Party leadership—Soviet historians will have the moral courage and 
the intellectual strength to cleanse their professional works and their history 
textbooks from such officially-sponsored falsifications of history. 
Other important signs of change for the better include: The increasing 
number of joint publications by the Karpati Konyvkiado [Carpathian Pub-
lisher] of Uzhorod and various Hungarian publishing houses of Budapest; 
the significantly increased opportunities for Carpatho-Hungarian authors to 
publish their works in Hungary; and the fact that since May of 1988 the only 
Hungarian newspapers of the province, the Karpati Igaz Szo [Carpathian 
True Word] can also be purchased in Hungary.56 The latter change is all 
the more meaningful as during the 1970s not even the National Szechenyi 
Library in Budapest was able to subscribe to this newspaper. 
Although some things have changed for the better, many of the negative 
trends mentioned in connection with the 1960s and 1970s are still present 
in the mid- and late-1980s. Thus, according to some sources the number of 
Hungarians in the province continues to decrease.57 While this may simply 
be the result of self-reclassification for reasons of social mobility, it is still 
a dangerous sign. Moreover, Hungarian churches—which are among the 
most important preservers of Hungarian nationality—are still suffering from 
state intervention. Because of their inability to train priests or ministers, 
they are chronically undermanned, and face the possibility of total extinc-
tion. This is best demonstrated by the fact that the 31 functioning Catholic 
parishes—during World War II there were 41—are kept in existence by a 
total of only 10 priests, whose average age is around 70 years.58 How long 
will they be able to continue their pastoral work without replacements? The 
situation is equally critical among the Hungarian Calvinists. While we do 
not know the ages of their ministers, we are told that their 81 congregations 
are kept going by a total of only 21 "clergymen"—including 13 ministers, 
4 assistants, and 4 students of theology.59 Without some significant changes 
in the attitude of the state, they too face gradual extinction. 
Problems still abound. But the positive changes of recent years are 
such that they may yet result in breaking down the formerly impenetra-
ble walls that ever since 1945 had separated the Hungarians of Carpatho-
Ruthenia from their motherland. Should these changes continue, the lives 
of these Hungarians will undoubtedly improve. These reforms will cer-
tainly lessen—although never fully eliminate—their feelings of isolation, 
and their belief that they were forcibly torn from their nation and from the 
intellectual and spiritual world of Western Civilization to which they had 
belonged for over a millennium. 
An important manifestation of this feeling is the fact that psychologically 
they still view themselves as being part of Hungary and of the West in gen-
eral. This is demonstrated in a multitude of different ways, including the 
way they keep time. Thus in Carpatho-Ruthenia if anyone inquires in Hun-
garian as to what time it is, he is automatically told only the Budapest time. 
Moreover, even though their whole life cycle is perforce geared to Moscow 
time—which is two hours ahead of Budapest—"most of their wrist-watches 
are still running according to Budapest time."60 Along the same lines, the 
region's Hungarians also tend to adjust their life styles to radio and televi-
sion broadcasts from Hungary, with little attention to broadcasts from Kiev 
or Moscow. They also pay more attention to the goings-on in the Hungarian 
Parliament than to events taking place in the Supreme Soviets of the Rus-
sian or Ukrainian capitals. They likewise read only Hungarian newspapers 
on a regular basis (e.g. Szabad Fold [Free Land], Uj Tiikor [New Mirror], 
Nok Lapja [Ladies' Journal], Elet es Irodalom [Life and Literature], etc.) 
and—except for official announcements in the party papers—they pay little 
attention to Russian and Ukrainian periodicals. For this very reason, most 
Carpatho-Hungarians are more familiar with intellectual and cultural de-
velopments in Hungary, than with similar trends in the Soviet Union.61 All 
this makes it amply clear that the Hungarians of Carpatho-Ruthenia cannot 
accept their intellectual-spiritual separation from Hungary as final, nor ac-
quiesce to their forced "transplantation" to the Byzantine-Slavic world of 
the Eastern Slavs. 
In the course of the past four decades, Carpatho-Hungarians were saved 
from total assimilation and denationalization by a number of factors, in-
cluding self-isolation, rural existence, lack of geographical mobility, and 
resistance to intermarriage. With the rise of industrialization and urbaniza-
tion the role of these methods of self-preservation are bound to decline. But 
should the current reforms continue, the Hungarians' resolve to survive will 
undoubtedly be strengthened by their increased contacts with the cultural 
and intellectual life of Hungary. And as we read the tacit profession of faith 
in their nationality by the youngest members of the Carpatho-Hungarian 
poets,62 we also have to profess our belief in the certain survival of this 
small segment of the Hungarian nation in the Carpathian Basin.63 
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The Hungarians of Yugoslavia: 
Facing an Uncertain Future 
Andrew Ludanyi 
The people of Yugoslavia are one of the most diverse in all Europe eth-
nically and linguistically. Besides the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes—who 
compose the bulk of the country's population—there are Hungarians, Al-
banians, Germans, Rumanians, Turks, Macedonians, Bulgarians, and some 
other nationality groups in the country.1 At the present time Yugoslavia's 
leaders are attempting to give these different peoples a common state alle-
giance as well as an opportunity to maintain their cultural diversity. This 
policy has prevailed since Tito and the communists have taken over the 
direction of the the country's political destiny. 
The purpose of the present study is to examine Yugoslavia's "national-
ity policy" towards the Hungarians. It will provide an overview of past 
and current Yugoslav policies and thereby try to contribute to an under-
standing of the present communist "solution" of the nationality question. 
As Robert Lee Wolff points out: "One [cannot] understand Balkan af-
fairs past or present without a close acquaintance with her minorities and 
their traditions."3 This observation applies not only to Yugoslavia and the 
Balkans, but to East European affairs in general. 
The present study will be confined to those Hungarians who live in 
what might be called "ethnic islands," it will not consider the fate of those 
Magyars who are scattered throughout the Yugoslav countryside or live in 
cities such as Zagreb and Belgrade. In particular, the examination will focus 
on the Hungarians living in the Darda triangle (Baranya), the Vojvodina (the 
Vajdasag, which is composed of the Backa [Bacska] and part of the Banat 
[Bansag]) and those parts of Croatia and Slovenia where they still have 
identifiable communities. It is these yet undispersed and unassimilated 
Magyar strongholds that have been cause for political friction between 
Hungary and Yugoslavia in the past, particularly during the interwar years 
and the heyday of the Cominform. 
East Central Europe's Hungarian minority problems arose with the political 
re-shuffling of boundaries that followed World War I. Yugoslavia—at first 
called the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes4 —obtained her "share" 
of Magyars through the Treaty of Trianon of 1920 which ceded to the 
new south Slavic state not only Croatia-Slavonia, but also Medjumurje 
(Murakoz), Prekomurje, the Darda triangle, Backa, and part of the Banat/ 
The cession of these areas was carried out under the principle of "self-
determination of peoples," but in reality it reflected the desires of French 
foreign policy in East Central Europe.6 It was also a reward to the Serbs 
for their support of the Entente cause in World War I.7 
The Magyar population of these areas was almost 400,000 in 1931 ac-
cording to the Yugoslav census of that year. This large minority was 
located in the country's ethnically most diverse area.8 No ethnic group 
composed a majority of either the Darda Triangle, Backa, or Banat—or of 
all three taken together. The three largest ethnic groups were, of course, 
the Magyars, Germans and South Slavs (including Croats, precani Serbs, 
Socki, and Bunyevci). Before the Second World War they each composed 
roughly one-third of the population of these areas.9 
Before discussing the position of the Magyar ethnic group in the interwar 
years, it is necessary to reflect at least briefly on the pre-World War I ethnic 
history of these areas. This is necessary because the relations between the 
Hungarians and Serbs and the other peoples of the Vojvodina have molded 
the context of their present interactions and expectations. 
Geographically the Vojvodina is an extension of the great Hungarian 
Plain which lies at the centre of the Carpathian Basin. Because it is geo-
graphically part and parcel of these lowlands, its history has usually been 
determined directly by the people who controlled the Carpathian Basin as 
a whole. The Magyars ruled it until the battle of Mohacs in 1526. In 
the years preceding this battle the area's population was predominantly 
Magyar. Even Belgrade (called Nandorfehervar by the Magyars) was for 
a long time a Hungarian fortress. Following the Turkish victory over the 
Hungarians at Mohacs the area underwent a drastic ethnic change. Turkish 
depredations completely depopulated and devastated the area. Only after 
the ascendancy of Habsburg Austria did the area regain some of its popu-
lation. However, the ethnic make-up of this new population was no longer 
predominantly Magyar. It had become mainly Serbian and German.10 
The Habsburg policy for this area was motivated by considerations of 
the external as well as the internal security of the Empire. It involved 
a re-colonization scheme that would provide an effective defence against 
the Turks while at the same time it would strengthen Austrian hegemony. 
Vienna's policy favoured Serbian and German colonists rather than Hun-
garians because of the anti-Habsburg attitudes of the latter." Consequently 
the population of the region became a patchwork of different nationali-
ties. However, at the end of the 18th century Magyars again began settling 
in this region. They filled up especially those areas which became re-
claimed through the drainage of swamps. Thus, by 1920 (when the Treaty 
of Trianon dismembered Hungary) the Vojvodina's population had become 
one-third South Slav, one-third German and one-third Hungarian.'2 
The rise of nationalism among these different ethnic groups became 
evident in the early part of the 19th century. The Hungarians exerted more 
and more effort to make the character of the Vojvodina more "Magyar." 
The South Slavs resisted this policy. When the Hungarians sought to throw 
off the yoke of Habsburg absolutism in 1848-49, the Serbs and Croats of 
the area sided with the latter. Habsburg practice of divide et impera thus 
prevailed. However, Austrian absolutism failed to reward the Serbs and 
Croats for their assistance. Instead, they were told in 1867—when Austria 
and Hungary had buried some of their differences—to seek a modus vivendi 
with the Magyars.13 The national consciousness of both the Serbs and the 
Croats soon would "cross the Rubicon." Most of them could no longer 
look on themselves as "Hungarians of Slavic ancestry." Thus, when the 
Austro-Hungarian monarchy dissolved at the end of World War I. they 
turned to the creation of a South Slav state as the logical expression of 
their national self-determination. In the closing months of World War I, 
Serbian and French troops occupied all of southern Hungary, including the 
Vojvodina.14 The Treaty of Trianon put its seal of approval on most of 
these military acquisitions. 
In the newly-formed Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes the posi-
tion of the Magyar ethnic group underwent a drastic change. From a posi-
tion of most favoured they were pushed into the position of least favoured. 
Their treatment was, of course, tied directly to both domestic and foreign 
policy developments. 
As part of France's scheme for a new international order in East Central 
Europe, the new South Slav kingdom was placed in direct opposition to 
Hungary and Bulgaria. Such opposition did not have to be fostered since 
the kingdom had gained territories at the expense of both these other states. 
The latter desired a revision of this post-war territorial settlement. In the 
face of such desires, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes looked 
to France and other "satisfied" powers (Czechoslovakia and Rumania) for 
allies.15 In this conflict the Magyars of Yugoslavia—as well as the Bulgars 
and pro-Bulgar Macedonians—became mere driftwood tossed hither and 
thither in the uncertain stream of East Central European power politics. 
In other words, the Magyar minority's condition of existence was always 
contingent on Yugoslavia's policies vis-a-vis Hungary. 
Yugoslavia's nationality policy was even more closely tied to its quest 
for political unification. While the idea of a South Slav state had long been 
the fervent wish to many Croatian and Serbian intellectuals, when such a 
union was finally realized dissension immediately arose regarding its char-
acter. The Serbs wished a centralized union dominated by themselves. The 
Croats, on the other hand, wanted a federal state which gave at least the 
three major South Slav nationalities an equal voice in the policies of the 
country.16 To bridge this rift the Serbs not infrequently used the minori-
ties either as countervailing forces vis-a-vis the Croats, or as scapegoats— 
personifying the dangers of external subversion—against which it was the 
duty of all good South Slavs to unite. 
Yugoslavia's German minority was frequently used as a countervailing 
force. It was in most cases—excepting the small numbers living in northern 
Slovenia—far removed from the Austrian border. In contrast to this, the 
Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Albanian minorities presented a direct threat to 
the frontiers of the country. Thus, the Magyars were well suited to fulfill 
the scapegoat role. They were viewed as a potential force of disruption 
which had to be hemmed in and weakened wherever possible.1 ' 
The policy chosen to ward off the Magyar "threat" was to isolate Hungary 
diplomatically. To this end Yugoslavia joined Rumania and Czechoslovakia 
in the Little Entente, a diplomatic and military alignment of states directed 
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primarily against Hungary. Besides surrounding Hungary with a ring of 
hostile states, Yugoslavia also attempted to impede contacts between the 
Magyars of Hungary and those that lived in Yugoslavia. This was done by 
denying visas to prospective travelers thus discouraging visits across the 
borders.19 
In Yugoslavia itself, the government resorted to a two-front campaign 
to weaken the Magyars politically. It used both outright repression and 
the more sophisticated, time-tried Habsburg policy of divide and rule. The 
application of these policies was often simultaneous, but at certain times 
one was preferred over the other. In the immediate post-World War I years 
repression was utilized more frequently but in the 1930s the government 
was more successful in playing the non-irredentist minorities against the 
Magyars.20 These tactics were used in almost all areas of life, including 
the political realm, as well as the educational, cultural, religious, economic, 
and social aspects of existence. 
The Magyars were effectively excluded from both national and local 
political affairs. But the other minorities were only slightly better off than 
the Magyars, as ordinary Serbs themselves were limited in the extent to 
which they could participate in political affairs. In fact, after 1929, the 
vast majority of Yugoslavia's inhabitants was barred from political life by 
King Alexander's dictatorship.21 On the whole, however, the government's 
authoritarianism weighed heaviest on the Magyars and some of the other 
22 irredentist nationality groups. 
The exclusion of Magyars from political life was evident in the pre-
vailing patterns of electoral practices and political appointments. In the 
elections to the Constituent Assembly Magyars were not admitted to the 
voters' lists. In the 1923 election to the Skupstina (National Assembly) not 
one Magyar deputy was elected, while the much smaller Rumanian minor-
ity secured one deputy and the German minority (which had about the same 
population as the Magyars) secured eight. In the 1925 elections the Mag-
yars were again barred from the Skupstina while the Germans elected five 
Deputies. Only in 1927 did the Magyars finally elect three Deputies when 
they ran under the party auspices of the Serbian Radical and Democrat 
parties. In this same election the Germans secured six mandates. When 
in 1929 the Dictatorship dissolved all parties, the Germans were allowed 
one senator and two deputies and the Magyars were allowed one deputy 
on the government list.24 As the above data indicates, the Magyar minority 
was barred from effective representation while the Germans were given a 
favoured though token status. In this both the policies of repression and of 
divide et impera are evident. 
In local government and in the civil service the same pattern prevailed. A 
few examples may be cited as representative. Even after the most "liberal" 
election opportunities of 1927, "there were in the whole Vojvodina only 
10 German and 6 Magyar village notaries, against 114 Slavs (nearly all 
Serbs)." After the eclipse of this "liberal" interlude and the establishment 
of the Dictatorship, local officials were again appointed rather than elected. 
In 1930 the appointments to the City Council of Zenta (a city that was over 
86 percent Magyar) included 4 Magyars out of a total of 38 Councilors.26 
This pattern of discrimination was also present in the country's civil ser-
vice. Under the Vidov Dan Constitution of 1921 (which was superseded 
by Alexander's Dictatorship in 1929) Article 19 stated that admission to 
public service required at least 10 years of residence in the Kingdom for 
* • 97 
all citizens whose nationality was not Serb, Croat or Slovene. 
Besides barring the Magyar population from participation in government, 
the Yugoslav state also demanded that in public discourse they use only 
Serbo-Croatian. This language demand was not confined to government 
transactions (e.g., Court proceedings, written communications to authori-
ties, etc.), but also applied to utterances made in public places like cafes oo 
and street corners. Shops had to use the "state language" as well and 
could resort to Magyar only when the customer was totally unable to com-
municate otherwise. Non-governmental or "private" clubs were required to 
use the state language to keep minutes and to "conduct business." Street 
names and shop-signs also had to follow this pattern. If a private busi-
ness refused to do so, it had to pay a surtax for the privilege of having its 
shop-sign appear in Magyar or German besides Serbian (i.e., in Cyrillic).29 
This intolerance carried over to the economic and social existence of the 
Magyars. Their cultural, educational and economic position was in many 
ways subject to this same stifling grip of Serbian nationalism. The most 
far-reaching effects were felt in the immediate post-Trianon period. 
The "land reform" carried out in the Vojvodina during these years is 
a good example of economic subjugation. Prior to the World War the 
land distribution in the area was undeniably inequitable. But this inequal-
ity did not involve "national discrimination." Because the area had been 
re-colonized by the Habsburgs with Serbs and Germans, the population 
was, in large part, composed of free-holders. However, the Magyar inhab-
itants were not so fortunate. Due to their late arrival in the region, they 
were settled on lands reclaimed by the drainage of swamps. This involved 
vast expenditures that could be covered only by the government and the 
landed gentry (whose members became the owners of much land in the 
region). Thus, among the Magyar inhabitants of the Vojvodina, great class 
differences existed. There was a small upper layer composed of landed 
aristocrats and Jewish merchants, and a large class of impoverished farm 
labourers.30 
When the Serbs undertook their land reform after incorporating the Vo-
jvodina into Yugoslavia, they resorted to discrimination on the basis of 
nationality. They broke up the large landed estates and redistributed them 
among Serbs, leaving the impoverished Magyar peasants as landless as they 
were before the reform.31 In fact, Magyars, Germans, and other "a-national" 
elements, were not only left out of the reform, but they were barred from 
buying land within a 50 kilometer zone of the Yugoslav-Hungarian border/"" 
In this way, the land reform which had seen most of the land confiscated 
in the Magyar areas of the Vojvodina, turned out to be a means by which 
the Magyar masses were kept impoverished. More important, it became 
the pretext for bringing in new colonists—called dobrovoljci—from Serbia 
who were settled in these Magyar populated areas. These new Serb settlers 
diluted to some extent the compact Magyar areas and also gave the state 
"dependable" inhabitants along its northern borders.33 
While discrimination in the agricultural realm was responsible for most 
of the misery experienced by Hungarians, there were similarly unfavourable 
trends in other areas of their economic life. Many Magyars were forced to 
seek employment in the interior of the country due to the hiring policies of 
manufacturers in the Vojvodina: they tended to hire only a certain minimum 
quota of non-Serbs. Magyar firms, on the other hand, were "to take on 
Serbian Directors or to place a certain number of [their] shares at the 
disposal of the Government."34 
While all these policies of Serbianizing were objectionable, it was the 
attempt to Serbianize their tongues and their hearts that made Magyars most 
resentful of Yugoslav rule. The intellectual and spiritual life of the Magyars 
was closely tied to the fate of their churches, schools, and folk culture. The 
Yugoslav government, however, made every attempt to limit the Magyar 
character of each. In a sense they all became subject to restrictive state 
supervision. This supervision affected the churches first, then the schools, 
and then the total cultural-intellectual existence of the Magyars.35 
The churches have played a national as well as a religious role in the 
history of most Eastern European countries. This also holds true for the 
churches of the Vojvodina. Most Roman Catholics in this area were Ma-
gyars (the remainder were Swabians, Croats, Sokci and Bunyevci) while 
the Serbs were Serbian Orthodox. In this way the churches reflected the 
national aspirations of their adherents. To curb the Magyar "national" role 
of the Roman Catholic Church the Yugoslav government pared down its 
jurisdiction and powers and also transformed the ethnic composition of its 
hierarchy. This was accomplished through a Concordat with the Holy See 
which re-drew the boundaries of the Church's dioceses so that these would 
correspond to new state boundaries. Once this was done, the clergy of 
the Vojvodina became subject to the Croatian prelates in Zagreb and the 
Papal Nuncio at Belgrade. In this way the Hungarian influence through the 
Catholic Church became inoperative. 
The churches of Yugoslavia were also subjected to control by the state 
through the subsidies given to them. This determined the extent to which 
churches could carry on their traditional activities. As C.A. Macartney has 
pointed out, the Roman Catholics and Protestants received less than their 
"fair share" relative to churches representing other nationality groups.38 
However, this aspect of Yugoslav policy was rationalized in most Serb 
nationalist quarters as necessary to stem the influence of a-national institu-
tions. 
Much more disruptive for the minorities than this discrimination in the 
allocation of subsidies, was the policy of depriving the Catholic Church 
of its traditional role in education. All the Church's schools were trans-
formed into state schools controlled directly by the Ministry of Education 
in Belgrade. For the Magyars this meant the loss of education in their 
own language. Only in the first four elementary grades were they left with 
Magyar instruction. In all education above that level instruction was given 
exclusively in Serbian/ However, even the number of elementary schools 
left to the Magyars was well below that which their numbers would have 
warranted. In 1934 they possessed only 157 school units (sections and 
classes combined) as opposed to the 693 school units which they had be-
fore World War I.40 Furthermore, the content of education was often little 
above the level of indoctrination in Yugoslav nationalism, taught by a staff 
that was at least one-third Slav even in the Magyar school units.41 
The discriminatory policies of the state also made their presence felt 
in the Magyars' more general cultural life. Cultural associations were not 
allowed to form until the Dictatorship of 1929 enabled the Magyars to orga-
nize a "Popular Cultural Association" at Veliki Beckerek (Nagy Becskerek) 
and the "People's Circle" at Subotica (Szabadka).42 Otherwise, the policy 
of national discrimination remained the same. Concert programmes had 
to contain a certain number of Serb numbers and cultural or folklore pro-
grammes had to keep down the number of Hungarian national dances to 
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one or two. 
This discriminatory policy prevailed as long as Yugoslavia's foreign pol-
icy continued to place it in opposition to Hungary. The assassination of 
King Alexander in 1934 by a Macedonian terrorist, however, altered the 
general foreign policy orientation of Yugoslavia. By 1936-37 there were 
definite signs of a rapprochement with Hungary.44 This also became per-
ceptible in the easing of repressive measures against the Magyars of the 
Vojvodina. Unfortunately, the clash of the great powers again threw a 
monkey-wrench into this process of accommodation. German and Italian 
ambitions stood in the way of Serbian-Magyar reconciliation. 
When Hitler's armies marched into Yugoslavia, it was already on the 
verge of disintegration. Hungary joined the powers dismembering Yugo-
slavia—in spite of Paul Teleki's suicide. In light of their interwar experi-
ences, it is not surprising that most of the Hungarians in the Vojvodina wel-
comed the Hungarian reacquisition and occupation of the Backa (Bacska) 
and the Darda triangle (Baranya). However, the occupation was a short-
lived respite and led to some adverse short-term consequences. Among 
other developments, the occupying troops were responsible for atrocities 
that were committed at Novi Sad.45 After the retreat of the Hungarian army 
and the advance of the Red Army and the partisans, retaliation was wrought 
upon the local Hungarians rather than the perpetrators of the excesses. At 
any rate, at the end of hostilities the Hungarians of the Vojvodina were 
viewed as a minority that had attempted to "desert" Yugoslavia during the 
partisans' fight for Yugoslavia's preservation. 
These changed conditions dramatically affected majority-minority rela-
tions. The new ethnic balance in the revived Yugoslav state as well as in 
Tito 's partisan movement, provided the basis for this new policy. Tito's 
personal leadership and the ideological commitments of the Party set the 
stage for more integrationist and tolerant ethnic policies. 
The war also had far-reaching demographic consequences. As was pointed 
out above, in the interwar period the population of the Vojvodina had 
been roughly one-third German, one-third Hungarian and one-third South 
Slav. However, the last years of the struggle and the immediate post-war 
consolidation enabled the new rulers of Yugoslavia to drastically alter the 
ethnic profile of the region. They obliterated the three-way ethnic balance 
of the population via deportations, emigration and executions. 
The first census after the war (1948) indicates the magnitude of the 
transformation. The Vojvodina's German population was reduced from 
317,000 in 1931 to about 32,000 in 1948. From an ethnic and political 
perspective this resulted in a completely different Vojvodina. It produced 
a Slav-dominated province by increasing the share of the Serbs in the pop-
ulation to over one-half (841,000 in 1948), from their previous number of 
462,000 in 1931. It also increased the overall proportion of the South Slavic 
population with the influx of new settlers from Croatia, Macedonia, Mon-
tenegro, and elsewhere. Thus, the post-war ethnic profile of the Vojvodina 
was about one-fourth Hungarian, over one-half Serb and nearly one-fourth 
other South Slavs. (The rise of the Serb, Croat, and other Slavic share of 
the population was achieved in large part, by the extensive colonization of 
the lands left vacant by the deported Germans.)46 
More recent population trends in the Vojvodina altered this post-war 
profile slightly. In recent years the Hungarian population has declined 
even further, while the South Slavic population has continued to increase 
at a steady rate. For example, the Serb population of 841,000 of 1948 
grew to 1,089,000 in 1971, and to 1,107,378 in 1981, while the Hungarian 
population of 429,000 in 1948 decreased slightly to 424,000 in 1971, and 
to 385,356 in 1981. On an all-Yugoslav level this demographic stagnation 
has even more adverse consequences. While Yugoslavia's population as a 
whole increased from 18.5 million to 22.5 million between 1961 and 1981, 
the Hungarian population during the same period dropped from 504,000 to 
426,867. At the same time, the Albanian population of 915,000 increased 
to 1,730,878. From a bio-political perspective, in contrast to the dynamism 
of the Albanians, the Hungarians are in definite decline within the overall 
population. This demographic stagnation may be the result of their more 
effective "integration." It could also be a sign of their alienation if the 
population losses were due to emigration, a low birthrate, or assimilation 
by other ethnic groups.47 
The wartime struggles and the trauma of internecine ethnic conflict con-
vinced the leaders of at least the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) 
that a new approach was needed for the solution of the nationality question. 
Tito and his followers were able to bridge some of the conflicts already 
during the war through their leading position at the head of the partisan 
guerrilla forces. As Milovan Djilas has pointed out in one of his essays: 
It is incontestable that in the massacres going on between Serbs and 
Croats the Yugoslav state would have disappeared had not the Com-
munists appeared on the scene. They had all the conditions for such a 
role: vision, organization and leadership. The Communists were im-
pervious not only to the demoralization of the ruling classes, but also to 
the chauvinistic excesses. They were the only party that was Yugoslav 
[emphasis in original] in the composition of its membership, in its po-
litical practice and—interpreted narrowly—in its internationalism.48 
Thus, the communist-dominated partisans saw the key to successful re-
sistance against the Germans in trans-ethnic unity. Such unity could be 
attained only if the programme and objectives of the partisans were di-
vorced from the narrow ethnic squabbles of the past. Since Tito and the 
Yugoslav communists dominated the partisans, the ideological orientation 
of the leaders enabled the movement as a whole to rise above the national-
ist conflicts. Liberation from the German yoke provided the unifying ideal. 
Thus, partisan groups came into existence in all parts of the country—even 
the Vojvodina—fighting for the common cause of national liberation.49 
Unlike other newly established communist states, Tito's Yugoslavia did 
not depend primarily on the Red Army either to ensure the establishment 
of a communist government or to eradicate domestic opposition. Although 
the Red Army played a key role in the liberation of Belgrade, North-East 
Serbia, and the Vojvodina (thereby crushing the major centres of nation-
alist Cetnik resistance), the partisans were able to assert their own control 
over most of Yugoslavia. At any rate, the new order under the CPY was 
eminently qualified to consolidate communist power and eliminate domes-
tic opposition. The process of consolidation had particularly far-reaching 
consequences for the ethnic destiny of the Vojvodina. Under the pretext of 
eliminating "war criminals" and "collaborators," communist security units 
imprisoned or executed about 150,000 Volksdeutsche and 30,000 Hungar-
ians. But the most extensive demographic changes were caused by the 
deportations of the German population (about 450,000) and about 40,000 
of the Hungarians.50 Almost all other ethnic groups also suffered. How-
ever, it is safe to say that these liquidations—with the exception of the 
Germans, and possibly the Hungarians—were motivated more by consid-
erations of ideology and power, than by ethnic animosity. Whatever the 
motivation, in the case of the Hungarian liquidations, the result was to de-
prive Yugoslavia's Magyars of their leaders. Fortunately, these drastic and 
inhuman policies were part of power consolidation rather than a permanent 
feature of Yugoslav nationality policy. 
The non-South Slavic and former "enemy" nationalities continued to be 
treated as second-rate citizens during the period of the Tito-Stalin conflict. 
Their rights were partially restored and their existence became more bear-
able only after—many years after—the Cominform's anti-Titoist campaigns 
ended. From that time to the early 1980s their status as minority nationali-
ties steadily improved, although there were some set-backs along the way. 
In this evolution of relations, the official self-definition of Yugoslavia via 
the partisan experience, its acceptance of the premises of Marxist-Leninist 
nationality policies, the increased representation of some minorities in the 
Party, and the copying of Soviet federalism, together established the setting 
for inter-ethnic relations. 
The historical experience of World War II consecrates the partisan leaders 
as the saviors of national independence and honour. At the same time, it 
provides a common enemy, a common danger against which all Yugoslavs 
must unite. This outside threat is German imperialism. Even in present-day 
Yugoslavia the German threat is viewed as the foremost symbol of outside 
interference, against which constant vigilance is needed to preserve the 
independence of the country.51 It had been routinely played up in the press 
and in governmental foreign policy pronouncements until the normalization 
of relations with West Germany. After the split between Tito and Stalin, 
the danger of Cominform intervention was utilized in a similar way. But 
the German threat (in the symbolic sense) is more effective because it is 
based on a bloodier historical experience and is more easily fitted into the 
ideological prerequisites of contemporary Yugoslavia.52 
The partisan myth is not just based on antagonism to Germany, it also 
contains a sense of mission, giving it a supranational appeal. According to 
the myth, the partisans of World War II were fighting not just against Ger-
many but also against world reaction and racism. The legacy of fighting 
these retrograde tendencies has given the present-day leaders the reputa-
tion of being true internationalists. As leaders of the "progressive forces" 
of history, they have depended on the unity and solidarity of all nation-
alities within the country. Although at first the partisans were mostly 
Serbs and Montenegrins, after 1942, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, and 
other nationalities also joined the movement in increasing numbers. Thus 
the partisans became a genuinely all-Yugoslav antifascist alliance, which 
fought to rid the whole country, and not just certain parts, of the German 
occupation.53 One has to be in Yugoslavia only a few days to feel the per-
vasive role of the partisan myth. This distinctively communist Yugoslavian 
political culture is manifest everywhere. One encounters its manifestations 
in the partisan ethos of the government and in the day-to-day life of the 
people. Radio programmes devote a great deal of attention to it. For exam-
ple, programmes called "partisan songs" are a part of the weekly schedule 
of most Yugoslav radio stations. Besides radio and television, the myth is 
propagated in schools, history books, journals, and the press.54 
Even the Hungarians of the Vojvodina have the opportunity to participate 
in this myth. Although most Hungarians were not sympathetic to the parti-
san cause and had actually favoured the re-annexation of the Vojvodina to 
Hungary, during the last few months of the war, the partisans established 
a special brigade composed of Hungarian "volunteers." It was called the 
Petofi brigade in honour of the Hungarian revolutionary poet who died in 
1849. This unit actually saw action against the Germans in the battle of 
Bolman. Although the Hungarian contribution to the partisan cause was 
limited to this one brigade in one battle, a great deal has been made of it 
by Yugoslav historians.55 With this one historical episode they have been 
integrated into the destiny of the Yugoslav political order.56 
This self-definition myth is also based on the pragmatic political re-
alization that no one South Slavic nation is able to rule Yugoslavia by 
excluding the others from power. This had been tried by the Serbs—the 
most numerous nationality—during the interwar years and it had devastat-
ing consequences. To the leadership in the CPY it became obvious that 
the new Yugoslavia must involve both symbolically and in reality all the 
major South Slavic nations in the decision-making process. Somehow the 
interests and political influence of these peoples had to be balanced. The 
major balancer became Tito personally and the Party's control mechanisms 
by which internal cohesion and discipline could be maintained. 
The pragmatic recognition of power relations was rationalized by the ide-
ological requirements of Marxist-Leninist nationality policy and the Soviet 
pattern of federalism. These were incorporated into the Yugoslav consti-
tutional order together with the partisan myth. While in the earlier two 
constitutions (1946, 1953) the link was only implicit, it has been made 
explicit in the later documents (1963, 1974) through the enumeration of 
certain "basic principles." Incorporating the ideals of the wartime struggles 
and some of Yugoslavia's own ideological innovations, the 1963 Constitu-
tion states: "The peoples of Yugoslavia, on the basis of the right of every 
people to self-determination, including the right to secession, on the basis 
of their common struggle and their will freely declared in the People's 
Liberation War and Socialist Revolution, and in accord with their historical 
aspirations . . . have united in a federal republic of free and equal peoples 
and nationalities."57 The Constitution of 1974 re-states this principle in the 
following way: 
The nations of Yugoslavia, proceeding from the right of every nation 
to self-determination, including the right to secession, on the basis of 
their will freely expressed in the common struggle of all nations and 
nationalities in the National Liberation War and Socialist Revolution, 
and in conformity with their historic aspiration, aware that further 
consolidation of their brotherhood and unity is in the common interest, 
have, together with the nationalities with which they live, united in a 
federal republic of free and equal nations and nationalities and founded 
a socialist federal community of working people—the Socialist Federal 
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Republic of Yugoslavia. 
These declarations go far beyond most East European constitutions and, 
in fact, beyond anything that the Yugoslavs themselves consider feasible 
or desirable. For this reason, both the right to secession and the right 
to self-determination are not mentioned in the body of the constitutions.59 
Still, their inspirational use in the introductions indicates confidence in the 
durability of Yugoslavia's unity. A similar confidence is nowhere evident 
in Rumania or Czechoslovakia, where "indivisibility" is tirelessly stressed. 
More than fourteen years have passed since the adoption of the 1974 
Constitution. Over-all, it has reinforced rather than changed existing poli-
cies. However, in some instances this basic law is more precise. The 
two quotations above illustrate the change. While the earlier introduction 
refers rather loosely to peoples and nationalities, the 1974 Constitution 
distinguishes between "nations" and "nationalities." The distinction is im-
portant because—while both nations and nationalities are to be guaranteed 
"equality" and "freedom" within a "socialist federal community of work-
ing people"—only "nations" have the theoretical right to self-determination 
and secession.60 Throughout the Constitution of 1974, reference to "na-
tions" means the South Slavs (Serbs, Croats, Slovenes), while reference to 
"nationalities" means the non-South Slavs (Albanians, Hungarians, Ruma-
nians, etc.). In other words, Yugoslavia's Staatsvolk or Staatsvolker are the 
South Slavic "nations," whereas the "nationalities" are national minorities 
who are co-nationals with the Staatsvolker of the neighbouring states.61 In 
constitutional practice, the distinction has always existed. However, since 
about 1966 the "official" position has stressed symbolic equality rather than 
the majority-minority relationship. 
This symbolic equality, however, has never provided the Hungarians 
with a proportional share of decision-making roles either in the military, 
central administration, or the local and provincial levels of decision making. 
Party membership of the Hungarians in the Vojvodina has grown from 7.4 
percent of the total in 1953 to 9.3 percent in 1968, to 10.4 percent 1976, 
to 11.0 percent in 1982.62 This growth of membership indicates greater 
involvement, but it is still not in proportion to the Hungarian share of the 
population, which is close to 20 percent in the Vojvodina. It is ironic 
that the overall population of the Hungarians has been declining since the 
1961 census while their Party membership has more than doubled in that 
time period. At any rate, this development seems to have had little effect 
on the ability of Hungarians to cope with the socio-economic forces that 
seem to undermine their ability to maintain their culture in the Yugoslav 
environment. 
Their ability to persist culturally has been more closely related to the need 
for over-all ethnic/nationality harmony in the country. The ideological and 
constitutional definition of nationality rights reflects this. Yet even these are 
at times amended by political events on both the international and domestic 
front. The Tito-Stalin split of 1948, the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, the 
purge of Rankovic in 1966, the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia 
in 1968, the Croatian unrest of 1970-71, as well as the Albanian stirrings 
of 1968, 1981-82, 1986-87, have perhaps been the most important such 
events. 
The first of these events, the confrontation between Tito's Yugoslavia 
and Stalin's Cominform, had negative repercussions in the short-run and 
positive consequences in the long-run on Yugoslav inter-ethnic relations. In 
the long-run the consequences were positive because they enabled Yugoslav 
domestic affairs to develop independently of Soviet foreign policy demands. 
Thus, while the rest of Eastern Europe continued to toe the Soviet policy 
line on nationality issues, the Yugoslavs went their own way and began 
to experiment with different policy options in this area. The first policy 
adopted, independent of the Soviet example, was a direct response to the 
pressures of the 1948 confrontation. 
After June 28, 1948, when the Yugoslav party was expelled from the 
Cominform, it became clear that the split in the "Socialist camp" was final. 
Stalin, of course, hoped that the expulsion would lead to Tito's demise 
and Yugoslavia's re-incorporation into the bloc. To make certain that Tito 
would not survive, Stalin unleashed a campaign of vilification against him 
personally and the Yugoslav revisionists in general. The campaign included 
a concerted propaganda drive by Yugoslavia's neighbours as well as eco-
nomic, military, and political quarantine. One aspect of this campaign was 
to discredit Yugoslav nationality policies and to foment unrest, particularly 
among the national minorities. Each one of the neighbouring bloc states 
was given the assignment to stir-up discontent among fellow nationals in 
Yugoslavia. All of these criticisms equated the Titoist policies with "chau-
vinist pan-Serb" aspirations.63 However, the campaign was limited to the 
border-zone national minorities and was not extended to the traditional 
rivalry between Croats and Serbs. As Robert R. King points out, the ob-
jective was not to destroy Yugoslavia, but to topple Tito and to bring the 
country back into the camp.64 
Some unrest was actually generated by this campaign, but it was not 
enough to coax any one of the minority nationalities into rioting or rebel-
lion. Individual cases of desertion from the armed forces and illegal border 
crossings were the extent to which the campaign activated the minorities.65 
Since these minority inhabited areas also coincided with the first lines of 
military defence, the concentration of Yugoslav military units in these ar-
eas acted as a deterrent to opposition to Tito. In this way, the unrest that 
was generated, actually failed in its objective. At the same time, it made 
Yugoslav policy-makers more aware of the vulnerability of their border 
areas. This sense of insecurity resulted in more centralized solutions to the 
nationality question in the 1950s. 
The Constitution of 1953 as well as the policy statements of many gov-
ernment and party officials reflected a commitment to "Yugoslavism" or 
"jugoslovenstvo,"66 By stressing a trans-ethnic national consciousness they 
hoped to defuse the local nationalisms of Serbs, Croats, Macedonians, and 
other South Slavs and replace it with a more generalized sense of loyalty 
to undergird the Yugoslav state. Although this focus on "Staatsvolk" role 
and self-consciousness of the Slavic peoples was not really concerned with 
the minority nationalities, it also had consequences for their existence. By 
de-emphasizing the role of the Republics, it tied the fate of non-Slavic 
minorities more closely to federal standards than might have been oth-
erwise. This was inadvertently to their benefit. Yet in terms of formal 
self-government this period circumscribed the autonomy of the Vojvodina 
and of Kosovo-Metohia. These provinces were constitutionally inferior to 
the republics and in fact were dependencies of the Serbian Republic. This 
status did not change significantly even after the general turmoil that swept 
Eastern Europe in 1956. 
Of all the Hungarian minorities in Eastern Europe, the Hungarians of the 
Vojvodina remained the most passive during the Revolution of 1956.6/ 
There are a number of possible explanations for this. First, the Hungarians 
in this area suffered greatly at the end of World War II for their "national" 
solidarity with Hungary during the war.68 In other words, they may have 
been more effectively intimidated than their fellow Hungarians in Transyl-
vania, Slovakia or Subcarpathian Ruthenia. Second, Yugoslav treatment 
of Hungarians was improving rather than deteriorating at the time of the 
Revolution.69 Thirdly, the Yugoslav government did not immediately go 
on record opposing the Hungarian Revolution. In its initial phases, Tito 
sympathized with Imre Nagy and the revolutionary developments in Hun-
gary. Tito turned against the revolution only when the hegemony of the 
communist party became directly threatened.70 Thus, in the Vojvodina, the 
Hungarian response to the events of 1956 was, on the whole, low key. 
Another reason why the revolution's impact was limited was the fact that 
the Yugoslav authorities effectively isolated the Hungarian refugees stream-
ing across their borders from the local Hungarian population. Aside from 
some contact at local border crossing points like Osijek (Eszek), where 
some "fraternization" was inevitable, most Hungarians were whisked to 
camps which were separated from the Hungarians of Yugoslavia by distance 
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or administrative obstacles. At any rate, of the roughly 20,000 Hungarians 
who escaped to the West via Yugoslavia, most did not have an opportu-
nity to discuss their experiences with the Hungarians of the Vojvodina, or 
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Croatia, or Slovenia. Their impact was probably much more significant 
on the Yugoslav nationalities, particularly Croatian university students who 
seemed to have become restive during the days of the Revolution. ' How-
ever, this never became a mass movement of dissent. For the most part, 
Yugoslavs observed events in Hungary with apprehension, and wanted to 
keep out of the conflict. 
Most of the reactions to Hungary's revolution occurred at the govern-
mental level in Yugoslavia. These reactions were closely linked to the 
broader questions of the international setting and the recent moves to nor-
malize Soviet-Yugoslav relations. The revolution in Hungary put Tito and 
his regime in an awkward position. Although he favoured the loosened 
hold of the Soviet Union over Hungary (as well as Poland), he also feared 
the emergence of a nationalist government in Budapest.74 When it became 
apparent that Imre Nagy was no longer in complete control and the rev-
olution had taken on an anti-communist character, Tito, too, called for 
intervention.75 In the final analysis he was more secure with a pro-Moscow 
government than a government which might have a nationalist orientation. 
After all, a government of the latter stripe might raise revisionist claims to 
the Vojvodina and other Hungarian inhabited areas of northern Yugoslavia. 
By November 4th, therefore, the Yugoslav reaction reflected a kind of Little 
Entente bias. Although it never reached the hate-mongering intensity of 
the Czechoslovak and Rumanian anti-Revolutionary campaign, in essence 
it arrived at the same conclusion: the revolution must be crushed in order 
to contain Hungarian nationalism. 
The events of 1956, however, led to strains in Soviet-Yugoslav rela-
tions. This was apparent in Tito's fear of Soviet use of the Red Army after 
quelling the Hungarian Revolution. After November 4th, he ordered the 
strengthening of Yugoslav military units along the Hungarian border. He 
also provided Imre Nagy and his entourage with temporary political asylum 
in the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest. Nagy's subsequent arrest outside 
the embassy by Soviet agents continued to complicate Soviet-Yugoslav 
relations. Furthermore Tito's Pula speech—while it justified the Soviet 
intervention—criticized the Hungarian and Soviet leadership's handling of 
the whole crisis. Thus, Yugoslavia's relation to the Hungarian Revolution— 
as ambivalent as it was—led in the short-run to a deterioration of relations 
between it and the Soviet Union as well as the new Kadar regime in Bu-
dapest. 
The Hungarians of the Vojvodina—unlike their fellow Hungarians in 
other neighbouring states—did not become a casualty of these events. In 
terms of immediate effect, the revolution led to tightened security and 
military preparedness in the Hungarian inhabited areas. These, however, 
were probably aimed to dissuade the Soviets from a strike into Yugoslavia. 
They were not responses to Hungarian unrest. In the long-run, the Hungar-
ians of the Vojvodina did not face an erosion of their rights as a minority 
nationality. If anything, from 1956 through the 1960s to 1970-71, their 
educational and cultural institutions seem to have been strengthened.'7 In 
fact one of the most significant statements on minority nationality rights 
was proclaimed just three years after the revolution. It was issued by the 
Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the League of Commu-
nists of Yugoslavia in 1959. The statement set forth the general principles 
of inter-nationality relations, stressing that minorities in a sense can have 
two allegiances, one—mainly cultural—to their ethnic nation, while the 
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other is to their country of residence. More recently there has been some 
erosion of these rights, but it does not seem to be a result of a systematic 
campaign of Serbianization. Furthermore, this erosion is unrelated to the 
Revolution of 1956. 
More important in altering the situation of Yugoslavia's minorities, was 
the shifting power-balance within the League of Communists of Yugoslavia 
in favour of the decentralizers. This shift was evident in policies adopted in 
the early 1960s and in the Constitutional revisions of 1963. This revision 
further extended decentralization by providing more "self-government" on 
the local level, while restricting the possibility for ethnic groups to act in 
concert against the interests of the federation. In effect, it was a unify-7Q 
ing instrument that did not, however, impose a unitary structure. Finally, 
the shift in power was evident to everyone when Alexander Rankovic was 
forced to resign in 1966. As the defender of centralism and "Yugoslavism" 
he had tried to keep the reformists at bay. With his eclipse from power the 
ethnic consciousness of the various parts of Yugoslavia could again mani-
fest themselves more openly, particularly among the South Slavic "nations" 
within their respective republics. On paper even the non-Slavic "national-
ities" had gained. However, their gains were to some extent undercut by 
the new vigour of republican level decision-making. It is not a coincidence 
that the unrest among the Albanians of Kosovo and Macedonia reached the 
boiling point just at the height of the process of decentralization in 1968. 
With the ouster of Rankovic, the decentralization process picked up 
momentum. At the symbolic level it provided the Provinces of Vojvo-
dina and Kosovo with virtual constitutional equality with the six republics. 
Yet the continuing process of decentralization did not accord more "self-
government" to either the Hungarians or the Albanians as distinct nation-
alities. In fact, the process of decentralization encouraged greater expec-
tations, only to frustrate them at the level of the Serbian Republic. These 
frustrations in turn led to strained relations not so much between the Hun-
garians and the Serbs, but between the Albanians and the Serbs. These 
strains surfaced in the Vojvodina in the late 1960s and at the height of 
the Croatian self-assertion movement of 1970-71. Two incidents are par-
ticularly revealing. One involved Laszlo Rehak, the foremost Hungarian 
communist scholar of the nationality question in the Vojvodina. The subject 
of the "Rehak Affair," was one of the most prominent representatives of 
the Hungarians in the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. Yet, when, as 
a representative in the Serbian Republic Assembly, he dared question the 
foot-dragging of the University of Novi Sad administration in setting up a 
Hungarian Studies Institute, the Serbian press immediately attacked him as 
a "nationalist" and whipped up enough opposition to block his election to 
the vice-presidential post of the Serbian Republic Executive Committee.80 
The other example occurred at a much less visible level, but also points 
out the limits of tolerance toward criticism of the treatment of nationalities. 
This second case involved a student at the University of Novi Sad who 
expressed his frustrations in an article in the periodical Uj Symposion. He 
contended that Hungarians were the "niggers" of Yugoslavia, since those 
who spoke Hungarian in public places (i.e., department stores) were treated 
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as second-rate members of society. For having published the article the 
student was stripped of all his organizational responsibilities (as Hungarian 
language programme co-ordinator of the Novi Sad Youth Council), was 
deprived of his scholarship, and was labeled a "nationalist" trouble-maker. 
Furthermore, the periodical itself had to make a public apology for allowing 
the article to be published.82 
In both these instances the treatment of minority representatives, at dif-
ferent levels of social and political life, defined the context and limits of 
minority rights within the Serbian Republic. However, for the Hungari-
ans of the Vojvodina this type of government-initiated harassment is the 
exception rather than the rule. For the average person the occasion for 
nationality discrimination occurs within a social rather than a political or 
economic context. For example a negative atmosphere prevails in public 
facilities like stores, taverns or restaurants which makes people hesitate or 
refuse to communicate in Hungarian. On one occasion, I witnessed a group 
of young people being harassed because they had been singing Hungarian 
songs in a tavern. To avoid being beaten up the group had to vacate the 
premises. On another occasion, I witnessed on a bus ride between Novi 
Sad and Subotica, a bully and his friends making crude passes at Hun-
garian girls, feeling secure that the prospects of nationality confrontation 
would make the Hungarian men escorts hesitate to put them in their place. 
Finally, at the lowest levels of administration, whether in a post office, 
travel agency, or a police station, the people who deal with the public are 
unwilling or unable to speak the minority language.83 A more aggressive 
campaign of bilingualism in street signs, postal forms, and the instruction 
of public servants could have beneficial results. Until such a programme 
is adopted, the social atmosphere will remain intimidating and stifling for 
the average person with a minority background. 
It is in response to these circumstances that the treatment of Hungarians 
received international press attention at the end of 1982. Gyula Illyes, the 
"grand old man" of Hungarian letters, gave an interview to the Frankfurter 
Rundschau on December 21, 1982. In this interview he asserted that even 
in Yugoslavia (and not just in Rumania and Czechoslovakia) the Hungarian 
population is threatened by assimilationist pressures. The contradiction be-
tween the officially prescribed position, and the actual status of Hungarians, 
is just unreconcilable. A flurry of orchestrated outrage followed. The "old 
man" of Yugoslavia's Hungarian writers, Imre Bori, was given the assign-
ment to reject the allegations. Bori's "rebuttal" appeared in Magyar Szo on 
February 20, 1983 and was also published in Borba. It was followed by 
an article in Vecernji List on February 25, 1983 protesting Illyes's intrusion 
into Yugoslavia's domestic concerns. None of Illyes's concerns (demo-
graphic stagnation, drop in bilingual instruction, etc.) were addressed, he 
was simply told to butt out.84 
To be fair, the central government in Belgrade tries to improve the social 
atmosphere that surrounds majority-minority relations. However, even the 
best intentions of the federal government encounters the stubborn discrimi-
natory legacy of the past. This legacy is composed of ingrained biases and 
established modes of reaction which had received official encouragement 
in the interwar years. To overcome this legacy requires persistent effort at 
reform not just on the federal level, but on the level of the Serbian Repub-
lic, the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina and the city, commune, and 
workers' councils levels that mold the day-to-day activities and existence 
of all the inhabitants of the Vojvodina. 
In the Slovenian Republic such commitment and effort has been demon-
strated in recent years. True, Slovenia has a much smaller minority popu-
lation to contend with. There are only 9,496 Hungarians in Slovenia out of 
a total population of 1,891,864 inhabitants in that republic.85 Nonetheless, 
this small Hungarian minority, as well as the Italian minority, is a constant 
concern of the Ljubljana administration. The Slovenian Republic provides 
them with bilingual educational institutions and various opportunities for 
preserving their cultural identity. One of the most important of these is the 
right to have institutionalized "national" representation in defence of their 
cultural and other interests. Furthermore, the government actively supports 
efforts to monitor the minority's capability to maintain its communal links 
in other republics and to its "mother" nation.86 
Although in comparison the efforts in the Vojvodina fall short of the 
Slovenian Republic, on the formal level the Magyars there still have in-
comparably greater cultural and educational opportunities than in the inter-
war years. Under Tito, and under his successors, the Yugoslav state has 
respected the right of the Magyars to maintain themselves as Magyars. It 
has provided them with educational institutions, cultural facilities and pub-
lishing opportunities which are doing a credible, although diminishing job 
in serving the Hungarian cultural interests of the Vojvodina.87 
Yugoslavia's self-image and the image it wants to project to the outside 
world tends to reinforce these commitments. It has been the scene of nu-
merous international conferences and symposia dealing with the problems 
and needs of minorities. Probably the most significant such conclaves have 
been the UN sponsored meetings at Ljubljana (1965), Ohrid (1974), and 
Novi Sad (1976), and the ECSC follow-up conference held in Belgrade 
in 1977.88 At gatherings such as these the Yugoslavs have frequently pre-
sented their nationality policies as a model to the rest of the world. For 
the Yugoslavs, being a role model for multi-ethnic societies is at least as 
important as being a champion of non-alignment. In their international 
relations, these aspects of purpose and self-definition are frequently pre-
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sented as complementary. The minorities, in fact, are viewed as a means 
of building bridges between different—usually neighbouring—members of 
the international community of states.90 
For the Hungarians of the Vojvodina this role of being a bridge to Yu-
goslavia's northern neighbour, is both acceptable and beneficial. The reason 
for this is that Hungary has reciprocated Yugoslav overtures in this potential 
problem area—excepting only the period of the Cominformist aberration— 
by providing its South Slavic minorities (Serbs, Croats, Slovenes) with 
extensive cultural opportunities and by also stressing their "bridging" role 
toward Yugoslavia.91 This mutuality has been expressed in various ways 
between the two states. Cultural exchange programmes of various sorts 
have been its most obvious manifestation. Dance groups, exhibits, films, 
books, periodicals and other cultural products have crossed the border in 
both directions on a regular basis. Sister cities in the two states have also 
provided exchange opportunities on a more localized level. Finally, the 
two states have assisted their respective minorities on the territory of their 
neighbour, by providing them with textbooks, curricular assistance, and 
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even educational opportunities at the teacher training or university levels. 
This reciprocity has been threatened only when relations between the 
USSR and Yugoslavia deteriorated. These low points were the above men-
tioned Cominform crisis of 1948, the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and 
its repercussions, as well as the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslo-
vakia. During the latter, Soviet and Hungarian military units were actually 
drawn up along Yugoslavia's borders. In response Yugoslavia mobilized its 
own military units in the Vojvodina, including Hungarians who had been 
conscripted into the Yugoslav armed forces. However, this confrontation 
was brief, and at least between Hungary and Yugoslavia, normalization fol-
lowed. It should also be pointed out that this crisis did not lead to defections 
among the respective Hungarian and South Slav minority populations of 
either Yugoslavia or Hungary.93 
Only the Albanian population registered its discontent at this time. Al-
banian unrest has also resurfaced more recently in the crisis of 1981-82 
and 1986-87.94 However, the unrest in the south has not led to similar 
disenchantment in the north. If anything, the Hungarians have been uti-
lized to demonstrate contentment vis-a-vis the unrest of the Albanians. In 
the final analysis, the relatively good relations between Hungary and Yu-
goslavia, and the constantly re-occurring strains in the relations between 
Albania and Yugoslavia, account in part for this difference. True, there are 
other important considerations that have to be taken into account, but these 
domestic factors could probably find solution within the context of real 
pluralism combined with a rational economic development programme. 
The Albanian stirrings warn us not to draw hasty conclusions about the 
Yugoslav "solution" to the nationality question. The discontent in Kosovo 
and the passivity in Vojvodina might also indicate that the "solutions" that 
were applied in the two instances were different. Or, if they were the 
same, that within different contexts these "solutions" may not always be 
solutions. Continued study and comparison of the Kosovo and Vojvodina 
experiences is in order. 
In the meantime, some tentative conclusions can be drawn from the present 
analysis about the fate and the future prospects of the Hungarians in the 
Vojvodina. On the positive side of the ledger, their treatment—aside from 
the immediate post-war years and during the Cominform conflict—has been 
much better than before the war and it is also tolerant and pluralistic in 
comparison to the fate of Hungarians in contemporary Rumania, Czechoslo-
vakia or the Carpatho-Ukrainian S.S.R. On the negative side, however, like 
the Hungarian minorities in the above cited states, they are subject to the 
whims of a changing constellation of power within a one-party autocratic 
political order. Within this context Lenin's "democratic centralism" can 
override the interests, needs, and rights of any subgroup or its institutions. 
Unless "democratic centralism" is wielded by leaders committed to ethno-
cultural pluralism (as was the case with Tito), this aspect of the Yugoslav 
political order remains a sword of Damocles over minority existence. This 
is apparent in the different treatment of Hungarians in the Slovenian Repub-
lic and in the Vojvodina. The developments in Kosovo should also caution 
us against assuming that conditions will continue to be characterized by 
cultural tolerance on the official level. In this sense, we should always 
remember that historical development is not a clearly defined highway into 
the future, and that everything may be subject to change. Yet, if change 
brings the sword of Damocles down on the Hungarians and other minori-
ties, it is not likely that the Yugoslav state will itself survive. Recent history 
in the Vojvodina and other parts of Yugoslavia supports the observation that 
the very existence of its unity—legitimacy of its present order—depends 
on the cultural pluralism that it can secure for all its inhabitants. 
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Anti-Magyar Propaganda in Rumania and the 
Hungarian Minority in Transylvania 
Louis J . Elteto 
That relations between Rumania and Hungary have never been good is a 
tragic fact that need not be elucidated to anyone even slightly familiar with 
the history of the two nations.' Yet after the consolidation of the communist 
system following World War II, both Rumania and Hungary took scrupulous 
care, in the name of socialist brotherhood, to censor anything that might 
be even slightly offensive to the other. This did not entirely apply to 
Rumanian history books, to be sure, in which the omissions of fact about 
Transylvania's past were as insulting from a Hungarian viewpoint as the 
additions of myth (doubly so in the case of compulsory textbooks issued 
for the use of Hungarian minority schools), but it was true enough of 
literature and of journalism in general. For three decades, nothing negative 
could appear in Hungary about Rumania, and nothing bad in Rumania 
about Hungary—at least not about contemporary Hungary. Criticising the 
past from a Marxist viewpoint was, of course, not only permitted, but 
mandatory, and if the exploiters of yesteryear happened to have been Ma-
gyars, what of it? The same class was, after all, also a target in books and 
journals across the border; but so were the "fascists" of the recent past, a 
term that in time came to mean chiefly the Hungarians. Since Rumania, 
which had also been fascist until the summer of 1944, had managed to 
finish the war an anti-fascist victor, while the Hungarians had persisted in 
waging war against the Soviet liberators (and their eager, fresh Rumanian 
allies) to the bitter end, the latter retained the distinction of having been the 
fascists who had been overcome, alone in fact in the entire socialist camp 
after the East Germans were transubstantiated into a new nation. Here, too, 
then, Rumanian writing was not very different from that which could be 
found in Hungary: only what was self-flagellation there, often became, in 
Rumania, anti-Hungarian bias duly concealed under political labels. 
The literary modus vivendi that had evolved between the two states be-
gan to deteriorate in the 1970s. The reasons are too complex to treat 
here, but they have much to do with the methodical development of a 
new, or renewed official Rumanian nationalism, in which the minorities of 
Rumania, particularly the Hungarian, came to be seen as a negative and po-
tentially dangerous element. The net effect of the new policies has been a 
heavy-handed, at times brutal cultural repression of Rumanian-Hungarians, 
a suppression that has continued to worsen. The campaign to cripple or 
to eliminate Hungarian schools, churches, theaters, publications, radio and 
television programming in Rumania, and the tragic fate of many Hungarian 
intellectuals living in the country has been well-documented in the West-
ern press during the last decade, as have various pronouncements made by 
members of the Rumanian government, notably Nicolae Ceausescu, declar-
ing Rumania to be a unified nation state in which minorities are at best a 
temporary irritation. 
Whatever the reasons for the resurgence of Rumanian nationalism, a 
parallel development in Hungary is certainly not among them. In fact, a 
major criticism of the Kadar regime among Hungarian intellectuals has been 
precisely that it has been too slow to react to these Rumanian initiatives. 
Although the new policies generated some internal resistance among the 
Hungarian minority in Rumania, overt response from Hungary remained 
negligible for a long time. Not only were the government and the Party 
silent on the issue: so were Hungarian writers, who were not allowed to 
speak out against what was happening to their fellow Hungarians next door. 
The only exception was the late Gyula Illyes, Hungary's most prominent 
poet, who dared—or was permitted to—raise his voice against the new 
Rumanian political course in several interviews and articles both in Hungary 
and abroad, but even his message was meek and late, years after the anti-
Hungarian campaign had begun. How gently even he had to tread may be 
seen from the tenor of the two-part article he published on the matter in 
Magyar Nemzet, a large circulation daily, in which he could not yet even 
name Rumania, though the reference was obvious enough to his readers: 
According to authentic data and verifiable complaints, minority groups 
numbering several hundred thousand, even a million, have no univer-
sities of their own. Nor are there any institutes of higher education 
in their mother tongue, and soon they will not even have their own 
secondary schools, as the existing ones are being standardized to give 
instruction in the [official] language of the state; as a result, the youth 
of the national minority cannot learn a trade in their mother tongue. 
Europe's largest national minority is Hungarian; approximately 16 to 
18 percent of a total of 20,000,000.2 
This much was possible; but when Illyes tried to summarize the broader 
question in book form, he failed. His volume, Szellem es eroszak [Spirit 
and Tyranny] had already been produced by Magveto Publishers in Bu-
dapest when permission to release it was withdrawn, and the stock was 
first warehoused, then shredded.3 
Illyes was promptly called a fascist in Bucharest, and other writers in 
Budapest came to his defense,4 but there the matter seemed to rest as far as 
the Hungarian general public was concerned—which paid scant attention 
to the entire affair at the time. Illyes continued to play the champion of the 
Hungarian minorities among Hungarian intellectuals at home and abroad 
until his death in 1983, and did as much as he could to make everyone 
aware of the problem. Yet his efforts did not lead to an open discussion of 
the issue in Hungary—the subject remained official taboo. 
In Rumania, literary works dealing with the topic of the Hungarian tenure 
of Northern Transylvania during World War II had started to appear in 
the early 70s; F. Pacurariu's novel, Labirintul [Labyrinth] (1974) deserves 
special mention among these productions, because it was awarded the grand 
prize of the Rumanian Writers' Union. But about this time, preparations 
were being made for the publication of Arhangelii Cruzimii, a volume that 
represents the opening shot in a literary propaganda campaign, the first in a 
series of inexpensive, popular works written with the intention of whipping 
up nationalist sentiment and anti-Hungarian feeling among the Rumanian 
populace.5 
That a connection exits between Illyes' articles and the launching of 
work on Arhanghelii is made very probable by the date of an alleged 
letter—March 10, 1978, a few weeks after the appearance of the second 
Magyar Nemzet installment—from one Radu Alexandru to the editors of 
the periodical Vatra, asking them to launch an investigation "to establish 
the truth" in the name of the 29 victims of a massacre committed by 
Hungarian field gendarmes on October 16, 1944 in the village of Moisei, 
Maramures, in which his father had been shot. What makes the letter less 
than credible is its style: Alexandru, who claims to be a simple factory 
worker, clothes his appeal in references to patriotism, a concern for national 
history, Cosbuc, Caragiale and Slavici, and of course Ceausescu. There are 
even two very appropriate quotations from "Excelenta sa." In any case, 
the resulting volume, from the pens of Dr. Gheorge I. Bodea and Vasile 
T. Suciu, appeared in Tirgu Mures in 1982, in the appropriately titled series 
"Documentele Continuitatii" (Documents of Continuity, a reference to the 
official view of Rumania's uninterrupted past since pre-Dacian times to the 
present). The delay of four years between the beginning of the project and 
the final publication could, of course, be explained by the requirements 
of careful research and investigative reporting, but could also have been 
caused by a hesitation on the part of the publisher, or of higher authorities, 
to permit the work's printing and distribution. Its release meant, after all, 
a radical departure in censorship policy, and there can be no doubt that the 
possible benefits and negative consequences of publication were debated at 
length. If so, the Rumanian hawks won out in the end. 
That this line of speculation is not at all far-fetched becomes appar-
ent from an interview that Ion Lancranjan, Rumania's ablest propagandist, 
granted Mariana Braescu, of Scinteia Tineretului.6 In it, he outlines the 
difficulties he experienced in having his works published. Certain writ-
ers, whom Lancranjan labels "business intellectuals," did not sympathize 
with him, and the atmosphere in the Cultural Council reminded him of an 
inquisition: the aesthetic value of his works was questioned, and he was 
accused of political irresponsibility. He attributes his "victory" to the fact 
that there were, nevertheless, a few sober voices in among his colleagues, 
and adds that the negative manifestations are a result of the "spirit of the 
past," against which he, and the Party, are struggling. 
Arhangelii Cruzimii is a propaganda work pure and simple, no matter 
what the truth is about the alleged massacre of Moisei. It is meant to be 
read with fist clenched. If Rumania had a free press, it would not be worth 
a comment; but in a country that exercises complete central control over 
the printed word, its appearance on the bookstands ultimately had to be 
approved by the highest authority. Therein lies its only significance. 
There seems to have been no reaction whatever in Hungary to Arhanghe-
lii. That is hardly surprising: the only possible rejoinder would be to 
publish a similar expose about a massacre in which the butchers were Ru-
manian and the victims Hungarian. If the Hungarians have not done this, 
it is not for want of material. 
But Lancranjan's Cuvintdespre Transilvania, which appeared at the same 
time as Arhangelii, was a horse of another colour.7 
In spite of the troubles Lancranjan had in publishing this and other works, 
he is an important and popular writer who has won many a distinction: 
among others, the State Prize for Literature and the prize of the Rumanian 
Writers' Union for his novel Cordovanii (1963). The style he adopted in 
Cuvint, while perhaps too romantic for the sophisticated reader, is just right 
for the masses at whom he aimed it. Marketed by the Publishing House for 
Sport and Tourism, the cheap (8 lei) paperback had a run of over 50,000 
copies8 and was sold out within a week; its black-market price immediately 
jumped to 100 lei.9 
Cuvint is a collection of essays written during the years 1967-82. Lest 
any miss its aim, it was given its imprimatur on March 15, 1982—Hungary's 
national holiday. It immediately received wide coverage and positive re-
views in the Rumanian press—in Luceafarul, the publication of the Ruma-
nian Writers' Union, in Flacara, the organ of the United Democratic and 
Socialist Front, and in Scinteia Tineretului, the organ of Communist youth, 
among others. The reviews, some of which were nothing less than odes to 
the work and its author, continued throughout the months of April and May. 
The book itself consists of four parts: "Rapsodie transilvana" [Transyl-
vanian Rhapsody], "Meleaguri natale" [Native regions], "Patriotismul—o 
necesitate vitala" [Patriotism—a vital necessity], and the essay that gave the 
collection its cover title, "Cuvint despre Transylvania." The first three parts 
(pp. 5-119) consist of geographic, historical and ethnic sketches of Tran-
sylvania, past and present, in which however there is no mention whatever 
of any of the area's several minorities—which, in Orwellian style, have 
become collective unpersons, unpeoples, despite the fact that Transylva-
nia's history was, for centuries, chiefly their history—of the Germans and 
Hungarians who built the country's cities and towns, and created its cul-
tural landscape. Lancranjan's main purpose in these essays is to whip up 
patriotic feeling and to underline the dogma of continuity, the 2000-year-
old xenophobic struggle against "the foreigner." His Rumania is a nation 
state, in which there can be no room for others: "For we are . . . a single 
people and single country," indeed, a people whose greatness exceeds the 
borders of the state, for "if you go toward the West [toward Hungary!] you 
will meet our people . . . if to the South, as well . . . and to the East, and 
to the West . . . And here, in Transylvania, too, for we were and we are 
the original people . . —and so forth, for 114 pages of preaching about 
the homeland, patriotism, the one and indivisible Rumanian nation, the one 
and indivisible Rumanian past and future. 
Had Lancranjan stopped here, there would in all likelihood have been no 
comment from Hungary. But in his main essay, "A Word about Transylva-
nia," he goes much further in attacking the "foreigner" directly, spouting 
not only patriotism this time, but also a paranoid fear of, and hatred for, 
Hungary and Hungarians that remind us of the worst propaganda of the 
interwar years. Hitler raved like this once, against the Jews. 
At first he repeats the dogma again: the Rumanian peasant was "in 
the beginning a Dacian, then a Roman, and later became a Rumanian in 
the course of natural continuity, upon which archaeological and linguistic 
research cast ever new light, without being able to clarify it completely. Not 
because there is anything mysterious or miraculous about this indubitable 
continuity, but because it is so real and natural . . . so obvious that it has 
no need of proof . . And the minorities had better accept this obvious 
truth that has no need of proof: "Taking into account that I am living 
and working in a new, socialist country, in which the national minorities 
have equal rights—the brotherhood we have sought and are seeking can be 
realized only if they [the minorities] accept certain vital and real historic 
facts of ours as self-evident, and not merely pro forma, out of politeness: 
our constancy and continuity, the permanent majority of Rumanians in 
Transylvania, and the irreversibility of our great Unification."12 
Transylvania has always been Rumanian soil, "where other nationalities 
immigrated or were brought in as colonists: the Hungarians, the Germans 
and the Szekelys." The colonization was, furthermore, a foreign plot: it 
was not "limited to Transylvania, but extended to the whole country; its 
aim was to disperse, to break a more than obvious unity."13 The basic 
character of the Rumanian people was molded in its long resistance to 
outside forces. And there are "those who still hope and want Transylvania 
to fall into foreign hands . . ." Some of the plotters are living among the 
Rumanians, others just across the borders. "We must not forget that, with 
regard to Transylvania, there have been and there are revisionist tendencies, 
that irredentism rears its head from time to time, either nearby or further 
away, from outside, preaching unity and brotherhood to our faces, while 
stabbing us in the back." And while the minorities have been repressed, 
as they properly should, they are nevertheless ingrates, for "unashamedly 
they exploit, overtly or covertly, all social and political repression, turning 
them into banners for their loathsome ends . . ."14 So much for internal and 
external appeals for basic human rights for the Transylvanian German and 
Hungarian minorities. 
Though Kadar's Hungary had been diffident and deferent toward Ceaus-
escu's Rumania, Lancranjan advances the preposterous claim that the "pre-
sent situation—in spite of all social and political differences—is reminiscent 
of the times after World War I and after 1930, when they kept pointing their 
fingers at Transylvania, without which Hungary could not be 'great ' . . ,"15 
And, without naming him, he twice misquotes Janos Kadar as having said, 
in Budapest in 1966, and in Helsinki in 1975, that "The Trianon treaty was 
an imperialist dictate, which dismembered Hungary and awarded Transyl-
vania to Rumania," and that "In our century, after the vain sacrifices of 
World War I, the territory of defeated Hungary was reduced by one-third."16 
In fact Kadar's first statement had been aimed largely at Hungary's former 
leaders: "The imperialist dictate of Trianon following World War I served 
as an excuse for the ruling classes to whip up extreme nationalist, chau-
17 
vinist sentiment, the hatred of neighbouring nations," while the second 
reads as follows: 
It is our conviction that the primary desire of all European nations is 
peace. If possible, this is even more true in the case of the Hungarian 
people, which has lived for centuries at a cross roads of armies, and 
has spilled immeasurable quantities of its blood in order to survive and 
to protect its state against the threat of destruction. In our century, 
after the vain sacrifices of World War I, Hungary, defeated, shrank to 
one-third of its former territory; in World War II, having bled on the 
wrong side as a consequence of its rulers' sins, it lost eight percent of 
its adult population, and the country became a pile of ruins.18 
Lancranjan's malice knows no end. He quotes a certain levente]q named 
Torday from a brosura, a pamphlet, of 1940, titled Without Mercy: "I won't 
wait for the war to come. I won't wait. I'll wipe out every Vlach [Ru-
manian] who crosses my path. I'll wipe out every one. There'll be no 
mercy! By night, I'll put Vlach villages to the torch; I'll put their inhabi-
tants to the sword; I'll poison their wells, and kill even their babies in their 
cribs."20 What Rumanian can read this and not see red? And Lancranjan 
implies that this represented an official view, a "part of an integral system 
of racist propaganda," which still typifies official and unofficial Hungarian 
sentiments. But while he admits that its author, Diicso was a hack writer, 
Lancranjan does not tell his readers that Torday is a fictitious character 
in a fourth-rate dime novel written at a time when Hungary was on the 
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brink of war with Rumania, and knows fully well that they, living in 
socialist Rumania, cannot even imagine that in Horthy's much maligned 
Hungary any fool could publish almost anything he pleased.22 Lancranjan 
attacks, over and over again, Hungarian historiography concerning Tran-
sylvania; he insults prominent Transylvanian Hungarian writers, such as 
Jozsef Meliusz, for their loyalty to their native land. He refutes the idea, 
advanced not only by Hungarians in the past, but also by Germans and 
even Rumanians, that Transylvania could have been the Switzerland of the 
East, in no uncertain terms: "Transylvania could never become an Eastern 
Switzerland, because from the most ancient times a single nation has lived, 
worked, loved and dreamed on both sides of the Carpathians . . . [where] in 
the natural course of things a definite civilization and a definite nation has 
come into being: the Daco-Roman, or Dacian, or Rumanian, as it finally 
came to be known . . ."24 It was, he suggests, the Rumanians who civilized 
the Hungarian barbarians who invaded the area, because the Rumanians 
were Christians long before the Hungarians. According to him, "the mi-
nority status of Transylvanian Hungarians did not begin in 1918 . . . but at 
the time of their coming to Transylvania, where the original population was 
already in the majority and living a developed, stable social and political 
life . . ." He refers to alleged anti-Rumanian articles in the contemporary 
Hungarian press (without naming names or giving titles), articles that have 
never existed.25 Through and through, Lancranjan twists facts, and heaps 
insult upon insult—so much so that the work would not be worthy of no-
tice, let alone a reply, were it not for the circumstances of its publication, 
its reception, and its conclusion, which has found an alarming echo at the 
highest level of the Rumanian government. 
As we have seen, there was opposition to Lancranjan among his col-
leagues, and perhaps even in certain lower-level political circles. That is, 
from the standpoint of the minorities, a hopeful sign, for it means that there 
are—there must be—decent people of good will in some of those positions; 
it cannot, after all, be imagined that those who opposed the publication were 
all members of the Hungarian minority, nor that they were really afraid of 
Hungarian reaction. The sad thing is that the book was published after all. 
that those who objected were overruled—and that it was followed by such 
positive critique in the Rumanian press. Artur Silvestri compares the work 
with "an 'icon' or a 'bible. '"2 f i Mihai Ungheanu praises it at length, and 
goes so far as to label it a rejection of Marxist interpretations of Transylva-
nia's history; his review is, if anything, even more blatantly anti-Hungarian 
and abrasive in tone than Lancranjan's work. He speaks of "aberrations," 
"theses of Hungarian revisionism tenaciously preached to this day," of 
"danger-signs," "backward, propagandistic views," of "a rekindling of a 
chauvinistic way of thinking." "Lancranjan proposes that we look upon 
Transylvania without idealism and prejudices," he writes. "There are the-
ses that must be rejected fully. Among these is the misleading proposition 
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that Rumania is a multinational state. . . .' In an interview, F. Pacu-
rariu, himself a prize winning writer and former Rumanian ambassador to 
Argentina, Uruguay, and Greece, has this to say about Cuvint: 
This book is a hymn of gratitude for Transylvania, which is our na-
tion's hearth and refuge; it is a lyric discovery of our country. It 
reflects sincere patriotism, an understanding of true Transylvanian re-
ality. This book is a rejection of all those erroneous and tendentious 
views and opinions which certain people have formed about the Tran-
sylvanian situation (past and present). 
Some of our friends and non-friends (Blaga would have called them 
devils and satans), knowing the passion I demonstrate for the past and 
present problems of which Lancranjan speaks, have told me, without 
having read the book, that 'they had heard that there are certain as-
saults [against some people] to be found in the book.' I have told 
them, and I wish to repeat it here, that this is a deeply thought-out 
work, a book written with a sense of responsibility. It should, there-
fore, not be judged from hearsay, one needs to meditate properly upon 
it, because, as all books, this one, too, could be perfected. Had I been 
asked, I would have suggested that the writer omit certain quotations, 
and find others, weightier ones, more moving ones, more tragic ones 
in the interest of fraternal understanding among the peoples living in 
this region. I say this fully conscious of my responsibility: this is an 
honest and just book, which is worth reading and discussing openly 
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and honestly . . . 
The essay's most alarming thesis is that the Hungarian minority in Ru-
mania is somehow responsible for many of the country's post-war ills. 
Taking a page from the writings of his spiritual ancestors, the leaders of 
the Iron Guard, who had viewed modern history in terms of a Jewish plot, 
Lancranjan blames, mutatis mutandis, the Hungarians for the painful up-
heavals of the transition to the socialist system. Hungarian chauvinists and 
non-chauvinists (they are all the same) infiltrated and headed the organs of 
the Rumanian Party and state, even the Securitate. The Rumanians' mistake 
is to have granted them too much freedom. Thus, they have "more printing 
(publications and book titles) in their mother tongue than we Rumanians 
have," he complains, though he admits that this is only "relative to the 
proportion of the Hungarian population of Rumania." And, he continues 
hysterically, the more concessions they are given, the more they demand. 
"What if one day they ask us, in the most democratic manner possible, to 
pick up our rivers and move from this land, what are we Rumanians going 
to do then? Will we grant this wish, too, or what are we going to do?"29 
It is as if Lancranjan were anticipating the words of his Leader, Nicolae 
Ceausescu: 
We committed a grave error in giving the minorities so much freedom. 
We have allowed them too much; that is why they have become such 
nationalists and chauvinists. The minorities endanger our country's 
independence, sovereignty, and territorial inviolability. We have to 
change this in the future. I have decided, and I am convinced that 
you, comrades, will agree with me, that in this regard we must take 
the most resolute steps against all hostile manifestations, that we must 
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resolutely beat back all their demands. 
There were, to my knowledge, only two responses to Cuvint in Hungary: 
by Gyorgy Szaraz, whom Lancranjan had personally attacked,31 and by 
Pal Koteles. Both essays are lengthy, calm refutations of Lancranjan's 
most outrageous claims, in which the quotations and summations serve not 
merely as points to refute, but also—and principally—to familiarize the 
Hungarian public, which had no access to the original, with the general 
content and tone of the work. Of the two reviews, that of Szaraz is the 
more detailed; it is polite enough to be almost conciliatory, though it does 
not lack firmness in its conclusion: 
Lancranjan demands unconditional understanding, unconditional re-
spect, and unconditional capitulation of me. I ought not know the 
names Bethlen and Bocskay, the two Bolyais, Misztotfalusi, or Korosi 
Csoma; I should not know Zagon, the churches with the wooden 
spires; I should deny that Varad was . . . the city of Ady; I should 
spell Dozsa: Doja, Erzsebet Szilagyi as Elisabeta Salajan, and refer 
to Csikszereda as Miercurea Ciuc even when speaking Hungarian . . . 
This would be the price of his friendship, of his toleration . . . [But] 
though I call it Maros, the river will still be his Mures, the Aranyos 
will remain Ariesul to him, and the Szamos Somes. But he is jealous 
perhaps for my even knowing the names—of villages, of mountains, 
and of people—he is proud of, and begrudges me the respect I bear 
for the feelings attached to the names, though he has no use for my 
respect. For all that I love the Miorita, the world of the doinas and 
the ballads, I love the quiet European spirit of his countryman, Lucian 
Blaga, and the Mezoseg means to me not only Zsigmond Kemeny and 
Andras Siito, but also Dan Pavel, who died so young—and this makes 
me no less, and no worse a Hungarian. 
I'm sorry he cannot understand that.32 
Koteles, in turn—perhaps for having experienced socialist brotherhood 
first hand in Rumania, which he had succeeded in leaving only recently—is 
less patient with Lancranjan, calling his work exactly what it is: a collection 
of propaganda essays. 
His fabrications and his labels are an insult to the Hungarian people, 
and with that [category], to the human dignity of the Hungarians who 
have shown that they are loyal citizens of Rumania . . . We cannot 
just dismiss the book. We cannot pretend that we know nothing of it, 
that we have not heard of it or seen it, that we therefore have nothing 
to say about the matter. We do! 
[Lancranjan] thinks some of us worry unduly about the fate of the 
Hungarians in Rumania. This book is the very proof that no such 
worry can be excessive or uncalled-for." 
Though Szaraz, an important member of the Writers' Union and a chief 
contributor to the influential periodical, Elet es Irodalom, was able to have 
his article published with impunity, Koteles was soon censored for his 
efforts—not for the Lancranjan review per se, to be sure, rather for pub-
lishing some of his essays, the Lancranjan piece among them, abroad, in 
the Western, emigre press. Upon his return from a lecture tour in the 
United States and Canada, he was officially silenced, and his contract with 
a regional journal terminated. He has yet to be published since, in spite 
of strong domestic and foreign protests in his behalf. For all its liberality, 
present-day Hungary still does not permit its writers freedom of speech 
and press in certain questions, and that of the Hungarian minorities has 
been near the top of the list of taboos for a long time.34 [Editors' note: 
the situation has changed in Hungary and some of Szaraz's writings have 
appeared in print after this study had been written.] 
But no matter how much official Hungary would like to have ignored 
Rumanian propaganda, it has not been able to do so. In 1986 alone, three 
more cheap, high-volume anti-Hungarian works left Rumania's presses: a 
collection of historical documents and two novels, Doru Munteanu's Black 
Friday, and Lancranjan's Torrid Autumn. 
As could be expected, Lancranjan's 239-page opus is the most vicious of 
the three. Its plot is a life-and-death struggle between Gyuri, a Hungarian 
peasant who had fled from the puszta to Transylvania and who is an atheist, 
a mass murderer and a war criminal, with Ion, a noble, naive, kindly, reli-
gious and melancholy Rumanian, whose ancestors, it goes without saying, 
have tilled that very land from time immemorial. Gyuri's crimes, which 
Lancranjan renders in naturalistic detail, consist of having repeatedly mur-
dered Rumanians of all kinds: teen-agers, priests, mothers and babies. He 
had choked them, disemboweled them, machine-gunned them. Although 
Gyuri had confessed his deeds after the war, he was not brought to justice, 
because those in charge at the time in Rumania were themselves Hungar-
ians. Now it is up to Ion to take vengeance personally on Gyuri and on 
his whore of a wife, who sleeps with Rumanians only to mock them later. 
(Her mother, too, had been a whore, the slut of Hungarian counts.) Gyuri 
had been trained for his role as mass murderer in Hungary in the 1930s. 
He could have emigrated to Australia, which is full of Hungarian war crim-
inals, but feels safer in a Rumanian village, because Rumania's laws are 
lax and its people kind and understanding. 
But the primitive framework is merely a vessel for Lancranjan's propa-
ganda. What he had outlined in Cuvint he now fleshes out in conversations 
between the principals and in internal monologues. Among his major ideas: 
it is not the Hungarian ruling classes alone who are guilty, as the Marxists 
teach, because all Hungarians are potential mass murderers; militarism and 
a thirst for blood is their nature. There is no way Hungarians can ever wash 
the blood of innocent Rumanians they have been butchering for centuries 
from their hands, therefore, there can be no equality between Hungarians 
and Rumanians, the butchers and the butchered. All Hungarians are per-
fidious scum, whether they are priests or Communist activists, all their 
preaching about equality is for the purpose of preventing the Rumanians 
from taking a just vengeance for the past, now that they could do so. Yet 
such revenge must be personal, for Rumania is still ruled by foreigners. 
Neither the Party nor the state can be trusted. The author has Gyuri recall 
the words of a Comrade Zoltan, an officer of the Rumanian Securitate: 
"We Hungarians can achieve what we could not reach after the First World 
War. We can use—we must use!—socialism and the rights they have given 
us to fight for Great and Eternal Hungary, to seize all power here in Tran-
sylvania, so that when the opportune moment comes we can unite with the 
Motherland, for we who live here and those over there are one body and 
one soul."35 
Though Ion decides to be Gyuri's personal prosecutor, judge, jury, and 
hangman while the two are alone in the mountains, he does not carry out 
his plan. Instead, after nearly two hundred pages of pregnant conversation, 
Lancranjan's deus ex machina intervenes: a storm arises, and Gyuri is 
struck by lightning. Ion, noble soul that he is after all, saves his life, 
whereupon another bolt of lightning strikes Ion dead. Gyuri recovers but 
* « • 37 loses his mind: he imagines he is Arpad, the king of the wdd boars. In the 
end, he is turned over to the police, because people suspect he has murdered 
Ion. In spite of this clever twist, one has the impression that Lancranjan is 
really suggesting that it is all right even for private Rumanians to murder 
Hungarians. 
Otherwise, the work seems to reflect the pseudo-religious, mystical-
fascistic spirit of the Iron Guard. Lancranjan believes that whatever is 
Rumanian is holy,38 and that his peasants are still a pristine race that fol-
lows the teachings of "ancient kings and popas."39 Organically one with 
the soil, the Rumanian peasant should stay on the land, learn the tradi-
tion from the village priest and the teacher, who alone may be trusted, 
and fight against the seductions of the city, of Hungarian clergy, agitators, 
intellectuals and whores. 
It is hard to believe that such a book could be written in the Europe of 
the 1980s, harder still that it could be issued. Since Ceausescu's Rumania 
is not a country in which any fool may publish whatever he pleases, one 
must conclude that this, and similar works, are indeed "part of an integral 
system of racist propaganda" sanctioned by the very highest levels of the 
Rumanian Communist Party. 
Hungary, for its part, has not reacted to the new provocations, but the 
release of a new, three-volume History of Transylvania^ by the Hungarian 
Academy of Science in November, 1986, may mark a move toward a 
tougher stance against the Ceausescu regime. Commissioned in 1976, it is 
anything but a reply to the propaganda works under discussion: rather, it is 
a serious scholarly effort not meant for the casual reader, who will hardly 
want to pay its hefty price of 950 forints. Nor is it an apology aimed at 
the West: Hungarian in language, it is not immediately accessible to most 
Western scholars. But its release created quite a stir in Hungary, where 
Transylvania could hardly be mentioned before; and with the prestige of 
the Academy, and of Minister of Education Bela Kopeczi as editor-in-chief 
behind it, it is perceived by many as a long-overdue response to Rumania, 
whether or not that was original aim of the undertaking. 
It is not my task to comment on History of Transylvania here, even 
briefly. The three volumes will stand or fall in the light of competent, 
objective, scholarly criticism. So far, there has been none of that from 
the Rumanian side, only vituperative invective. But then what hope can 
there be for a calm dialogue at present, when Rumania's leader himself is 
a true believer in the Daco-Rumanian national-socialist doctrine, which— 
though it needs no proof, as Lancranjan assures us—not only Hungarian 
scholarship, but all serious scholarship, must question? 
In a speech held before a joint meeting of the Council of Workers of 
Hungarian Nationality of Rumania and of its German equivalent, Nicolae 
Ceausescu commented on the new history book as follows: 
Can anyone change history? Can anyone alter the fact that 2500 years 
ago Herodotus called the Dacians living in this parts . . . 'the best 
and the bravest' of the Thracians? . . . Can anyone change the fact 
that Burebista created a unified state, that Decebal improved upon it, 
and that the Dacians fought the Romans for centuries. . . ? . . . Why 
deny the existence of another people, [even] though that people has 
lived here for over 2500 years, and did not retire before the migrating 
peoples, but fought back, defending its soil and existence? 
It is hard to comprehend the reviving of Horthyist, fascist, chau-
vinist, and among these also racist theses. How could one imagine 
that a scientific academy would allow the publication of writings and 
works that are insulting to other peoples? What kind of scholarship is 
this? Whom does such scholarship serve, if not the most reactionary, 
imperialist circles?41 
The Hungarians are quite mistaken if they think they can achieve peace, 
truth, and justice, or even a partial meeting of the minds through rational 
discussion with the current Rumanian leadership and with the writers and 
"scholars" that leadership has fostered: for what they are up against is an 
irrational, pseudo-religious fanaticism. As such, it is anachronistic, and 
because it is that, it will end soon. It will be ended by the Rumanian 
people themselves, its most numerous victims, led by those whose love 
of Rumania is mature enough to blossom without being nourished by the 
hatred of their neighbours. 
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REVIEW ARTICLE 
A History of Transylvania: 
Its Impact and Reception 
Thomas Szendrey 
Bela Kopeczi, ed. Erdely tortenete. 3 vols. Budapest: Magyar Tu-
domanyos Akademia, 1986. 
History should be written sine ira et studio, but that is never wholly possi-
ble; nor can it ever measure up to the Rankean ideal, but nonetheless should 
attempt to approach it. These volumes on the history of Transylvania cer-
tainly attempt this in spite of the great temptations and difficulties involved 
in writing about this part of the world and its competing nationalisms. 
However, there is another factor in the writing of history than the schol-
arly intentions of the historians, namely the political-cultural context in 
which one of necessity must live and work. Then there is also the network 
of world politics and the particular place in it occupied by both reader and 
writer, which in turn gives rise to interpretations and evaluations, indeed 
misinterpretations and re-evaluations based upon subjective interests. This 
is something no writer or historian can fully anticipate or control. The work 
has a life of its own and becomes a part of the consciousness of its readers, 
living on and influencing life in its myriad dimensions. This review is thus 
an expression of this consciousness in the life of one historian, hopefully 
a fair and meaningful one. 
A detailed and comprehensive three volume history of Transylvania has 
been published under the aegis of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and 
edited by the then minister of cultural affairs Bela Kopeczi, a literary and 
cultural historian of some renown. The work has generated more contro-
versy among historians, politicians, and the public in Hungary, Rumania, 
and indeed throughout the world, mostly on account of the bitter response 
it has elicited from Rumanian academic and political circles. This has been 
augmented and followed by the defence of the volumes by spokesmen for 
the Hungarian government as well as those for the Hungarian Academy 
of Sciences.1 Furthermore, scholars throughout the world, especially those 
concerned with the history of East Central Europe and also those dealing 
with minority issues, have also responded to the volumes and the con-
troversy surrounding them in both the media and scholarly publications.2 
One needs to add that if the interest extends beyond purely academic cir-
cles and is perceived in political terms, even the language of publication, 
i.e. Hungarian, mostly ceases as an issue of concern. After all, numerous 
significant and controversial books have been published in the Hungarian 
language without generating interest and controversy of this magnitude, 
extending from the pages of leading world newspapers to the halls of the 
U.S. Congress and beyond. 
Obviously, there must be a number of reasons for this vast interest in 
a rather lengthy (almost 2,000 pages) and detailed scholarly work dealing 
with a small and isolated geographical entity populated mostly by Hungar-
ians, Rumanians, and Germans; a part of Rumania since the peace treaties 
after World War I, it was for most of its history a part of the Hungarian 
kingdom and also for approximately 150 years an independent principality 
quite conscious of its Hungarian ties. The interest is certainly not evoked 
either by the style and detail of the three rather hefty volumes, represent-
ing difficult reading even for one well versed in the history of the people 
and nations involved. Perhaps the interest can be explained in part be-
cause nothing comparable has been written or published in Hungary for 
more than forty years; this, however, would only explain the interest in 
the volumes by Hungarians and Hungarian-reading specialists and scholars 
dealing with these topics. Nonetheless, any reawakening of interest in the 
history of Transylvania and its peoples in any context is welcome. 
The concern and interest of Rumanian historians and the reading public 
in Rumania should be and is self-evident. The volumes deal with topics 
which involve their ancestors in Transylvania, the development of the Ru-
manian nationality there, and their status in the region, among other issues.3 
Nonetheless, the volumes deal with these topics in a way which often chal-
lenges the assumptions of Rumanian national sentiment and especially Ru-
manian nationalist historiography. Indeed, the response to these volumes 
borders on politically induced hysteria, by no means a proper response to 
volumes from which chauvinistic mentality and tone, which had marred 
some other writings on this theme, are decidedly missing. One cannot but 
believe that the Rumanian response, especially by its political leaders and 
many of its historians and writers, is unwarranted and unjustifiable.4 
There must be more to the generally expressed Rumanian attitude to-
ward these volumes than a concern with scholarship and alternative in-
terpretations; the tone of the writings and polemics directed against the 
work certainly points in such a direction. In the judgment of this re-
viewer this something else is the politization of scholarship, especially 
history, to serve the goal of creating a unitary national state by the current 
regime at the expense of destroying the national past of the major eth-
nic minorities in Rumania today, namely the Hungarians and Germans of 
Transylvania. The changes in nationality policies the past twenty years cer-
tainly point in this direction. Consider the following; many local archives, 
especially in Transylvania have been gathered together and forcibly re-
moved to Bucharest and other locations; decrees have limited education 
in the languages of the minorities and publication opportunities have been 
greatly restricted. The list could be extended to include political and socio-
economic decisions which have impacted negatively on the quality of life 
in Rumania, but these have also affected all citizens of the state regardless 
of nationality and have led to some limited manifestations of dissatisfac-
tion with the regime and the unparalleled and unprecedented number of 
refugees (and not just ethnic Hungarians) seeking refuge in Hungary and 
elsewhere. 
All of these events have had an impact on the conscience of peoples 
throughout the world, especially in Western Europe, the United States, and 
Canada (which together with Hungary sponsored a resolution on human 
rights at the Vienna conference on cooperation and peace) and which has 
resulted in some unpleasant and damaging political publicity for the Ru-
manian regime. Quite simply, the fate of the largest national minority in 
East Central Europe—the Hungarians of Transylvania—is a matter of some 
concern and this is by no means totally unrelated to the history of Tran-
sylvania and its peoples. Thus, the publication of this three volume Erdely 
tortenete, by the publishing house of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 
has once again focused attention on an issue which for the past forty years 
has been kept alive mostly outside of Hungary. It is to this situation that 
we must now turn. 
With the imposition of Soviet hegemony over East Central Europe in 
the immediate post-World War II era, it was stressed that the imposition 
of a new internationalist ideology would remove or at least alleviate the 
national antagonisms of the region. Given the extent and depth of nation-
alist sentiment this did not and has not happened, but two consequences of 
the somewhat altered nationality situation in post-war East Central Europe 
must be noted nonetheless. First of all, the peoples of the region suffered 
a similar fate under native Stalinist regimes. Secondly, the Hungarian mi-
nority in Rumania obtained more autonomy, especially in educational and 
cultural matters, than during the Ceausescu years. It was undoubtedly the 
situation of the Hungarian minority, especially during the past few years, 
which led to the decision on the part of the Hungarian Academy of Sci-
ences (with the necessary consent of the government) to proceed with the 
publication of this work. 
In a preliminary review of this work, Nandor Dreisziger noted that the 
publication of these volumes was a "debt paid in Budapest,"5 after more 
than forty years of official silence about Transylvania. One might extend 
this observation by noting that the historical consciousness of the elder 
generation had not forgotten about Transylvania, but had no forum to ex-
press its concern. The younger generation, meanwhile, generally only knew 
about Hungarians living in Rumania and was mostly unaware of the his-
torical connection between Hungary and Transylvania. It was the joint 
activity (still mostly unrecognized) of Hungarians in the western world and 
the writings and activities of writers such as Gyula Illyes and Aron Tamasi 
on behalf of the Hungarian minorities which awakened the consciousness 
of many Hungarians and brought about a renewal of interest and concern 
with Hungarians beyond the borders of Hungary in the early 1970s.6 Hun-
garian writers and scholars in the Western World had not been affected by 
Budapest 's non-concern for Transylvania (and the Hungarian minorities in 
general) and had kept alive in their consciousness the historical connec-
tion of Hungary and Transylvania, even if not always with the necessary 
critical spirit. One could thus argue that the confluence of concern for 
Transylvania by Hungarians throughout the world was united by the ris-
ing intolerance of the Ceausescu regime toward its minorities generally 
and the Hungarian one specifically. The most recent manifestations of this 
concern were the huge demonstration in Budapest on June 27, 1988 and 
the ongoing activity of the Hungarian Human Rights Foundation and other 
such organizations in the United States and elsewhere.7 All of these and 
other activities are tied in with the renewed interest of Hungarians with 
Transylvania and the publication of these three volumes is also tied in with 
this, even if only indirectly, with the consequences of its publication, and 
certainly not with the intentions of its writers who consistently maintained 
a sense of scholarship and a moderate tone in their work. In spite of the 
extent and quality of the three volumes (and the large number of copies 
sold and distributed), for many people it still remains a mostly unread sym-
bol of care and concern resting on their bookshelves for others to see. It 
should be noted that the scholarly level and sometimes turgid style ill suits 
this work for a popular audience. For academics and scholars, however, it 
is and remains an essential and latest component of an on-going tradition 
of historical writing on Transylvania. Its impact could nonetheless be mul-
tiplied by publishing a one volume summary in both Hungarian and other 
languages so that its values and accomplishments may become known in 
wider circles. Nonetheless, it still remains our task to discuss it and its 
place in the long tradition of Hungarian historical writing on this topic. 
sfc c^ rfc jf: sf: 
Even a cursory examination of the development of Hungarian historiogra-
phy will confirm that the history of Transylvania has always been a signifi-
cant component of it. From the earliest chronicles, through the writings of 
the Renaissance and humanist scholars, the accounts of seventeenth century 
memoir writers, and extending into the era of modern and contemporary 
historical scholarship, Hungarian and Transylvanian history have generally 
been treated as parts of an integral entity, even when some parts were inde-
pendent or under foreign rule at different times in a more or less common 
past. One should also add that this common history included the past of 
the non-Magyar peoples who also live in Transylvania. 
These historical writings before the eighteenth century generally dealt 
more with the monarchy and aristocratic and military elements of the soci-
ety and did so generally without sharply distinguishing ethnic or national 
background; that was not their primary consideration. With the eighteenth 
century—and accelerating in significance—there commenced a great inter-
est in the past which resulted in the formulation of national histories for the 
various peoples of Europe generally, but especially for those who lacked a 
distinct historical tradition of their own. It was thus during the late seven-
teenth and mostly during the eighteenth century that there developed distinct 
historiographical traditions in Transylvania among Hungarians (in addition 
to the already developed currents of Hungarian historiography), Rumanians 
(in conjunction mostly with the Moldavians and Wallachians), and Saxons 
(also distinct from other German historical developments). Needless to 
say, these emerging traditions could best be described as incipiently self-
conscious, leading eventually to a fully developed romantically inspired 
nationalism. 
Some examples of this development can be pointed out here, but it is 
not possible to provide a comprehensive account of these historiographical 
traditions. Nor do the volumes discussed in this review provide more than 
an episodic and scattered historiographical account—one of their most ob-
vious shortcomings. A distinctive historiographical tradition emerges from 
the writings of Gabor Bethlen, prince regnant of Transylvania in the early 
seventeenth century, including especially the writings of Bethlen himself, 
that of his court historian Gaspar Bojthi Veres and also Janos Kemeny 
among others.g This tradition was continued apace during the balance of 
the century and even beyond. A few examples may be noted: Peter Apor, 
Metamorphosis Transylvaniae (1736) ; Peter Bod, Magyar Athenas ( 1766) ; 
also the historical writings of Mihaly Cserei, Pal Debreczeni Ember, Jozsef 
Benko, and Janos Kenosi-Tozser. Among the Saxons one must take note of 
Marton Schmeizel who taught a generation of Saxon historians in Transyl-
vania. Hence in the centuries during which modern historical scholarship 
developed, the Hungarian and Saxon scholars of Transylvania produced 
valuable work. 
Rumanian scholarship in Transylvania also began to develop in the early 
and mid-eighteenth centuries and found support among the Rumanian aris-
tocracy and clergy. Especially significant was the political and scholarly 
work of Inochentie Micu-Klein and his activities were significant for the 
subsequent development of Rumanian historical consciousness,10 specifi-
cally the first formulation by him of the theory of Daco-Roman-Rumanian 
continuity in 1735. There were hardly any other significant formulations 
before this time. 
The ongoing interest in and concern with the past of the various peoples 
who populated Transylvania through the centuries received an obvious im-
petus from the gradual extension of nationalism to more and more elements 
of the population. Historical writings increased in number and became the 
foundation of those historically based ideologies which became and con-
tinue to be significant for shaping and influencing the historiographical 
tradition and historical-political consciousness of these peoples. The strict 
devotion to scholarly canons characteristic of many (by no means all) eigh-
teenth century works gradually gave way to historical writings and attitudes 
characterized by a sense of romantic nationalism; this may have been help-
ful for the development of literary and cultural life in a national context. 
It was certainly not favourable for the maintenance of the commitment to 
finding out what happened, so essential to the continued writing of sound 
history. Indeed, the historical works of the first half of the nineteenth cen-
tury (with very few exceptions) were characterized more by a love of nation 
than dedication to historical truth. A romanticized version of the history 
of the peoples of East Central Europe became—and continues to persist 
in some form—as a component part of the respective historical mythology 
of these peoples. This has not been salutary for either scholarship or the 
promotion of understanding among these peoples. The political history 
of Transylvania is certainly a telling and instructive commentary on this 
situation.11 
Late nineteenth century historical writing (and this historiographical tra-
dition continued certainly until 1914) found itself ensnared in a political-
cultural conflict. As it moved away from many of the illusions of romantic 
historiography toward a more positivist and scientific historiography, the 
historical consciousness of their readers (the educated public generally) 
was still informed—indeed captivated—by prior vision. Thus scholarship, 
while moving away from that vision found itself out of touch with a nation-
alist inspired political system. The activities of scholars and writers such as 
Sandor Szilagyi, Henrik Marczali, and Imre Miko among others, thus did 
not always mesh with popular ideals and aspirations about past, present, 
and future. Rumanian historical scholarship also became substantially more 
nationalistic (cf. Xenopol, Iorga, etc.) for the reason that historical stud-
ies and consciousness emanating therefrom served Rumanian nationalist 
aspirations. 
This politization of historical scholarship led to mutual recriminations 
and fostered attitudes of hostility and misunderstanding. All of this was 
then caught up in the throes of World War I and its all too well-known 
consequences, specifically the division of Austria-Hungary by the peace 
treaties of St. Germain and Trianon.12 Nor did this fail to have an impact on 
scholarly life generally and historical writing specifically. While some at-
tempts were made to maintain the necessary dedication to the principles and 
moral demands of historical scholarship, the shock of Trianon—probably 
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the greatest tragedy in the history of the Hungarian nation " —was sim-
ply too much and the revisionism born of the dismemberment of Hungary 
acted as an impetus to politicians and very many scholars and historians 
to point out the injustices of the changed situation for Hungarians in this 
region of Europe. Thus, a new revisionist historiography was born and 
while in the hands of competent historians (such as Gyula Szekfii, Balint 
Homan, Sandor Domanovszky, and Imre Lukinich among others) it re-
tained a sense of qualified professionalism, qualified, however, only in the 
context of revisionist attitudes; the other characteristics remained on the 
same high scholarly level as previously. 
Revisionism became the central concern of the political and cultural life 
of inter-war Hungary and resulted in some very obvious dislocations in the 
historical consciousness of very many Hungarians; often it led to highly 
unrealistic political and cultural attitudes and fostered the acceptance of 
catastrophic and radical historical and political visions.14 For example, at 
the time of the second Vienna Award (1940), when a part of Transyl-
vania was restored to Hungary, a commemorative album entitled Erdely 
(Transylvania) was published with the participation of many of Hungary's 
most esteemed scholars and politicians and this undoubtedly reflected rather 
evidently the revisionist program and its attitudes.15 However, even this 
volume still exhibited a substantially more moderate tone and was charac-
terized by more respect for the standards of language and scholarship than 
the most recent (since the mid-sixties) Rumanian government sponsored 
historical or other writings on Hungary.16 Needless to say, not all writings 
produced by Rumanian and Hungarian writers and scholars about each 
other are characterized by such invective. It is precisely these three vol-
umes which provide numerous examples of understanding and cooperation 
among the various peoples inhabiting Transylvania. 
Movement away from excessively revisionistic attitudes on the part of 
Hungarian scholars and historians can be noted by the early 1940s; one 
must mention the establishment and work of the Teleki Institute; also, 
Gyula Szekfii's book Etat et Nation (1942) represents a movement away 
from revisionism as did the writings of Laszlo Galdi and Laszlo Makkai; 
the latter wrote a number of books including Erdely tortenete (1946) and 
edited the second volume of the work under review. 
The changed attitude was in no small measure the result of World War 
II; revisionism—or at the very least its most outspoken version—was tem-
pered by the crucible of war and defeat, the consequence of which was 
the reconfirmation of the Trianon frontiers at the Paris peace conference of 
1947. The imposition of Soviet hegemony over East Central Europe after 
the war engulfed both Rumania and Hungary and this common condition 
caused more concern for the Hungarians and Rumanians respectively than 
the nationality disputes; immediate post-war relations between the various 
peoples were better, though by no means free of conflict and controversy. 
Hungarian historians in post-war Transylvania carried out some historical 
work characterized by sound scholarship and a somewhat more concilia-
tory spirit—especially the work of Lajos Kelemen and his students—but 
this nonetheless remained the work of a tolerated minority; the same is true 
with regard to the work of Tmre Miko. 
The Rumanian historical attitudes were mostly maintained, but were 
marked by an ever increasing Marxist character. This also was true of 
the scholarly work of the national minorities. Although hampered by the 
restrictions of this ideology, the internationalist attitudes of the Soviet im-
posed regimes somewhat attenuated nationality conflicts, at least until the 
late 1950s. Since that time the increasingly intolerant nationality policy 
of the Bucharest regime has weighed ever more heavily on the nationali-
ties, especially the large Hungarian minority. Indeed, there has been and 
continues to be a strongly chauvinistic tone to Rumanian political and cul-
tural policies. This was also evident in the planning and execution of the 
International Congress of Historical Sciences held in Bucharest in 1980. 
On account of the close connection between some elements of Hungarian 
revisionism and Nazi Germany—most manifest in the German role in the 
two Vienna awards—the post-war regimes were not particularly receptive to 
the revisionism of the pre-war years, but were nonetheless somewhat con-
cerned with the fate and future of the Hungarian minorities. This changed 
abruptly with the imposition of the Soviet-backed communist government 
in 1948 and revisionism—and even nationalism—became in effect taboo 
subjects. Hungarian nationalism and concern with Hungarian populations 
in the so-called former succession states were neglected and proscribed. 
The struggle against nationalism and its manifold manifestations occupied 
the time of many historians and ideologues. Although there remained some 
minimal evidence of concern with the minorities, the issue continued to be 
neglected and even actively discouraged until the early 1970s, at which 
time a few studies on Hungarian minorities once again appeared and some 
public attention was once again focused on these issues.1 ' With the excep-
tion of a few relatively minor and highly specialized historical writings on 
the minorities, the three volume Erdely tortenete published in 1986 was the 
first comprehensive history of Transylvania published in Hungary since the 
volume also entitled Erdely tortenete—by Laszlo Makkai some forty years 
earlier. His scholarly activity thus provides the only continuity of writing 
on Transylvania in Hungary today. 
The Rumanians had not destroyed so completely the historical conscious-
ness of their people regarding their claims to Transylvania and the myth of 
Daco-Roman continuity and had made these claims known to the world, 
especially since 1963. This situation, coupled with the seemingly more in-
dependent line of Rumanian foreign policy, has created much good will for 
Rumania and has also contributed indirectly to a wider acceptance of her 
"historically-based" claim to Transylvania. The ever increasing repression 
of the national minorities by the Rumanian government during the past two 
decades, however, has recently elicited extensive opposition from human 
rights groups, including among others Amnesty International, and increas-
ingly from other nations and even regional organizations. The force of this 
pressure was then compounded by the publication of these volumes and 
its sponsorship by the highly regarded Hungarian Academy of Sciences. 
This has resulted in more pressure upon the cultural life of the Hungarians 
in Rumania and led to a worsening of Hungarian-Rumanian relations. By 
declaring those issues which are fundamentally supportive of Rumanian 
chauvinism historical mythology, the work angered and provoked the Ru-
manian government; thus this history of Transylvania not only became a 
scholarly concern but entered the political arena. Rumanian government 
reaction to these volumes has been virulent in the extreme and the academic 
and cultural media have taken their cue from the government response. 
In this connection it may be useful to examine the motivation of Hungarian 
historians for producing this work; it should be evident from the amount 
of work and effort that went into it that it has been in the planning and 
writing phases for a number of years and thus could not have been moti-
vated by strict political considerations alone. In another sense, however, it 
represented an ongoing concern which had been kept under political wraps 
for quite some time; the history of Transylvania, after all, has always been 
a part of or intimately related to the history of the Hungarian people for a 
thousand years and has always been studied or written about by Hungarian 
historians as they dealt with the history of Hungary. The publication of a 
separate or specific history of Transylvania, however, has been subjected 
to political restraints for many years since 1946. Hence, the publication of 
these three volumes now is not totally unrelated to either the political vi-
cissitudes of the last forty years in Hungary specifically and the Soviet bloc 
contextually; nor is it unrelated to the much longer tradition of Hungarian 
historical writing about Transylvania. 
The reasons motivating the publication of these volumes were stated and 
specified in a lecture given by Zsigmond P. Pach (academician and direc-
tor, Institute of History, Hungarian Academy of Sciences) entitled "Why 
do we write the History of Transylvania," presented to a professional con-
ference devoted to this topic and published in the literary-cultural weekly 
Elet es Irodalom (Life and Literature).18 Pach makes three key points in 
his lecture. First of all, he rejects any association with prior Hungarian 
nationalism and revisionism, stating in the process that they as Marxists 
are opposed to all kinds of nationalism and also reject nationalist Hungar-
ian historical writings. Secondly, Pach rejects with equal vehemence the 
older, newer, and most recent formulations of Rumanian nationalist histo-
riography as well, specifically the theory of Daco-Roman continuity and 
the related "historical rights" of the Rumanians to Transylvania. This brief 
critique is then concluded with a third point, namely the unwillingness of 
Hungarian historians to engage in a nationalist dispute, stressing instead 
that the history of Transylvania forms an integral part of both Hungarian 
and Rumanian history and that historical scholarship should not be used to 
deny the existence or rights of the other.19 
This statement, while undoubtedly academic in tone, and not dealing 
specifically with the political dimension of the conflict over Transylvania 
and the human and national rights of the minority populations, nonethe-
less stands out in bold relief from the bulk of the Rumanian statements 
and reviews of these three volumes. The reaction of the Rumanian party 
and political leadership, as first formulated by Ceausescu and repeated by 
numerous others on many levels and at different forums, accused the Hun-
garian government of fascist tendencies, Horthyite revisionism, and the 
utter falsification of history, among other similar charges and characteriza-
tions. Many of the statements were then repeated in not only the popular, 
but also the professional and academic media and official government pub-
lications in foreign languages. The vehemence and tone of these responses 
and reviews have even been noted by western scholars who have reviewed 
these volumes in literary and professional reviews. Herewith are but two 
examples. Norman Stone, writing in the Times (London) Literary Sup-
plement, concludes as follows: "Meanwhile, the sheer hardship of life, 
in terms of hunger and cold and darkness, is the one thing that has re-
mained genuinely internationalist in present-day Rumania. That darkness, 
to judge from the over-reaction of the Rumanian Academy of Sciences to 
a scholarly work of high standard, goes far."20 Another reviewer, Martyn 
R a d y , writ ing in the Slavonic and East European Review, wr i tes the fol-
lowing: "Nevertheless, despite the evident scholarship of its contents and 
the impressive—and hitherto unsullied—reputation of its individual con-
tributors, Erdcly tortenete has been roundly condemned in Rumania as a 
mischievous work which deliberately falsifies the historical record."21 It 
should be noted that this review attempts sympathetically to understand 
the Rumanian version of Transylvanian history and the Rumanian point of 
22 
view. 
Professional reviews of this work inevitably praise its scholarly tone, 
comprehensiveness, organization, and the conscious effort to incorporate 
the history of the Saxons and Rumanians. While written from a Hungarian 
perspective, its discussion of the Rumanian role in the history of Transyl-
vania is quite detailed and balanced; there is no denial of their role and 
place in Transylvania and the chauvinism expressed by some Hungarian 
statesmen and writers in the latter nineteenth century is as roundly con-
demned as the formulations of Rumanian historical mythology. There is 
some disagreement on the interpretation of the role of the Rumanians in the 
1848 revolutions, but then Hungarian historians are not agreed on similar 
issues concerning 1848 in other parts of Hungary either. There is a very 
detailed discussion and analysis of the early settlements which conclude, 
on the basis of archaeological and historical analysis, that the theory of 
Daco-Roman continuity is not tenable; it should be stressed that some Ru-
manian archaeologists also dispute that point on the basis of archaeological 
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and historical evidence." 
It may be instructive to point out that the periodization and some of the 
discussion is based upon self-confessed Marxist categories, but this is gen-
erally subdued and thus only marginally evident. Furthermore, the books 
are supplemented by comprehensive bibliographies; further documentation 
can be found in the notes which are not as extensive as one is used to 
in historical monographs. However, this is not so much a monographic 
study than a synthesis and if viewed in that context the documentation 
can be judged as sufficient. There is one disturbing element and that is 
the excessive role assigned to the history of economic affairs and the vast 
amount of such detail; this is especially evident in the third volume cover-
ing the period since 1830. Intellectual and cultural affairs are not given as 
much prominence as one would have desired and the role of the churches 
is mostly limited to their political role. The rich spiritual and theological 
heritage is not given its proper estimate. These comments notwithstanding, 
the work achieves its major goal of presenting a synthesis of the history of 
Transylvania. 
Having previously noted the response of Rumania's political leadership 
to this work, a brief characterization of the reviews and statements of some 
Rumanian scholars may also prove instructive. Sadly, however, these state-
ments in their essentials follow the lead and tone of the political declara-
tions; indeed it was expected, even mandated that this be so. The work 
under discussion is generally characterized as a malevolent work which de-
liberately falsifies history in the service of Hungarian revisionism. An essay 
by Titus Popovici entitled "Deliberate Falsification of History: Method and 
Style" manages to gather more invective—punctuated by personal insults 
against one of the major authors, Laszlo Makkai—and distortion into fif-
teen pages than most writers. Just one example, and by no means the most 
offensive, is the following: "1 shall endeavor to describe the content of 
Erdely Tortenete, a still-born product of a gang-rape of history, showing 
no leniency to the 'intellectual' stature of the authors of this hybrid concoc-
tion which displays a distressing simplicity and lack of sophistication even 
in the use of nuances."24 One should add that the description of the content 
assumes the work to be a cheap pulp novel, a characterization varied and 
repeated any number of times. Obviously, this kind of writing is best left 
without comment. 
Another such critique, while somewhat more subdued in tone, discusses 
mostly the first volume, specifically the archaeological chapters written 
mostly by Andras Mocsy. Not satisfied with disagreeing with Mocsy's 
conclusions, which is after all a right any reviewer and critic possesses, 
they constantly characterize it as tendentious and non-scientific; however, 
the constant repetition of charges without substantial contrary evidence does 
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not qualify as a critical assessment. 
The attribution of ill will, obvious chauvinistic attitudes, the falsification 
of history—charges constantly repeated—is also typical of an article enti-
tled "A Conscious Forgery of History under the Aegis of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences."26 After a brief review of some contested points typ-
ical of most Rumanian critical observations on these themes, the authors, 
including Stefan Pascu, a leading Rumanian historian specializing in the 
history of Transylvania, assert "that the national question has been fully 
and finally settled,"27 thereby denying even the very existence of minority 
populations in Rumania. After this political assertion, the review goes on 
to castigate some of the writers personally and bemoans the lack of atten-
tion to twentieth century developments, specifically noting that the volume 
does not mention what the reviewers characterize as the great industrial 
accomplishments of socialist Rumania. 
While it is correct that the history of Transylvania published by the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences treats the history of Transylvania beyond 
1918 only very briefly in a postscript type of chapter, even that fact may be 
explained by other considerations. The historical sources and the necessary 
critical analysis has not as yet been completed and finalized, but more to 
the point; these events are still too close in time to allow the necessary 
perspective for a nuanced, sound, and balanced analysis. The events of 
World War II, the passions engendered by human rights issues, the current 
situation of the Hungarian minority there, are all factors which make it 
emotionally difficult to achieve the necessary scholarly striving for some 
semblance of objectivity. 
The history of twentieth century Transylvania still remains to be writ-
ten. In this connection, it should be stated that the publication of these 
volumes has already engendered a renewed interest in the past and present 
of Transylvania. This interest must be maintained and it is surely to be 
hoped that cooperation with historians from Rumania, and especially, the 
involvement of historians from Transylvania's minorities in the future will 
be possible once the tone changes and the minorities in that country can 
once again continue to develop their cultural identity. In spite of the hope 
here expressed, the prospects appear even dimmer if one examines the 
future of education and cultural life for the minorities there. The destruc-
tion of villages planned by the Ceausescu regime, which elicited a huge 
demonstration in Budapest, also pushes the possibility of intellectual and 
cultural cooperation further into the future. Even in this context, one of the 
marchers in the Budapest demonstration carried a sign which read: "We 
do not wish the return of Transylvania, but rather the restoration of a more 
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human life in Transylvania." This sentiment should be read in the light 
of the statements cited from the reviews published in the Rumanian media. 
One can only hope that an abridged English language edition will be 
made available so that the knowledge about Transylvania in the Western 
World will become more balanced and more extensive. 
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In our previous number, Vol. XV, No. 2 (Fall 1988), an error crept into 
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the inconvenience it caused to everyone concerned. 



